The rights to a hearing and to a lawful judge in the spanish constitutional system

Right to Audience and Right to a Lawful Judge are presumed to be two of the most important guaranties for the rule of law. Both liberties are established in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 as “fundamental rights”, and they are included as a part of a most generic right: the right to due process of law. Along this text, I will try to show its content and significance, according to the sentences of the Spanish “Tribunal Constitucional”, passed through more than 25 years.

Expropriation of "old order" mineral rights in South Africa: the Constitutional Court has its say (twice)

The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (ZA) (MPRDA) makes provision for the conversion of so-called “old order” rights to prospecting and mining rights. The consequences of the failure of holders of old order rights to apply for (a) Conversion or (b) new rights under different circumstances were decided by the South African Constitutional Court in two decisions during 2013. These cases are discussed against the background of the nature, content and termination of old order rights. It is also discussed whether such rights were expropriated by the MPRDA and, if so, whether compensation is payable by the state.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

The rights of property vindicated against the claims of universal suffrage : with an analysis of the principle of property, and new views of constitutional interest and general policy.

Mode of access: Internet.

The government class book : designed for the instruction of youth in the principles of constitutional government and the rights and duties of citizens /

Mode of access: Internet.

Constitutional security to the citizens' rights of property : and the principles of public faith.

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 18580.2.

Where constitutional liberty came from : the origins and meaning of our Bill of Rights and constitutional government /

At head of title: Freedom agenda.

Redefining 'media' using a 'media-as-a-constitutional-component' concept:an evaluation of the need for the European Court of Human Rights to alter its understanding of 'media' within a new media landscape

This paper considers the impact of new media on freedom of expression and media freedom within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. Through comparative analysis of US jurisprudence and scholarship, this paper deals with the following three issues. First, it explores the traditional purpose of the media, and how media freedom, as opposed to freedom of expression, has been subject to privileged protection, within an ECHR context at least. Secondly, it considers the emergence of new media, and how it can be differentiated from the traditional media. Finally, it analyses the philosophical justifications for freedom of expression, and how they enable a workable definition of the media based upon the concept of the media-as-a-constitutional-component.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

Submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015

We argue that safeguards are necessary to ensure human rights are adequately protected. All systems of blocking access to online content necessarily raise difficult and problematic issues of infringement of freedom of speech and access to information. Given the importance of access to information across the breadth of modern life, great care must be taken to ensure that any measures designed to protect copyright by blocking access to online locations are proportionate. Any measures to block access to online content must be carefully tailored to avoid serious and disproportionate impact on human rights. This means first that the measures must be effective and adapted to achieve a legitimate purpose. The experience of foreign jurisdictions suggests that this legislation is unlikely to be effective. Unless and until there is clear evidence that the proposed scheme is likely to increase effective returns to Australian creators, this legislation should not be introduced. Second, the principle of proportionality requires ensuring that the proposed legislation does not unnecessarily burden legitimate speech or access to information. As currently worded, the draft legislation may result in online locations being blocked even though they would, if operated in Australia, not contravene Australian law. This is unacceptable, and if introduced, the law should be drafted so that it is clearly limited only to foreign locations where there is clear and compelling evidence that the location would authorise copyright infringement if it were in Australia. Third, proportionality requires that measures are reasonable and strike an appropriate balance between competing interests. This draft legislation provides few safeguards for the public interest or the interests of private actors who would access legitimate information. New safeguards should be introduced to ensure that the public interest is well represented at both the stage of the primary application and at any applications to rescind or vary injunctions. We recommend that: The legislation not be introduced unless and until there is compelling evidence that it will have a real and significant positive impact on the effective incomes of Australian creators. The ‘facilitates an infringement’ test in s 115A(1)(b) should be replaced with ‘authorises infringement’. The ‘primary purpose’ test in s 115A(1)(c) should be replaced with: “the online location has no substantial non-infringing uses”. An explicit role for public interest groups as amici curiae should be introduced. Costs of successful applications should be borne by applicants. Injunctions should be valid only for renewable two year terms. Section 115A(5) should be clarified, and cl (b) and (c) be removed. The effectiveness of the scheme should be evaluated in two years.

Franklin Barley: Patent law and plant breeders’ rights

This paper considers the relationship between patent law and plant breeders' rights in light of modern developments in biotechnology. It examines how a number of superior courts have sought to manage the tensions and conflicts between these competing schemes of intellectual property protection. Part 1 considers the High Court of Australia case of Grain Pool of Western Australia v the Commonwealth dealing with Franklin barley. Part 2 examines the significance of the Supreme Court of the United States decision in JEM Ag Supply Inc v Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc with respect to utility patents and hybrid seed. Part 3 considers the Supreme Court of Canada case of Harvard College v the Commissioner of Patents dealing with the transgenic animal, oncomouse, and discusses its implications for the forthcoming appeal from the Federal Court case of Percy Schmeiser v Monsanto.

A Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth)

The film company, Roadshow, the pay television company Foxtel, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp and News Limited — as well as copyright industries — have been clamouring for new copyright powers and remedies. In the summer break, the Coalition Government has responded to such entreaties from its industry supporters and donors, with a new package of copyright laws and policies. There has been significant debate over the proposals between the odd couple of Attorney-General George Brandis and the Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull. There has been deep, philosophical differences between the two Ministers over the copyright agenda. The Attorney-General George Brandis has supported a model of copyright maximalism, with strong rights and remedies for the copyright empires in film, television, and publishing. He has shown little empathy for the information technology companies of the digital economy. The Attorney-General has been impatient to press ahead with a copyright regime. The Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull, has been somewhat more circumspect,recognising that there is a need to ensure that copyright laws do not adversely impact upon competition in the digital economy. The final proposal is a somewhat awkward compromise between the discipline-and-punish regime preferred by Brandis, and the responsive regulation model favoured by Turnbull. In his new book, Information Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Laws for the Internet Age, Cory Doctorow has some sage advice for copyright owners: Things that don’t make money: * Complaining about piracy. * Calling your customers thieves. * Treating your customers like thieves. In this context, the push by copyright owners and the Coalition Government to have a copyright crackdown may well be counter-productive to their interests. This submission considers a number of key elements of the Coalition Government’s Copyright Crackdown. Part 1 examines the proposals in respect of the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (Cth). Part 2 focuses upon the proposed Copyright Code. Part 3 considers the question of safe harbours for intermediaries. Part 4 examines the question of copyright exceptions – particularly looking at the proposal of the Australian Law Reform Commission for the introduction of a defence of fair use. Part 5 highlights the recommendations of the IT Pricing Inquiry and the Harper Competition Policy Review in respect of copyright law, consumer rights, and competition law.

Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?

Gibbs, N., Getting Constitutional Theory into Proportion: A Matter of Interpretation?, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27 (1), 175-191. RAE2008