926 resultados para competitive neutrality
Resumo:
The human tendency to cooperate with nonkin even in short-run relationships remains a puzzle. Recently it has been hypothesized that altruism may be a byproduct of “mentalizing”, the process of understanding and predicting the mental states of others. Another idea is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. The paper shows that these two arguments are stronger when combined in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over non-altruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly. Further, once such an equilibrium is established, altruists will not be supplanted by mutants who have similar mentalizing abilities but who lack altruism.
Resumo:
In many organisms, individuals behave more altruistically towards relatives than towards unrelated individuals. Here, we conducted a study to determine if the performance of Arabidopsis thaliana is influenced by whether individuals are in competition with kin or non-kin. We selected seven pairs of genetically distinct accessions that originated from local populations throughout Europe. We measured the biomass of one focal plant surrounded by six kin or non-kin neighbours in in vitro growth experiments and counted the number of siliques produced per pot by one focal plant surrounded by four kin or non-kin neighbours. The biomass and number of siliques of a focal plant were not affected by the relatedness of the neighbour. Depending on the accession, a plant performed better or worse in a pure stand than when surrounded by non-kin plants. In addition, whole-genome microarray analyses revealed that there were no genes differentially expressed between kin and non-kin conditions. In conclusion, our study does not provide any evidence for a differential response to kin vs non-kin in A. thaliana. Rather, the outcome of the interaction between kin and non-kin seems to depend on the strength of the competitive abilities of the accessions.
Resumo:
We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is efficient, constrained only by search frictions. We also show that the performance of an alternative trading protocol in the cheap-talk environment depends on the level of price dispersion generated by the protocol: If a trading protocol compresses (spreads) the distribution of prices relative to the first-price auction, then an efficient fully revealing equilibrium always (never) exists. Our results identify the settings in which cheap talk can serve as an efficient competitive instrument, in the sense that the central insights from the literature on competing auctions and competitive search continue to hold unaltered even without ex ante price commitment.
Resumo:
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call “invariance,” and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.
Resumo:
Targeting mTOR (mammalian target of rapamycin) is an effective approach in the treatment of advanced RCC (renal cell carcinoma). Rapamycin-like drugs (rapalogues) have shown clinical activities and have been approved for the treatment of RCC. Recently, with the development of ATP-competitive inhibitors of mTOR, therapies targeting mTOR have entered a new era. Here, we discuss the biological relevance of blocking mTOR in RCC and review the mechanisms of action of rapalogues in RCC. We also advance some perspectives on the use of ATP-competitive inhibitors of mTOR in RCC.
Resumo:
A major initiative of the Thatcher and Major Conservative administrations was that public sector ancillary and professional services provided by incumbent direct service organisations [DSOs] be put out to tender. Analyses of this initiative, in the UK and elsewhere, found costs were often reduced in the short run. However, few if any studies went beyond the first round of tendering. We analyze data collected over successive rounds of tendering for cleaning and catering services of Scottish hospitals in order to assess the long term consequences of this initiative. The experience of the two services was very different. Cost savings for cleaning services tended to increase with each additional round of tendering and became increasingly stable. In accordance with previous results in the literature, DSOs produced smaller cost reductions than private contractors: probably an inevitable consequence of the tendering process at the time. Cost savings from DSOs tended to disappear during the first round of tendering, but they appear to have been more permanent in successive rounds. Cost savings for catering, on the other hand, tended to be much smaller, and these were not sustained.
Resumo:
A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.
Resumo:
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
Resumo:
In a recent paper Tishler and Milstein (2009) fi…nd that increased competition may increase aggregate R&D spending while market output decreases. Therefore, they obtain the surprising result that R&D spending is excessive when competition becomes intense. Their result is based on the standard linear demand function for differentiated products introduced by Bowley (1924) where decreased product differentiation is interpreted as more competitive pressure. In this paper I show that at an aggregate level this interpretation is problematic because equilibrium effects are dominated by a demand reduction effect. A slight modifi…cation of the standard demand function eliminates this effect. For the Tishler and Milstein (2009) setting it is shown that then increased competition increases both R&D spending and aggregate market output. Therefore, at least for consumers, more intense competition increases welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…fication Numbers: D43, L1, O3. Keywords: Oligopoly markets, Product differentiation, Competitive pressure.
Resumo:
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.
