923 resultados para conforming bid (tender)
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Research on the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the improved availability of data. Researchers have addressed questions regarding the factors that influence bid-ask spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. Intra-day data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the price impact of transactions on a trade-by-trade analysis. The growth in the creation of tax-transparent securities has greatly enhanced the visibility of securitized real estate, and has naturally led to the question of whether the increased visibility of real estate has caused market liquidity to change. Although the growth in the public market for securitized real estate has occurred in international markets, it has not been accompanied by universal publication of transaction data. Therefore this paper develops an aggregate daily data-based test for liquidity and applies the test to US data in order to check for consistency with the results of prior intra-day analysis. If the two approaches produce similar results, we can apply the same technique to markets in which less detailed data are available and offer conclusions on the liquidity of a wider set of markets.
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Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.
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In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.
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The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark-up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent 30 years, little progress has been made, due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. The debate is resumed by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to ensure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of 12 construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.
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Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders' bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder's probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.
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Identificar, compartilhar e gerenciar os riscos de contratar são preocupações que impedem o estabelicmento e a administração das Parcerias Públicos Particulares (PPP). Porem, gerentes das entidades públicas, bancos de formento, construtoras e seguradoras pesquisam e utilizam muitas técnicas para enfrentar a avaliação e gerenciamento dos riscos. A transferência de risco é uma indicação dos chamados benefícios que são inspirados pelos PPP, contudo devido às realidades contratuais e conceptuais, a entidade de cede o risco (o partido público) permanece quase sempre como o portador final do risco. Conseqüentemente, o partido público retem um interesse de resistência na gerência total destes riscos cedidos. Esta dissertação explora alguns defeitos das aproximações comuns a conceituar a gestão de risco no contexto de um PPP. Focalizando os conceitos da interdependência e da reciprocidade e usando na decisão para transferir o risco do projeto, esta dissertação molda a decisão para transferir o risco nos termos das realidades interdependentes de relacionamentos sistemáticos, alargam os conceitos técnicos do risco e da avaliação de risco, considerando o uso reflexivo das diferenças na analise de um estudo de caso. O autor explora estes conceitos em uma análise da decisão de um gerente de risco da empresa de construção civil brasileira Construtora Norberto Odebrecht (ODB) para projetar uma facilidade inovadora da ligação de garantia com Inter-American Development Bank (BID) e uma seguradora, American International Group (AIG), um negócio que ganhe o reconhecimento Trade Finance Magazine’s 2007 deal of the year. O autor mostra que por compreender a transferência de risco nos termos abordados nesta dissertação, um atore que transfere o risco pode identificar e criar mais oportunidades de estabelecer relacionamentos em longo prazo, através dos processos que a literatura atual do PPP ainda não considere. Os resultados devem fornecer contribuições para a pesquisas sobre a transferência do risco do projeto, na cooperação entre organizações e na seleção do sócio do projeto do potencial.
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We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.
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Se incluyó además en la investigación la Biblioteca de la Fundación Educacional "Roberto Bellarmino" y la Biblioteca del Centro de Investigación y Planificación del Medio Ambiente (CIPMA)