Federal States, Industries and Education Level – Effects of TTIP in Germany. Policy Brief #2013/05

A purely microeconomic perspective shows that all major industries and states would benefit from a transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP). The greatest manufacturing and employment effects would be seen in the electronics industry as well as metal processing. Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia would benefit most from this. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that new jobs would be created for all education groups – even for relatively unskilled workers. Their real income could increase even more than that of highly qualified workers.

Restoring international balance [microform] : Japan's trade and investment patterns : a staff study /

"July 6, 1988."

World trade and investment; the economics of interdependence.

Bibliography: p.565-570.

Three essays on trade and investment

From H. G. Johnson's work (Review of Economic Studies, 1953–54) on tariff retaliation, the questions of whether a country can win a “tariff war” and how or even the broader question of what will affect a country's strategic position in setting bilateral tariff have been tackled in various situations. Although it is widely accepted that a country will have strategic advantages in winning the tariff war if its relative monopoly power is sufficiently large, it is unclear what are the forces behind such power formation. The goal of this research is to provide a unified framework and discuss various forces such as relative country size, absolute advantages and relative advantages simultaneously. In a two-country continuum-of-commodity neoclassical trade model, it is shown that sufficiently large relative country size is a sufficient condition for a country to choose a non-cooperative tariff Nash equilibrium over free trade. It is also shown that technology disparities such as absolute advantage, rate of technology disparity and the distribution of the technology disparity all contribute to a country's strategic position and interact with country size. ^ Leverage effect is usually used to explain the phenomenon of asymmetric volatility in equity returns. However, leverage itself can only account for parts of the asymmetry. In this research, it is shown that stock return volatility is related to firms’ financial status. Financially constrained firms tend to be more sensitive to the return changes. Financial constraint factor explains why some firms tend to be more volatile than others. I found that the financial constraint factor explains the stock return volatility independent of other factors such as firm size, industry affiliation and leverage. Firms’ industry affiliations are shown to be very weak in differentiating volatility. Firm size is proven to be a good factor in distinguishing the different levels of volatility and volatility-return sensitivity. Leverage hypothesis is also partly corroborated and the situation where leverage effect is not applicable is discussed. Finally, I examined the macroeconomic policy's effects on overall market volatility. ^

Setting the Rules of the Game: Mega-Regionals and the Role of the WTO

Faced with a WTO in a state of paralysis, large developed trading nations have shifted their attentions to other fora to pursue their trade policy objectives. In particular, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are now being used to promote the regulatory disciplines that were previously rejected by developing countries at the multilateral level. These so-called ‘deep’ or ‘21st century’ PTAs address a variety of issues, from technical norms, procurement, investment protection and intellectual property rights to social and environmental protection. Moreover, recently, developed countries have sought to negotiate PTAs which are large in scale, both in terms of economic size and geographical reach, including the so-called ‘mega-regional’ PTAs, such as the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the EU-Japan PTA, the Transpacific Partnership, and the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. These mega-regional PTAs are distinctive not just in terms of their sheer size and the breadth and depth of issues addressed, but also because some of their proponents readily admit that one of the central aims pursued by such agreements is to design global rules on new trade issues. In other words, these agreements are being conceived as alternatives to multilateral rule making at the WTO level. The proliferation of 21st century trade deals raises important questions concerning the continued relevance of the WTO as a global rule-making venue, and the impact that the regulatory disciplines promoted in such agreements will have on both developing and developed countries. This paper discusses the emerging features of an international trading system that is increasingly populated by large-scale PTAs and discusses some of the points of tension that arise from such practice. Firstly, it examines instances of horizontal tension resulting from the proliferation of PTAs, particularly the extent to which such PTAs represent a threat or multilateral trade governance. Secondly, it looks at an example of vertical tension by examining the manner in which the imposition of regulatory disciplines through trade agreements can undermine the ability of countries, especially developing countries, to pursue legitimate public interest objectives. Finally, the paper considers a number of steps that could be considered to address some of the adverse effects associated with the fragmentation of the international trading system, including the option of embracing variable geometry within the WTO framework and the need to develop mechanisms that provide flexibility for developing countries in the implementation of regulatory disciplines.

New silk road : trade and investment. perspectives for eu and new partnerships

China has already given a fundamental contribution to the present globalization process and have also highly benefited from it by integrating becoming the final stage of the Global Chains Production networks in Asia. This process in China was the result of a survival economic strategy that saw in the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment in intensive low cost workmanship oriented to exports, a fundamental condition to overpass it´s millenary delay. This strategy accepted that the add value that remain in China, although very small was very important to give jobs to millions of Chinese and take them out of the absolute poverty line where they were in 1978 when Deng Xiao Ping launch the 4 Modernizations and the Open Door Policies. Other policies token during the first 30 years of the China Economic Reform, like the Grasp the Big Let Go the Small, the Socialist Market Economy, the Go West and the Go Global were equally important transforming Chinese economy in the second world biggest one. This first globalization stage had its big push in 2001 when China joined the WTO we can say that a new world economic order had begun in that date, placing China in the center of the world.

