Links between body mass index, total body fat, cholesterol, high-density lipoprotein, and insulin sensitivity in patients with obesity related to depression, anger, and anxiety

OBJECTIVE: Define links between psychosocial parameters and metabolic variables in obese females before and after a low-calorie diet. METHOD: Nine female obese patients (age 36.1 +/- 7.1 years, body mass index [BMI] > 30 kg/m2) were investigated before and after a 6-week low-calorie diet accompanied by behavior therapy. Blood lipids, insulin sensitivity (Bergman protocol), fat distribution (by dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry [DEXA]), as well as psychological parameters such as depression, anger, anxiety, symptom load, and well-being, were assessed before and after the dieting period. RESULTS: The females lost 9.6 +/- 2.8 kg (p < .0001) of body weight, their BMI was reduced by 3.5 +/- 0.3 kg/m2 (p < .0001), and insulin sensitivity increased from 3.0 +/- 1.8 to 4.3 +/- 1.5 mg/kg (p = .05). Their abdominal fat content decreased from 22.3 +/- 5.5 to 18.9 +/- 4.5 kg (p < .0001). In parallel, psychological parameters such as irritability (p < .05) and cognitive control (p < .0001) increased, whereas feelings of hunger (p < .05), externality (p < .05), interpersonal sensitivity (p < .01), paranoid ideation (p < .05), psychoticism (p < .01), and global severity index (p < .01) decreased. Prospectively, differences in body fat (percent) were correlated to nervousness (p < .05). Waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) differences were significantly correlated to sociability (p < .05) and inversely to emotional instability (p < .05), whereas emotional instability was inversely correlated to differences in insulin sensitivity (p < .01). DISCUSSION: Weight reduction may lead to better somatic risk factor control. Women with more nervousness and better sociability at the beginning of a diet period may lose more weight than others.

Health control beliefs in old age - relationship with subjective and objective health and health behavior

The main purpose of this paper is to explore health control beliefs (internality, powerful others, chance) in different age cohorts of elderly people and to examine the relationship between health control beliefs and objective and subjective health, and health behaviour. This contribution shows data from an interdisciplinary longitudinal ageing study: (a) a descriptive analysis of age- and time-correlated changes in health control beliefs of different cohorts of elderly people by taking into account gender as a differential aspect; (b) group comparisons between objectively and subjectively healthy or sick people and their health control beliefs and health relevant behaviour. Participants are 442 community elderly, 309 men, 133 women, aged 65± 94 years (mean age: 74.95 years). Our data demonstrate the dominance of chance control beliefs over internality and powerful others in all age cohorts. It can be concluded that internal control remains stable well into old age, whereas a signi® cant age-correlated increase of externality can be observed. Our results show the signi® cant relationship of subjective health self-evaluations with health control beliefs and health behaviour which is not the case for objective health parameters. Strong gender effects are found for internality and social externality: women have signi® cantly lower internality and powerful others scores than men.

Personality complexes in adolescence: Traits, interests, work values, and self-evaluations

Following the recent trend in psychology towards a more integrative view of personality, the study attempted to establish the connections and underlying complexes of fundamental personality dispositions within two cohorts of Swiss adolescents in eighth and eleventh grade (N = 492, ages 13 to 19): Big-Five basic traits, big six vocational interests, work values, and generalized self-efficacy and externality of control beliefs. Five factors were identified which accounted for 60% of variance among the relations of the variables: (1) enterprisingconventional interests, (2) favorable personality dispositions, (3) social-artistic personality characteristics, (4) investigative-realistic interests, and (5) work value endorsement. Crosssectional findings indicate that particularly agreeableness and conscientiousness become closer related to interests and work values with increasing grade-level.

