Slid pairs in the initialisation of the A5/1 stream cipher

A5/1 is a shift register based stream cipher which uses a majority clocking rule to update its registers. It is designed to provide privacy for the GSM system. In this paper, we analyse the initialisation process of A5/1. We demonstrate a sliding property of the A5/1 cipher, where every valid internal state is also a legitimate loaded state and multiple key-IV pairs produce phase shifted keystream sequences. We describe a possible ciphertext only attack based on this property.

Multiple-time signature schemes against adaptive chosen message attacks

Multiple-time signatures are digital signature schemes where the signer is able to sign a predetermined number of messages. They are interesting cryptographic primitives because they allow to solve many important cryptographic problems, and at the same time offer substantial efficiency advantage over ordinary digital signature schemes like RSA. Multiple-time signature schemes have found numerous applications, in ordinary, on-line/off-line, forward-secure signatures, and multicast/stream authentication. We propose a multiple-time signature scheme with very efficient signing and verifying. Our construction is based on a combination of one-way functions and cover-free families, and it is secure against the adaptive chosen-message attack.

The resistance of PRESENT-80 against related-key differential attacks

We examine the security of the 64-bit lightweight block cipher PRESENT-80 against related-key differential attacks. With a computer search we are able to prove that for any related-key differential characteristic on full-round PRESENT-80, the probability of the characteristic only in the 64-bit state is not higher than 2−64. To overcome the exponential (in the state and key sizes) computational complexity of the search we use truncated differences, however as the key schedule is not nibble oriented, we switch to actual differences and apply early abort techniques to prune the tree-based search. With a new method called extended split approach we are able to make the whole search feasible and we implement and run it in real time. Our approach targets the PRESENT-80 cipher however,with small modifications can be reused for other lightweight ciphers as well.

Cryptanalysis of the convex hull click human identification protocol

Recently, a convex hull-based human identification protocol was proposed by Sobrado and Birget, whose steps can be performed by humans without additional aid. The main part of the protocol involves the user mentally forming a convex hull of secret icons in a set of graphical icons and then clicking randomly within this convex hull. While some rudimentary security issues of this protocol have been discussed, a comprehensive security analysis has been lacking. In this paper, we analyze the security of this convex hull-based protocol. In particular, we show two probabilistic attacks that reveal the user’s secret after the observation of only a handful of authentication sessions. These attacks can be efficiently implemented as their time and space complexities are considerably less than brute force attack. We show that while the first attack can be mitigated through appropriately chosen values of system parameters, the second attack succeeds with a non-negligible probability even with large system parameter values that cross the threshold of usability.

Cryptanalysis of LASH

We show that the LASH-x hash function is vulnerable to attacks that trade time for memory, including collision attacks as fast as 2(4x/11) and preimage attacks as fast as 2(4x/7). Moreover, we briefly mention heuristic lattice based collision attacks that use small memory but require very long messages that are expected to find collisions much faster than 2 x/2. All of these attacks exploit the designers’ choice of an all zero IV. We then consider whether LASH can be patched simply by changing the IV. In this case, we show that LASH is vulnerable to a 2(7x/8) preimage attack. We also show that LASH is trivially not a PRF when any subset of input bytes is used as a secret key. None of our attacks depend upon the particular contents of the LASH matrix – we only assume that the distribution of elements is more or less uniform.

On the (in)security of IDEA in various hashing modes

In this article, we study the security of the IDEA block cipher when it is used in various simple-length or double-length hashing modes. Even though this cipher is still considered as secure, we show that one should avoid its use as internal primitive for block cipher based hashing. In particular, we are able to generate instantaneously free-start collisions for most modes, and even semi-free-start collisions, pseudo-preimages or hash collisions in practical complexity. This work shows a practical example of the gap that exists between secret-key and known or chosen-key security for block ciphers. Moreover, we also settle the 20-year-old standing open question concerning the security of the Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM double-length compression functions, originally invented to be instantiated with IDEA. Our attacks have been verified experimentally and work even for strengthened versions of IDEA with any number of rounds.

Cryptanalysis of the convex hull click human identification protocol

Recently a convex hull based human identification protocol was proposed by Sobrado and Birget, whose steps can be performed by humans without additional aid. The main part of the protocol involves the user mentally forming a convex hull of secret icons in a set of graphical icons and then clicking randomly within this convex hull. In this paper we show two efficient probabilistic attacks on this protocol which reveal the user’s secret after the observation of only a handful of authentication sessions. We show that while the first attack can be mitigated through appropriately chosen values of system parameters, the second attack succeeds with a non-negligible probability even with large system parameter values which cross the threshold of usability.

Weaknesses in the initialisation process of the Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher

The Common Scrambling Algorithm Stream Cipher (CSASC) is a shift register based stream cipher designed to encrypt digital video broadcast. CSA-SC produces a pseudo-random binary sequence that is used to mask the contents of the transmission. In this paper, we analyse the initialisation process of the CSA-SC keystream generator and demonstrate weaknesses which lead to state convergence, slid pairs and shifted keystreams. As a result, the cipher may be vulnerable to distinguishing attacks, time-memory-data trade-off attacks or slide attacks.