Resumo:
Several species of snails, including Pomacea haustrum, Marisa cornuarietis and Helisoma duryi, have been identified as probable competitors and/or predators of planorbid intermediate hosts of Schistosoma. During the last few years, studies carried out in the Caribbean region have shown reductions and even disappearances of populations of Biomphalaria glabrata and B. straminea in breeding places where the snail Melanoides tuberculata was introduced. Observations made over a period of 10 years in two lakes close to Belo Horizonte, MG, showed that there were marked reductions in autochthonous populations of B. glabrata and B. straminea after the arrival of M. tuberculata, both Biomphalaria species disappearing completely after eight years.
Resumo:
Neutrality tests in quantitative genetics provide a statistical framework for the detection of selection on polygenic traits in wild populations. However, the existing method based on comparisons of divergence at neutral markers and quantitative traits (Q(st)-F(st)) suffers from several limitations that hinder a clear interpretation of the results with typical empirical designs. In this article, we propose a multivariate extension of this neutrality test based on empirical estimates of the among-populations (D) and within-populations (G) covariance matrices by MANOVA. A simple pattern is expected under neutrality: D = 2F(st)/(1 - F(st))G, so that neutrality implies both proportionality of the two matrices and a specific value of the proportionality coefficient. This pattern is tested using Flury's framework for matrix comparison [common principal-component (CPC) analysis], a well-known tool in G matrix evolution studies. We show the importance of using a Bartlett adjustment of the test for the small sample sizes typically found in empirical studies. We propose a dual test: (i) that the proportionality coefficient is not different from its neutral expectation [2F(st)/(1 - F(st))] and (ii) that the MANOVA estimates of mean square matrices between and among populations are proportional. These two tests combined provide a more stringent test for neutrality than the classic Q(st)-F(st) comparison and avoid several statistical problems. Extensive simulations of realistic empirical designs suggest that these tests correctly detect the expected pattern under neutrality and have enough power to efficiently detect mild to strong selection (homogeneous, heterogeneous, or mixed) when it is occurring on a set of traits. This method also provides a rigorous and quantitative framework for disentangling the effects of different selection regimes and of drift on the evolution of the G matrix. We discuss practical requirements for the proper application of our test in empirical studies and potential extensions.
8-Methoxy-naphtho[2,3-b]thiophen-4,9-quinone, a non-competitive inhibitor of trypanothione reductase
Resumo:
The enzyme trypanothione reductase is a recognised drug target in trypanosomatids and has been used in the search of new compounds with potential activity against diseases such as leishmaniasis, Chagas disease and African trypanosomiasis. 8-Methoxy-naphtho [2,3-b] thiophen-4,9-quinone was selected in a screening of natural and synthetic compounds using an in vitro assay with the recombinant enzyme from Trypanosoma cruzi. Its mode of inhibition fits a non-competitive model with respect to the substrate (trypanothione) and to the co-factor (NADPH), with Ki-values of 5 and 3.6 µM, respectively. When tested against human glutathione reductase, this compound did not display any significant inhibition at 100 µM, indicating a good selectivity against the parasite enzyme.
Resumo:
In transplant rejection, graft versus host or autoimmune diseases T cells are mediating the pathophysiological processes. Compared to unspecific pharmacological immune suppression specific inhibition of those T cells, that are involved in the disease, would be an alternative and attractive approach. T cells are activated after their T cell receptor (TCR) recognizes an antigenic peptide displayed by the Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC). Molecules that interact with MHC-peptide-complexes in a specific fashion should block T cells with identical specificity. Using the model of the SSX2 (103-111)/HLA-A*0201 complex we investigated a panel of MHC-peptide-specific Fab antibodies for their capacity blocking specific T cell clones. Like TCRs all Fab antibodies reacted with the MHC complex only when the SSX2 (103-111) peptide was displayed. By introducing single amino acid mutations in the HLA-A*0201 heavy chain we identified the K66 residue as the most critical binding similar to that of TCRs. However, some Fab antibodies did not inhibit the reactivity of a specific T cell clone against peptide pulsed, artificial targets, nor cells displaying the peptide after endogenous processing. Measurements of binding kinetics revealed that only those Fab antibodies were capable of blocking T cells that interacted with an affinity in the nanomolar range. Fab antibodies binding like TCRs with affinities on the lower micromolar range did not inhibit T cell reactivity. These results indicate that molecules that block T cells by competitive binding with the TCR must have the same specificity but higher affinity for the MHC-peptide-complex than the TCR.