The causal attributions of nursing students towards adolescent survivors of brain injury

Background: The hidden nature of brain injury means that it is often difficult for people to understand the sometimes challenging behaviors that individuals exhibit. The misattribution of these behaviors may lead to a lack of consideration and public censure if the individual is seen as simply misbehaving.

Objective: The aim of this study was to explore the impact of visual cues indicating the presence or absence of brain injury on prejudice, desire for social interaction, and causal attributions of nursing and computing science students.

Method: An independent-groups design was employed in this research, which recruited 190 first-year nursing students and 194 first-year computing science students from a major university in Belfast, UK. A short passage describing an adolescent’s behavior after a brain injury, together with one of three images portraying a young adolescent with a scar, a head dressing, or neither of these, was given to participants. They were then asked to answer questions relating to prejudice, social interaction, locus of control, and causal attributions. The attributional statements suggested that the character’s behavior could be the result of brain injury or adolescence.

Results: Analysis of variance demonstrated a statistically significant difference between the student groups, where nursing students (M = 45.17, SD = 4.69) desired more social interaction with the fictional adolescent than their computer science peers (M = 38.64, SD = 7.69). Further, analysis of variance showed a main effect of image on the attributional statement that described adolescence as a suitable explanation for the character’s lack of self-confidence.

Discussion: Attributions of brain injury were influenced by the presence of a visible but potentially specious indicator of injury. This suggests that survivors of brain injury who do not display any outward indicator may receive less care and face expectations to behave in a manner consistent with the norms of society. If their injury does not allow them to meet with these expectations, they may face public censure and discrimination.

Are causal and intervention judgments inextricably linked? A developmental study.

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children's causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children's causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8years made causal structure judgments on a three-component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children's causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked. © 2011 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.


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Additivity Pretraining and cue competition effects: Developmental evidence for a reasoning account of causal learning

The effect of additivity pretraining on blocking has been taken as evidence for a reasoning account of human and animal causal learning. If inferential reasoning underpins this effect, then developmental differences in the magnitude of this effect in children would be expected. Experiment 1 examined cue competition effects in children's (4- to 5-year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds) causal learning using a new paradigm analogous to the food allergy task used in studies of human adult causal learning. Blocking was stronger in the older than the younger children, and additivity pretraining only affected blocking in the older group. Unovershadowing was not affected by age or by pretraining. In experiment 2, levels of blocking were found to be correlated with the ability to answer questions that required children to reason about additivity. Our results support an inferential reasoning explanation of cue competition effects. (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved.

Causal Models of Clinically Significant Behaviors in Angelman, Cornelia de Lange, Prader-Willi and Smith-Magenis Syndromes

The operant learning theory account of behaviors of clinical significance in people with intellectual disability (ID) has dominated the field for nearly 50 years. However, in the last two decades, there has been a substantial increase in published research that describes the behavioral phenotypes of genetic disorders and shows that behaviors such as self-injury and aggression are more common in some syndromes than might be expected given group characteristics. These cross-syndrome differences in prevalence warrant explanation, not least because this observation challenges an exclusively operant learning theory account. To explore this possible conflict between theoretical account and empirical observation, we describe the genetic cause and physical, social, cognitive and behavioral phenotypes of four disorders associated with ID (Angleman, Cornelia de Lange, Prader-Willi and Smith-Magenis syndromes) and focus on the behaviors of clinical significance in each syndrome. For each syndrome we then describe a model of the interactions between physical characteristics, cognitive and motivational endophenotypes and environmental factors (including operant reinforcement) to account for the resultant behavioral phenotype. In each syndrome it is possible to identify pathways from gene to physical phenotype to cognitive or motivational endophenotype to behavior to environment and back to behavior. We identify the implications of these models for responsive and early intervention and the challenges for research in this area. We identify a pressing need for meaningful dialog between different disciplines to construct better informed models that can incorporate all relevant and robust empirical evidence.

Encouraging children to think counterfactually enhances blocking in a causal learning task

According to a higher order reasoning account, inferential reasoning processes underpin the widely observed cue competition effect of blocking in causal learning. The inference required for blocking has been described as modus tollens (if p then q, not q therefore not p). Young children are known to have difficulties with this type of inference, but research with adults suggests that this inference is easier if participants think counterfactually. In this study, 100 children (51 five-year-olds and 49 six- to seven-year-olds) were assigned to two types of pretraining groups. The counterfactual group observed demonstrations of cues paired with outcomes and answered questions about what the outcome would have been if the causal status of cues had been different, whereas the factual group answered factual questions about the same demonstrations. Children then completed a causal learning task. Counterfactual pretraining enhanced levels of blocking as well as modus tollens reasoning but only for the younger children. These findings provide new evidence for an important role for inferential reasoning in causal learning.