Calibrating a CGE model with NTBs that Incorporates Standard Models of Modern Trade Theory

We propose a way to incorporate NTBs for the four workhorse models of the modern trade literature in computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). CGE models feature intermediate linkages and thus allow us to study global value chains (GVCs). We show that the Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition model, the Melitz firm heterogeneity model and the Eaton and Kortum model can be defined as an Armington model with generalized marginal costs, generalized trade costs and a demand externality. As already known in the literature in both the Ethier-Krugman model and the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are a function of the amount of factor input bundles. In the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are also a function of the price of the factor input bundles. Lower factor prices raise the number of firms that can enter the market profitably (extensive margin), reducing generalized marginal costs of a representative firm. For the same reason the Melitz model features a demand externality: in a larger market more firms can enter. We implement the different models in a CGE setting with multiple sectors, intermediate linkages, non-homothetic preferences and detailed data on trade costs. We find the largest welfare effects from trade cost reductions in the Melitz model. We also employ the Melitz model to mimic changes in Non tariff Barriers (NTBs) with a fixed cost-character by analysing the effect of changes in fixed trade costs. While we work here with a model calibrated to the GTAP database, the methods developed can also be applied to CGE models based on the WIOD database.

Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities

Free riders and holdouts are market failures that potentially impede the completion of otherwise beneficial transactions. The key difference is that the free rider problem is a demand side externality that requires taxation to compel payment for a public good, while the holdout problem is a supply side externality that requires eminent domain to force the sale of land for large scale projects. This paper highlights that distinction between these two problems and uses the resulting insights to clarify the meaning of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.

Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution

The standard economic model of bilateral precaution postulates an interdependency between the care taken by injurers and victims that operates through the effects of each on the expected accident loss. This paper considers situations in which each party's precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party's cost of taking precaution. Generalizing the economic model of tort law in this way allows for a more complete analysis of when standard tort rules can and cannot induce optimal precaution. When this additional externality is introduced into a model of unilateral harm (where all accident losses are borne by the victim), none of the standard tort liability rules induces socially optimal behavior by both parties. Moreover, under a contributory negligence rule, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies; this gives rise to the possibility of litigation in equilibrium. A 'tort-like' liability rule that induces socially optimal behavior by both parties is then characterized; this involves a payment by victims to non-negligent injurers whenever an accident occurs. The model is then extended to consider the case of bilateral harm (where both parties suffer accident losses). It is shown that, as long as both parties can sue to recover their accident losses, all negligence-based tort rules lead to socially optimal behavior by both parties.

Property Law

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. Property law is a fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamental to the operation of the economy because it defines and protects the bundle of rights that constitute property. Property law thereby creates incentives to protect and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which market exchange of assets can take place. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter will both examine the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It will also examine various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property and state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced?

A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities

Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura [1993] to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.

Human Capital Externalities and Private Returns to Education in Kenya

We use micro data to analyse the effect of human capital externality on earnings and private returns to education. The earnings equations are estimated using the OLS method for a sample of full-time workers. The results show that human capital has a positive effect on earnings, indicating that an increase in education benefits all workers. However, men benefit more from women's education than the women do from men's. The effects of human capital externality on private returns to schooling are shown to vary substantially between rural and urban areas and across levels of the education system.

Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.

Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube

This paper presents a micro-model of knowledge creation and transfer in a small group of people. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation a¤ects the heterogeneity of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. The model features myopic agents in a pure externality model of interaction. In the two person case, we show that the equilibrium process tends to result in the accumulation of too much knowledge in common compared to the most productive state. Unlike the two-person case, in the four person case we show that the equilibrium process of knowledge creation may converge to the most productive state. Equilibrium paths are found analytically, and they are a discontinuous function of initial heterogeneity.

Modelo para evaluar el capital social en programas de cooperación para el desarrollo

Los programas de desarrollo regional promovidos por los gobiernos nacionales y las agencias multilaterales, como el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), se orientan a las políticas públicas de suministro de bienes públicos, ya sean servicios públicos o infraestructuras, a las regiones subdesarrolladas. Las evidencias apuntan que el éxito de estos programas depende en parte de externalidades, las cuales se relacionan con los cambios del tejido asociativo y los valores de los participantes de la comunidad. Estas externalidades se definen como el capital social. Cómo las externalidades no son directamente evaluadas en el impacto económico y social de los proyectos, pero su existencia es aceptada por los planificadores que reconocen la importancia de desarrollar el tejido de relaciones en la comunidad. Sin embargo este capital social no es medido. El objeto de esta tesis es investigar y proponer procesos de medida y evaluación del capital social de un proyecto, y relacionarlos con las actividades del mismo en un territorio y proyecto dado como casos de estudio. El Programa de Desarrollo de la Zona de Mata (PROMATA) en el Estado de Pernambuco, Brasil, financiado por el Estado de Pernambuco en Brasil y el BID, finalizado en 2010, ha sido elegido como caso de estudio. Para la evaluación y medida del capital social se han estudiado dos periodos. Uno considerando solo los planes del proyecto, sin considerar su implantación, que se ha denominado evaluación A Priori, basada en un panel de expertos con visión de las externalidades generadas. Y otra con la participación de las partes de la comunidad después de su finalización, denomina evaluación A Posteriori, para lo cual se han entrevistado un número significativo de partes interesadas utilizando un cuestionario especialmente diseñado. Los resultados han sido procesados mediante análisis estadísticos avanzados. El proyecto PROMATA es considerado un caso de éxito en Brasil, en parte por su aproximación al desarrollo asociativo. Sin embargo las valoraciones del capital social muestran que algunas relaciones Estado-sociedad y sociedad-personas no han cambiado todo lo esperado, en oposición a las evaluaciones de satisfacción de los indicadores del proyecto. Es el efecto externo del capital social. ABSTRACT The regional development programs promoted by the national governments and international multilateral agencies, like the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank (BID), are oriented to public policies under which public goods, like public services and infrastructures, are supplied to underdeveloped regions. More and more evidences are pointing to the fact that success of these programs depends in a good part of externalities, which are related to the changes in the networking and values among the stakeholders in the territory. These externalities are defined as the Social Capital. As externalities, they are not directly evaluated in the projects economic and social impact, but accepted to exist and the planners of the projects do acknowledge the important of social networking. However never assessed. The objective of this thesis is to investigate and propose a way to measure and assess the social capital of a given project, and relate that with the activities of the project, with a given project and territory as base case. The Development Program in Zona da Mata (PROMATA) in the State of Pernambuco, Brazil, funded by the Brazil State and the BID, ended in 2010, was chosen as the base case. For the assessment of the social capital two periods in time where studied. One considering only the project program named a priori evaluation and based in a panel of experts, which are aware of the possible externalities of the project. Other, considering the stakeholders view after the project ended, named posterior evaluation, which required interviewing a number of stakeholders using a specially designed questionnaire. The results were processed using advanced statistical techniques. PROMATA is considered a success case story in Brazil, in part for its social networking approach. However when the social capital is assessed there are areas of state-society and society-community relations not that well transformed, as the satisfaction research of the project indicators. This unforeseen externality is the social capital effect.

Relative Concerns on Visible Consumption: A Source of Economic Distortions

Do relative concerns on visible consumption give rise to economic distortions? We re-examine the question posited by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) building upon their general framework but recognizing that relative concerns can only apply to visible goods (e.g., cars, clothing, jewelry) and that households consume both visible and non-visible goods. Contrary to Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), the answer to this question turns to be always affirmative: the competitive equilibrium will always be different than the socially optimal one, since individuals do not take into account the negative externality they exert on others through the consumption of the visible good, while the social planner does. If one invokes separability assumptions, then the steady state competitive equilibrium consumption of non-visible goods will be strictly lower than the socially optimal one.

El paisaje, su patrimonialización y el beneficio económico

Desde hace dos décadas se viene asistiendo a un renovado interés por el paisaje en distintas disciplinas e instituciones políticas y administrativas. Algunos autores lo interpretan desde una perspectiva neorromántica, como reacción a los efectos destructores de la modernidad. El Convenio Europeo del Paisaje (CEP) estableció en Florencia en el año 2000 una definición de paisaje ampliamente aceptada y unas pautas de intervención sobre el mismo que pretenden ser el marco para las leyes nacionales y regionales de los países firmantes. El presente trabajo se propone explicar la recuperación del interés por el paisaje desde la perspectiva de la valorización económica del territorio, como externalidad que permite generar rentas. En mi opinión esa es la verdadera orientación de la CEP.

Monopolistic insurance and competitive financial markets

This dissertation studies the interaction between insurance and financial markets. Individuals who differ only in risk can save through a competitive market. They also have access to insurance contracts offered by a monopolist firm. We show that an equilibrium exists in that economy. Fundamentally, we identify an externality imposed on the insurer's decision by the endogeneity of prices in the financial market.We argue that, because of such externality and in contrast to the pure contract theory case, equilibrium may exhibit pooling.