Donor strategy under the fungibility of foreign aid

We develop a political–economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion – the degree of aid fungibility – is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off.

Food aid and food production: A theoretical analysis

It has been claimed that food aid leads to permanent dependency as it depresses domestic food prices and thus farmers find it profitable to take land out of food production and into more lucrative activities. This paper develops two alternative scenarios under which the hypothesis about the damaging effect of food aid may not be true. Under the first scenario, it is argued that food production in developing countries is often low due to unfavourable trade policies and if food aid is tied to the removal of bias against the agricultural sector, food aid will not have any disincentive effect on food production. The second exercise argues that the revenue raised by the recipient government by selling aid could be used for R and D in agricultural production.

Foreign aid, domestic investment and welfare

This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two-period, two-country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer-induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, such redistribution gives rise to the possibility of temporary aid being both potentially and strictly Pareto improving.

Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation

We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.

Logic of aid in an intertemporal setting

The paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.

On the tying of aid to tariff reform

This paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient's tariff. By constructing a three-country model with tariffs, and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates, we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality: (i) a rule which leaves the donor's welfare unchanged, and (ii) a rule which leaves the recipient government's total revenue unchanged. It is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can, inter alia, be used to ensure Pareto improvement.

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

The politics of foreign aid: A median voter perspective

The paper presents a model where the median voter in the donor country determines the support of foreign aid. It is first established that an individual in the donor country is affected by the direct benefits (due to altruism) and costs (due to taxes) of giving aid, and by the indirect benefits or costs of a change in the terms of trade. Then it is shown that the latter effect works through changing both the donor country's average income and its distribution of income. Given the stylized facts of a capital-abundant donor country and relatively capital-poor median voter, it is shown how redistribution-of-income effects soften the impact of terms-of-trade changes on the political support for foreign aid.

Tied aid, unemployment and welfare

The effect of foreign aid on the welfare levels of both the recipient and the donor country has been a much analysed topic for research in both the theory of international trade and development economics. In the development economics literature, concerns have been raised since the 1960s on the possible adverse effect of foreign aid on domestic savings and growth.1 The trade theory literature in this respect is much older and dates back to the 1920s when Professors Keynes and Ohlin debated on the effect of foreign aid on international terms of trade.2 Ever since, the terms of trade effect has been the cornerstone in the analysis of the welfare effect of foreign aid in the trade theory literature.3 After some early confusion, it is now well established that in a Walrasian stable world economy with two countries, a necessary condition for foreign aid to have perverse effects is that there is some distortion in either of the two countries.4 It is also known that, under normality and substitutability of goods, untied aid cannot be strictly Pareto-improving in a tariff distorted world.5

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.

Lowering grain boundary resistance of BaZr0.8Y0.2O3−δ with LiNO3 sintering-aid improves proton conductivity for fuel cell operation

A novel sintering additive based on LiNO3 was used to overcome the drawbacks of poor sinterability and low grain boundary conductivity in BaZr0.8Y0.2O3-δ (BZY20) protonic conductors. The Li-additive totally evaporated during the sintering process at 1600°C for 6 h, which led to highly dense BZY20 pellets (96.5% of the theoretical value). The proton conductivity values of BZY20 with Li sintering-aid were significantly larger than the values reported for BZY sintered with other metal oxides, due to the fast proton transport in the "clean" grain boundaries and grain interior. The total conductivity of BZY20-Li in wet Ar was 4.45 × 10-3 S cm-1 at 600°C. Based on the improved sinterability, anode-supported fuel cells with 25 μm-thick BZY20-Li electrolyte membranes were fabricated by a co-firing technique. The peak power density obtained at 700°C for a BZY-Ni/BZY20-Li/La0.6Sr0.4Co0.2Fe 0.8O3-δ (LSCF)-BZY cell was 53 mW cm-2, which is significantly larger than the values reported for fuel cells using electrolytes made of BZY sintered with the addition of ZnO and CuO, confirming the advantage of using Li as a sintering aid.

How can a Bourdieusian perspective aid the analysis of MBA education?

There is a lack of integrative conceptual models that would help to better understand the underlying reasons for the alleged problems of MBA education. To address this challenge, we draw on the work of Pierre Bourdieu to examine MBA education as an activity with its own ‘economy of exchange’ and ‘rules of the game.’ We argue that application of Bourdieu’s theoretical ideas elucidates three key issues in debate around MBA education: the outcomes of MBA programs, the inculcation of potentially problematic values and practices through the programs, and the potential of self-regulation such as accreditation and ranking for impeding development of MBA education. First, Bourdieu’s notions of capital – intellectual, social and symbolic – shed light on the ‘economy of exchange’ in MBA education. Critics of MBA programs have pointed out that the value of MBA degrees lies not only in ‘learning.’ Bourdieu’s framework allows further analysis of this issue by distinguishing between intellectual (learning), social (social networks), and symbolic capital (credentials and prestige). Second, the concept of ‘habitus’ suggests how values and practices are inculcated through MBA education. This process is often a ‘voluntary’ one where problematic or ethically questionable ideas may be regarded as natural. Third, Bourdieu’s reflections on the ‘doxa’ and its reproduction and legitimation illuminate the role of accreditation and ranking in MBA education. An analysis of such self-regulation explains in part how the system may turn out impeding change.