On trust, knowledge, sharing and innovation

Organisations continuously innovate, create, and are competitive if they improve their performance through continuous intellectual capital development, a key resource for value creation and organisational performance driver. Apart from sustaining competitive advantage, intellectual capital is increasingly important due to its ability to increase shareholder value, especially in public organisations. Employee learning, talent development, and knowledge creation allow the organisation to generate innovative ideas due to the quickness of knowledge obsolescence. The organisation's dynamic capabilities create and re-ignite organisational competencies for business sustainability being co-ordinated by well-structured organisational strategic routines ensuring continuous value creation streams into the business. This chapter focuses on the relationship between notions of knowledge sharing and trust in organisations. Lack of trust can impact negatively organisational knowledge sharing, dependent on trust, openness, and communication. The research sample included graduates and postgraduate students from two universities in Portugal. The findings revealed different perceptions according to the age group.

From perfect strangers to research partners: a study of relationships, resource sharing and perceived benefits within R&D cooperation networks

Doctoral thesis in Marketing and Strategy.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

The Importance of Revenue Sharing for the Local Economic Impacts of a Renewable Energy Project: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach

As demand for electricity from renewable energy sources grows, there is increasing interest, and public and financial support, for local communities to become involved in the development of renewable energy projects. In the UK, “Community Benefit” payments are the most common financial link between renewable energy projects and local communities. These are “goodwill” payments from the project developer for the community to spend as it wishes. However, if an ownership stake in the renewable energy project were possible, receipts to the local community would potentially be considerably higher. The local economic impacts of these receipts are difficult to quantify using traditional Input-Output techniques, but can be more appropriately handled within a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework where income flows between agents can be traced in detail. We use a SAM for the Shetland Islands to evaluate the potential local economic and employment impact of a large onshore wind energy project proposed for the Islands. Sensitivity analysis is used to show how the local impact varies with: the level of Community Benefit payments; the portion of intermediate inputs being sourced from within the local economy; and the level of any local community ownership of the project. By a substantial margin, local ownership confers the greatest economic impacts for the local community.

Monopoles in arbitrary dimension

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Complete Markets Strikes Back: Revisiting Risk Sharing Tests under Discount Rate Heterogeneity

Recent risk sharing tests strongly reject the hypothesis of complete markets, because in the data: (1) the individual consumption comoves with income and (2) the consumption dispersion increases over the life cycle. In this paper, I revisit the implications of these risk sharing tests in the context of a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity, which is extended to introduce the individual choices of effort in education. I .nd that a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity can pass both types of the risk sharing tests. The endogenous positive correlation between income growth rate and patience makes the individual consumption comove with income, even if the markets are complete. I also show that this model is quantitatively admissible to account for both the observed comovement of consumption and income and the increase of consumption dispersion over the life cycle.

Organizational configurations of strategic choices and strategic management accounting

This is the first study to adopt a configurational paradigm in an investigation of strategic management accounting (SMA) adoption. The study examines the alignment and effectiveness of strategic choice and strategic management accounting (SMA) system design configurations. Six configurations were derived empirically by deploying a cluster analysis of data collected from a sample of 193 large Slovenian companies. The first four clusters appear to provide some support for the central configurational proposition that higher levels of vertical and horizontal configurational alignments are associated with higher levels of performance. Evidence that contradicts the theory is also apparent, however, as the remaining two clusters exhibit high degrees of SMA vertical and horizontal alignment, but low performance levels. A particular contribution of the paper concerns its demonstration of the way that the configurational paradigm can be operationalised to examine management accounting phenomena and the nature of management accounting insights that can derive from applying the approach.

Symmetric planar central configurations of five bodies: Euler plus two

We study planar central configurations of the five-body problem where three of the bodies are collinear, forming an Euler central configuration of the three-body problem, and the two other bodies together with the collinear configuration are in the same plane. The problem considered here assumes certain symmetries. From the three bodies in the collinear configuration, the two bodies at the extremities have equal masses and the third one is at the middle point between the two. The fourth and fifth bodies are placed in a symmetric way: either with respect to the line containing the three bodies, or with respect to the middle body in the collinear configuration, or with respect to the perpendicular bisector of the segment containing the three bodies. The possible stacked five-body central configurations satisfying these types of symmetries are: a rhombus with four masses at the vertices and a fifth mass in the center, and a trapezoid with four masses at the vertices and a fifth mass at the midpoint of one of the parallel sides.