CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, And Managerial Risk-Taking

This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.

Corporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview

Purpose – This paper aims to review traditional corporate governance and accountability research, to suggest opportunities for future research in this field. Design/methodology/approach – The first part adopts an analytical frame of reference based on theory, accountability mechanisms, methodology, business sector/context, globalisation and time horizon. The second part of the paper locates the seven papers in the special issue in a framework of analysis showing how each one contributes to the field. The paper presents a frame of reference which may be used as a “roadmap” for researchers to navigate their way through the prior literature and to position their work on the frontiers of corporate governance research. The paper is primarily discursive and conceptual. Findings – The paper encourages broader approaches to corporate governance and accountability research beyond the traditional and primarily quantitative approaches of prior research. Broader theoretical perspectives, methodological approaches, accountability mechanism, sectors/contexts, globalisation, and time horizons are identified. Research limitations/implications – Greater use of qualitative research methods are suggested, which present challenges particularly of access to the “black box” of corporate boardrooms. Originality/value – Drawing on the analytical framework, and the papers in the special issue, the paper identifies opportunities for further research of accountability and corporate governance. Keywords Corporate governance, Management accountability, Research Paper type General review

Corporate governance: quo vadis?

Purpose – This paper aims to examine current research trends into corporate governance and to propose a different dynamic, humanistic approach based on individual purpose, values and psychology. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews selected literature to analyse the assumptions behind research into corporate governance and uses a multi-disciplinary body of literature to present a different theoretical approach based at the level of the individual rather than the organisation. Findings – The paper shows how the current recommendations of the corporate governance research models could backfire and lead to individual actions that are destructive when implemented in practice. This claim is based on identifying the hidden assumptions behind the principal-agent model in corporate governance, such as the Hobbesian view and the Homo Economicus approach. It argues against the axiomatic view that shareholders are the owners of the company, and it questions the way in which managers are assessed based either on the corporate share price (the shareholder view) or on a confusing set of measures which include more stakeholders (the stakeholder view), and shows how such a yardstick can be demotivating and put the corporation in danger. The paper proposes a humanistic, psychological approach that uses the individual manager as a unit of analysis instead of the corporation and illustrates how such an approach can help to build better governance. Research limitations/implications – The paper's limited scope can only outline a conceptual framework, but does not enter into detailed operationalisation. Practical implications – The paper illustrates the challenges in applying the proposed framework into practice. Originality/value – The paper calls for the use of an alternative unit of analysis, the manager, and for a dynamic and humanistic approach which encompasses the entirety of a person's cognition, including emotional and spiritual values, and which is as of yet usually not to be found in the corporate governance literature.

Global financial crisis: implications for Chinese corporate governance

This paper analyses the role of corporate governance failures and weaknesses in the global financial crisis with reference to the evolution of post-crisis corporate governance arrangements in China. The current crisis presents China with an opportunity to analyse its governance problems, reflect on its weaknesses and implement a strategy to address areas which need attention. This paper opens with a description of China’s exposure to the current global financial crisis and continues to critically evaluate the effectiveness of a free market system on corporate governance. Bratton (2002) maintains that incentive structures that motivate the self-regulatory systems generate less powerful checks against abuse than scholars and practitioners have believed. The paper highlights the need for corporate regulatory bodies and policy makers to revise and re-develop financial services sector regulations. Finally, the paper discusses the need of ethics in organizations - an issue that is beyond legislation. In an increasingly interconnected global economy, it is imperative to increase our understanding of what constitutes an effective corporate governance system. The paper contributes to the corporate governance body of literature within the Chinese context by providing insights into the contributing factors to corporate governance failure that led to the global financial crisis. It also provides policy recommendations for China’s policy makers to seriously consider. The results suggest a need for the re-examination of corporate governance adequacy and the institutionalisation of business ethics.

Corporate governance in Fiji’s Native Land Trust Board

This article examines corporate governance in one of Fiji’s largest trust organisations, the Native Land Trust Board. The principal-agent framework is utilised to analyse the governance issue in this study. An examination of the annual reports and final accounts over the last three decades indicates that poor governance practices by the agent have resulted in the Board not delivering maximum returns to its principal, the landowners.

Do private equity and venture capital backed firms have better corporate governance after going public?

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

Multiple large shareholders in corporate governance

Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not necessarily have the same interests as minority shareholders. We show that bargaining problems Ied by the presence of muItipIe controlling shareholders protect minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems, however, prevent efficient decisions. By solving this trade-off we find that i) muItipIe controlling shareholders should be present in firms with Iarge costs of diIuting minority shareholders and in firms with Iarge financing requirements, ii) an optimal ownership structure requires the presence of a dass of shareholders - the minority shareholders - with no control over corporate decisions. Evidence on the ownership structure of dose corporations in the V.S. is consistent with our model.

Corporate governance development in privately held family businesses: a multiple case analysis

The objective of this study is to better understand and illustrate the process and the motivations for corporate governance implementation in Brazilian privately held family businesses. Three case companies were analyzed through an adapted developmental framework to illustrate the progression in corporate governance in response to changes in the ownership, investment and management dimensions over time. In this development, causal relationships between corporate governance and the three other framework dimensions were identified. It was found that the analyzed companies´ corporate governance implementation was motivated by the need to curb agency costs, whereas a cornerstone in this development was the first generational change. Only after the family businesses have reached the necessary maturity on all three dimensions, corporate governance practices were implemented. Put simply, the analyzed case companies developed formal systems as they grew more complex. This study complements the academic discussions on corporate governance in family businesses by offering Brazilian evidence on its underlying motivations and sequential implementation over time.