An integer programming model for the minimum interval graph completion problem

The minimum interval graph completion problem consists of, given a graph G = ( V, E ), finding a supergraph H = ( V, E ∪ F ) that is an interval graph, while adding the least number of edges |F| . We present an integer programming formulation for solving the minimum interval graph completion problem recurring to a characteri- zation of interval graphs that produces a linear ordering of the maximal cliques of the solution graph.

Minimization of open orders using interval graphs

In this paper we address an order processing optimization problem known as the Minimization of Open Stacks Problem (MOSP). This problem consists in finding the best sequence for manufacturing the different products required by costumers, in a setting where only one product can be made at a time. The objective is to minimize the maximum number of incomplete orders from costumers that are being processed simultaneously. We present an integer programming model, based on the existence of a perfect elimination order in interval graphs, which finds an optimal sequence for the costumers orders. Among other economic advantages, manufacturing the products in this optimal sequence reduces the amount of space needed to store incomplete orders.

Sequencing cutting patterns with colored interval graphs

The problem addressed here originates in the industry of flat glass cutting and wood panel sawing, where smaller items are cut from larger items accordingly to predefined cutting patterns. In this type of industry the smaller pieces that are cut from the patterns are piled around the machine in stacks according to the size of the pieces, which are moved to the warehouse only when all items of the same size have been cut. If the cutting machine can process only one pattern at a time, and the workspace is limited, it is desirable to set the sequence in which the cutting patterns are processed in a way to minimize the maximum number of open stacks around the machine. This problem is known in literature as the minimization of open stacks (MOSP). To find the best sequence of the cutting patterns, we propose an integer programming model, based on interval graphs, that searches for an appropriate edge completion of the given graph of the problem, while defining a suitable coloring of its vertices.

Using interval graphs in an order processing optimization problem

In this paper we address an order processing optimization problem known as minimization of open stacks (MOSP). We present an integer pro gramming model, based on the existence of a perfect elimination scheme in interval graphs, which finds an optimal sequence for the costumers orders.

Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

TOXOCARIASIS: SEROLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS BY INDIRECT ANTIBODY COMPETITION ELISA

Toxocariasis is caused by infection of man by Toxocara canis and Toxocara cati larvae, the common roundworm of dogs and cats. Because larvae are difficult to detect in tissues, diagnosis is mostly based on serology. Non specific reactions are observed mainly due to cross-reactivity with Ascaris sp antigens. This investigation aimed at developing and evaluating an indirect antibody competition ELISA (IACE) employing a specific rabbit IgG anti-Toxocara canis excretory-secretory antigens as the competition antibody, in order to improve indirect ELISA specificity performed for toxocariasis diagnosis. For that, the rabbit IgG was previously absorbed by Ascaris suum adult antigens. Sensitivity and specificity of IACE were first evaluated in 28 serum samples of mice experimentally infected with T. canis embryonated eggs. Adopting cut-off value established in this population before infection, sensitivity and specificity were 100% after 20 days post-inoculation. For human population IACE was evaluated using sera from 440 patients with clinical signs of toxocariasis and the cut-off value was established with 60 serum samples from apparently healthy individuals. Using as reference test the indirect ELISA performed by Adolfo Lutz Institute, sensitivity was 60.2%, specificity was 98% and concordance was 77.3%. Repeatability of IACE was evaluated by the inter-reactions variation coefficient (2.4%).

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty

We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters.

Cournot duopoly with competition in the R&D expenditures

We present a new R&D investment in a Cournot Duopoly model and we analyze the different possible types of Nash R&D investments. We observe that the new production costs region can be decomposed in three economical regions, depending on the Nash R&D investment, showing the relevance of the use of patents in new technologies.

Unemployment, technological revolution and competition from developing countries

Unemployment is probably the most important social problem of our times in the rich industrial world. There are 35 million people unemployed in OECD countries(about 8,5%): the situation however differs between the USA and Europe. In this paper we will discuss the reasons for suche a difference.

Competition policy costs to firms

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and oligopolistic competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.