Swiss Policies for more Food Security

Resource-poor yet blissful Switzerland is also one of the most food-secure countries in the world: there are abundant food supplies, relatively low retail prices in terms of purchasing power parity, with few poverty traps. Domestic production covers 70% of net domestic consumption. A vast and efficient food reserve scheme insures against import disruptions. Nonetheless, the food security contribution by the four sectoral policies involved is mutually constrained: our agriculture is protected by the world’s highest tariffs. Huge subsidies, surface payments, and some production quotas substitute market signals with rent maximisation. Moreover, these inefficiencies also prevent trade and investment policies which would keep markets open, development policies which would provide African farmers with the tools to become more competitive, and supply policies which would work against speculators. The paralysing effect of Swiss agricultural policies is exacerbated by new “food security subsidies” in the name of “food sovereignty” while two pending people’s initiatives might yet increase the splendid isolation which in effect reduce Swiss farmer competitiveness and global food security. Is there a solution? Absent a successful conclusion of the Doha Round (WTO) or a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) further market openings and a consequent “recoupling” of taxpayer support to public goods production remain highly un-likely. To the very minimum Switzerland should resume the agricultural reform process, join other countries trying to prevent predatory behaviour of its investors in developing countries, and regionalise its food reserve.

Prospects for regulatory convergence under TTIP. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/15, October 2013

An ambitious, comprehensive and high-standard trade and investment agreement between the European Union and the United States is feasible, but a key concern is whether the transatlantic trade partners will succeed in creating a meaningful agreement within the tight timeline of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The target of a ratified pact before a new European Commission takes office in November 2014 is an objective that is likely to conflict with the level of ambition on the substance. Regulatory congruence would require the unilateral and unconditional recognition by the TTIP partners of each other’s standards, procedures and conformity assessment tests. The way forward is to create a ‘living’ (or progressive commitment) agreement on regulatory cooperation with a horizontal template for coherence and conformity assessment and a detailed monitoring mechanism, with implementation starting immediately for a few selected sectors. Regulatory harmonisation under TTIP may not lead to emerging markets automatically upgrading to the higher TTIP standards. Domestic priorities and the high demand from a rising price-sensitive group of consumers will likely result in a dual regulatory regime in emerging markets in the medium-term.

The TTIP negotiations: a Pirandello play

Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and the European Policy Centre during which experts, including Pascal Lamy, honorary president of Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and former Director of the WTO explored the key issues of the current Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. What are the geoeconomic and geostrategic goals of the negotiations? What are the rules of the negotiations? Who are the main players? What impact might TTIP have on world trade?

The Geostrategic Implications of TTIP. CEPS Special Report No. 105/April 2015

This paper analyses the strategic considerations that define the perceived need for transatlantic renewal, and examines the geo-economic impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on both emerging powers and poorer countries. It argues that TTIP has the potential to be a catalyst for trade liberalisation at the global level, as long as the US and the EU are proactive about making the ‘open architecture’ of TTIP a reality.

To ISDS or not to ISDS: A question of legitimacy in dispute resolution

Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has gained prominence in recent years with an explosion in the number of investor claims against states. While the evolution of this type of arbitration was expected, its focus and context was not. Investors are currently bringing actions against developed states in unanticipated policy areas. Greece, facing actions from investors challenging its debt haircut and Spain, battling investor challenges to its revamped energy policy are examples of the use of arbitration as a political as well as a dispute resolution tool. It is for this reason why the proposal for the inclusion of ISDS in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has caused so much heated discussion. This paper examines the recent evolution and likely trajectory of investor state dispute settlement, reflecting on consequences for perceptions of arbitration and its links with politics and economics.

The Conversation: Why TTIP will live on – but not for the EU

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – also known as TTIP – could be the next casualty in the Brexit fallout. But not in the way you might expect. The controversial trade agreement between the EU and United States could well fall apart, only for the UK to pick up the pieces for its own trade deal.

Transatlantyckie Partnerstwo w dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji (TTIP) w kontekście europejskiego bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego

Celem artykułu jest dokonanie charakterystyki Transatlantyckiego Partnerstwa w dziedzinie Handlu i Inwestycji (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; TTIP) w szerszym kontekście europejskiego bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego. Pomysł porozumienia zrodził się w rezultacie fundamentalnych zmian zachodzących współcześnie w gospodarce światowej oraz ich postrzegania w Europie i USA. W tekście stwierdzono, że w zamyśle architektów umowy handlowej główny cel TTIP ma wymiar przede wszystkim geopolityczny, a nie tylko ekonomiczny. Przedstawiono także najważniejsze wnioski, jakie płyną z dotychczas przeprowadzonych analiz dla gospodarki europejskiej, a także zidentyfikowano czynniki, które determinować będą wpływ porozumienia na poszczególne państwa europejskie. W artykule zaprezentowano także możliwe konsekwencje wynikające z wejścia umowy w życie dla Polski. Mogą one być istotne w szczególności dla potencjału rozwojowego polskiej gospodarki oraz bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego.