Uses of expertise:Sources, quotes, and voice in the reporting of genetics in the news

Science journalists call upon experts for background and for clarification and comment on scientific findings. This paper examines how science writers choose and use experts, and it focuses on several cases of reporting about genetics and behavior. Our research included two sources of data: interviews with 15 science reporters and three print media samples of coverage of genetics and behavior - alcoholism (between 1980-1995), homosexuality (in 1993 and 1995), and mental illness (between 1970-1995). Science reporters seek relevant and specific experts for nearly every story. Good sources are knowledgeable, are connected to prestigious institutions, are direct and articulate and don't overqualify statements, and they return phone calls. The mean number of experts quoted was 2.8 per story, differing for alcoholism (3.5), homosexuality (2.8), and mental illness (2.6). Researchers and scientists predominated among experts quoted. Quotes were used to provide context, give legitimization, as explication, to provide a kind of balance, and to outline implications. For the homosexuality sample, a significantly greater percentage of activists and advocates were quoted (21 percent compared with 5 percent and 1 percent in other samples, X <0.0001). "Lay" quotes for alcoholism and mental illness were minimal. Except for homosexuality, whose advocates are organized, those "affected" do not have a voice in genetics news stories.

Informational masking in young and elderly listeners for speech masked by simultaneous speech and noise

Three experiments measured the effects of age on informational masking of speech by competing speech. The experiments were designed to minimize the energetic contributions of the competing speech so that informational masking could be measured with no large corrections for energetic masking. Experiment 1 used a "speech-in-speech-in-noise" design, in which the competing speech was presented in noise at a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of -4 dB. This ensured that the noise primarily contributed the energetic masking but the competing speech contributed the informational masking. Equal amounts of informational masking (3 dB) were observed for young and elderly listeners, although less was found for hearing-impaired listeners. Experiment 2 tested a range of SNRs in this design and showed that informational masking increased with SNR up to about an SNR of -4 dB, but decreased thereafter. Experiment 3 further reduced the energetic contribution of the competing speech by filtering it into different frequency bands from the target speech. The elderly listeners again showed approximately the same amount of informational masking (4-5 dB), although some elderly listeners had particular difficulty understanding these stimuli in any condition. On the whole, these results suggest that young and elderly listeners were equally susceptible to informational masking. © 2009 Acoustical Society of America.

Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in a conception of free speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism.

Insults, free speech and offensiveness

This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing of offence is at most evidence that an insult has been communicated; it is not independent grounds of proscription or constraint. The victim of an insult may know that she has been insulted but not accept or agree with the insult, and thereby submit to the insulter. Hence insults need not, as Waldron argues they do, occasion dignitary harms. They do not of themselves subvert their victims' equal moral status. The claim that hateful speech endorses inequality should not be conflated with a claim that such speech directly subverts equality.

Thus, ‘wounding words’ should not unduly trouble the liberal defender of free speech either on the grounds of preventing offence or on those of avoiding dignitary harms.