Practical attack on NLM-MAC scheme

The NLM stream cipher designed by Hoon Jae Lee, Sang Min Sung, Hyeong Rag Kim is a strengthened version of the LM summation generator that combines linear and non-linear feedback shift registers. In recent works, the NLM cipher has been used for message authentication in lightweight communication over wireless sensor networks and for RFID authentication protocols. The work analyses the security of the NLM stream cipher and the NLM-MAC scheme that is built on the top of the NLM cipher. We first show that the NLM cipher suffers from two major weaknesses that lead to key recovery and forgery attacks. We prove the internal state of the NLM cipher can be recovered with time complexity about nlog7×2, where the total length of internal state is 2⋅n+22⋅n+2 bits. The attack needs about n2n2 key-stream bits. We also show adversary is able to forge any MAC tag very efficiently by having only one pair (MAC tag, ciphertext). The proposed attacks are practical and break the scheme with a negligible error probability.

Low probability differentials and the cryptanalysis of full-round CLEFIA-128

So far, low probability differentials for the key schedule of block ciphers have been used as a straightforward proof of security against related-key differential analysis. To achieve resistance, it is believed that for cipher with k-bit key it suffices the upper bound on the probability to be 2− k . Surprisingly, we show that this reasonable assumption is incorrect, and the probability should be (much) lower than 2− k . Our counter example is a related-key differential analysis of the well established block cipher CLEFIA-128. We show that although the key schedule of CLEFIA-128 prevents differentials with a probability higher than 2− 128, the linear part of the key schedule that produces the round keys, and the Feistel structure of the cipher, allow to exploit particularly chosen differentials with a probability as low as 2− 128. CLEFIA-128 has 214 such differentials, which translate to 214 pairs of weak keys. The probability of each differential is too low, but the weak keys have a special structure which allows with a divide-and-conquer approach to gain an advantage of 27 over generic analysis. We exploit the advantage and give a membership test for the weak-key class and provide analysis of the hashing modes. The proposed analysis has been tested with computer experiments on small-scale variants of CLEFIA-128. Our results do not threaten the practical use of CLEFIA.

Analysis of one-pass block cipher based authenticated encryption schemes

This project analyses and evaluates the integrity assurance mechanisms used in four Authenticated Encryption schemes based on symmetric block ciphers. These schemes are all cross chaining block cipher modes that claim to provide both confidentiality and integrity assurance simultaneously, in one pass over the data. The investigations include assessing the validity of an existing forgery attack on certain schemes, applying the attack approach to other schemes and implementing the attacks to verify claimed probabilities of successful forgeries. For these schemes, the theoretical basis of the attack was developed, the attack algorithm implemented and computer simulations performed for experimental verification.

Improved linear cryptanalysis of reduced-round SIMON-32 and SIMON-48

In this paper we analyse two variants of SIMON family of light-weight block ciphers against variants of linear cryptanalysis and present the best linear cryptanalytic results on these variants of reduced-round SIMON to date. We propose a time-memory trade-off method that finds differential/linear trails for any permutation allowing low Hamming weight differential/linear trails. Our method combines low Hamming weight trails found by the correlation matrix representing the target permutation with heavy Hamming weight trails found using a Mixed Integer Programming model representing the target differential/linear trail. Our method enables us to find a 17-round linear approximation for SIMON-48 which is the best current linear approximation for SIMON-48. Using only the correlation matrix method, we are able to find a 14-round linear approximation for SIMON-32 which is also the current best linear approximation for SIMON-32. The presented linear approximations allow us to mount a 23-round key recovery attack on SIMON-32 and a 24-round Key recovery attack on SIMON-48/96 which are the current best results on SIMON-32 and SIMON-48. In addition we have an attack on 24 rounds of SIMON-32 with marginal complexity.

Linearization Method and Linear Complexity

We focus on the relationship between the linearization method and linear complexity and show that the linearization method is another effective technique for calculating linear complexity. We analyze its effectiveness by comparing with the logic circuit method. We compare the relevant conditions and necessary computational cost with those of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm and the Games-Chan algorithm. The significant property of a linearization method is that it needs no output sequence from a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) because it calculates linear complexity using the algebraic expression of its algorithm. When a PRNG has n [bit] stages (registers or internal states), the necessary computational cost is smaller than O(2n). On the other hand, the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm needs O(N2) where N ( 2n) denotes period. Since existing methods calculate using the output sequence, an initial value of PRNG influences a resultant value of linear complexity. Therefore, a linear complexity is generally given as an estimate value. On the other hand, a linearization method calculates from an algorithm of PRNG, it can determine the lower bound of linear complexity.

impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round aria and camellia

This paper studies the security of the block ciphers ARIA and Camellia against impossible differential cryptanalysis. Our work improves the best impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia known so far. The designers of ARIA expected no impossible differentials exist for 4-round ARIA. However, we found some nontrivial 4-round impossible differentials, which may lead to a possible attack on 6-round ARIA. Moreover, we found some nontrivial 8-round impossible differentials for Camellia, whereas only 7-round impossible differentials were previously known. By using the 8-round impossible differentials, we presented an attack on 12-round Camellia without FL/FL 1 layers.

Algebraic Functions For Recognition

In the general case, a trilinear relationship between three perspective views is shown to exist. The trilinearity result is shown to be of much practical use in visual recognition by alignment --- yielding a direct method that cuts through the computations of camera transformation, scene structure and epipolar geometry. The proof of the central result may be of further interest as it demonstrates certain regularities across homographies of the plane and introduces new view invariants. Experiments on simulated and real image data were conducted, including a comparative analysis with epipolar intersection and the linear combination methods, with results indicating a greater degree of robustness in practice and a higher level of performance in re-projection tasks.