Blocking in children's causal learning depends on working memory and reasoning abilities.

A sample of 99 children completed a causal learning task that was an analogue of the food allergy paradigm used with adults. The cue competition effects of blocking and unovershadowing were assessed under forward and backward presentation conditions. Children also answered questions probing their ability to make the inference posited to be necessary for blocking by a reasoning account of cue competition. For the first time, children's working memory and general verbal ability were also measured alongside their causal learning. The magnitude of blocking and unovershadowing effects increased with age. However, analyses showed that the best predictor of both blocking and unovershadowing effects was children's performance on the reasoning questions. The magnitude of the blocking effect was also predicted by children's working memory abilities. These findings provide new evidence that cue competition effects such as blocking are underpinned by effortful reasoning processes. 

When does information about causal structure improve statistical reasoning?

Base rate neglect on the mammography problem can be overcome by explicitly presenting a causal basis for the typically vague false-positive statistic. One account of this causal facilitation effect is that people make probabilistic judgements over intuitive causal models parameterized with the evidence in the problem. Poorly defined or difficult-to-map evidence interferes with this process, leading to errors in statistical reasoning. To assess whether the construction of parameterized causal representations is an intuitive or deliberative process, in Experiment 1 we combined a secondary load paradigm with manipulations of the presence or absence of an alternative cause in typical statistical reasoning problems. We found limited effects of a secondary load, no evidence that information about an alternative cause improves statistical reasoning, but some evidence that it reduces base rate neglect errors. In Experiments 2 and 3 where we did not impose a load, we observed causal facilitation effects. The amount of Bayesian responding in the causal conditions was impervious to the presence of a load (Experiment 1) and to the precise statistical information that was presented (Experiment 3). However, we found less Bayesian responding in the causal condition than previously reported. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings and the suggestion that there may be population effects in the accuracy of statistical reasoning.

Whose statistical reasoning is improved by information about causal structure?

People often struggle when making Bayesian probabilistic estimates on the basis of competing sources of statistical evidence. Recently, Krynski and Tenenbaum (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 430–450, 2007) proposed that a causal Bayesian framework accounts for peoples’ errors in Bayesian reasoning and showed that, by clarifying the causal relations among the pieces of evidence, judgments on a classic statistical reasoning problem could be significantly improved. We aimed to understand whose statistical reasoning is facilitated by the causal structure intervention. In Experiment 1, although we observed causal facilitation effects overall, the effect was confined to participants high in numeracy. We did not find an overall facilitation effect in Experiment 2 but did replicate the earlier interaction between numerical ability and the presence or absence of causal content. This effect held when we controlled for general cognitive ability and thinking disposition. Our results suggest that clarifying causal structure facilitates Bayesian judgments, but only for participants with sufficient understanding of basic concepts in probability and statistics.

Causal knowledge and the development of inductive reasoning

We explored the development of sensitivity to causal relations in children’s inductive reasoning. Children (5-, 8-, and 12-year-olds) and adults were given trials in which they decided whether a property known to be possessed by members of one category was also possessed by members of (a) a taxonomically related category or (b) a causally related category. The direction of the causal link was either predictive (prey → predator) or diagnostic (predator → prey), and the property that participants reasoned about established either a taxonomic or causal context. There was a causal asymmetry effect across all age groups, with more causal choices when the causal link was predictive than when it was diagnostic. Furthermore, context-sensitive causal reasoning showed a curvilinear development, with causal choices being most frequent for 8-year-olds regardless of context. Causal inductions decreased thereafter because 12-year-olds and adults made more taxonomic choices when reasoning in the taxonomic context. These findings suggest that simple causal relations may often be the default knowledge structure in young children’s inductive reasoning, that sensitivity to causal direction is present early on, and that children over-generalize their causal knowledge when reasoning.

Temporal and statistical information in causal structure learning

Three experiments examined children’s and adults’ abilities to use statistical and temporal information to distinguish between common cause and causal chain structures. In Experiment 1, participants were provided with conditional probability information and/or temporal information and asked to infer the causal structure of a three-variable mechanical system that operated probabilistically. Participants of all ages preferentially relied on the temporal pattern of events in their inferences, even if this conflicted with statistical information. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants observed a series of interventions on the system, which in these experiments operated deterministically. In Experiment 2, participants found it easier to use temporal pattern information than statistical information provided as a result of interventions. In Experiment 3, in which no temporal pattern information was provided, children from 6-7 years, but not younger children, were able to use intervention information to make causal chain judgments, although they had difficulty when the structure was a common cause. The findings suggest that participants, and children in particular, may find it more difficult to use statistical information than temporal pattern information because of its demands on information processing resources. However, there may also be an inherent preference for temporal information.