Credit ratings and government bonds evidence before, during and after the european debt crisis

Neste projeto, investigamos se as agências de rating e as taxas de juro de longo prazo da dívida soberana tiveram uma influência recíproca antes, durante e após a crise da dívida soberana Europeia. Esta análise é realizada, estimando a relação existente entre os ratings da dívida soberana ou taxas de juro e factores macroeconomicos e estruturais, através de uma diferente aplicação de metodologias utilizadas para este efeito. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que, no período da crise soberana, os ratings e as taxas de juros tiveram um mútuo impacto, sugerindo que as descidas dos ratings podem ter conduzido a profecias auto-realizáveis, levando países relativamente estáveis a um eventual incumprimento

Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2010-2011: The region in the decade of the emerging economies

Incluye Bibliografía

Latin America: the missing financial crisis

Includes bibliography

Unfinished business in the international dialogue on debt

Includes bibliography

Capital flows to Latin America: fourth quarter 2002

Includes bibliography

Capital flows to Latin America: third quarter 2003

Includes bibliography

Capital flows to Latin America: third quarter 2004

Includes bibliography

Die Schuldenkrise und die Unterstützung der Europäischen Union

Die Unterstützung der EU durch ihre Bürger ist spätestens seit dem Vertrag von Maastricht Gegenstand einer Vielzahl von Beiträgen in der Einstellungsforschung. Eine zentrale Annahme der bisherigen Forschung war die große Distanz der EU zur Alltagswirklichkeit der Bürger. Nach dieser werden Einstellungen zur EU nur aufwendig oder mit Rückgriff auf Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat gebildet. Mit der Euro-Schuldenkrise, deren wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen für die Bürger und einer Vielzahl von EU-Krisengipfeln erfuhr die europäische Politik seit 2010 eine enorme Aufmerksamkeit in der Öffentlichkeit. In dieser Arbeit wird die Entwicklung der EU-Unterstützung vergleichend in Deutschland und Griechenland vor und während der Schuldenkrise untersucht: 1) Zunächst wird diskutiert, inwieweit die Schuldenkrise mit den etablierten Determinanten der Unterstützungsforschung theoretisch zusammenhängt. Im Mittelpunkt stehen wirtschaftliche und demokratische Performanz, europäische und nationale Identität sowie Heuristiken zum Nationalstaat. 2) Der Fokus auf Deutschland und Griechenland ermöglicht einen Vergleich der Determinanten vor und während der Krise, da beide Länder substanziell völlig unterschiedlich, jedoch gleichzeitig betroffen waren. Während die Bürger in Griechenland spürbare Wohlstandsverluste erleiden, stellt sich in Deutschland die Frage nach der Solidarität mit den europäischen Nachbarn. 3) Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass die etablierten Determinanten in der Schuldenkrise ihre Relevanz behalten. Das individuelle wirtschaftliche Schicksal ist in Griechenland ein stärkerer Einflussfaktor als vor der Krise. Es bestätigt sich die Erwartung, dass die größere Präsenz der EU in der Krise mit einer geringeren Bedeutung der Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat einhergeht.

Essays on credit rating agencies and the assessment of sovereign risk

Sovereign ratings have only recently regained attention in the academic debate. This seems to be somewhat surprising against the background that their influence is well-known and that rating decisions have often been criticized in the past (as for example during the Asian crisis in the 90s). Sovereign ratings do not only assess the creditworthiness of governments: They are also included in the calculation of ratings for sub-sovereign issuers whereby their rating is usually restricted to the upper bound of the sovereign rating (sovereign ceiling). Earlier studies have also shown that the downgrade of a sovereign often leads to contagion effects on neighbor countries. This study focuses first on misleading incentives in the rating industry before chapter three summarizes the literature on the influence and determinants of sovereign ratings. The fourth chapter explores empirically how ratings respond to changes in sovereign debt across specific country groups. The fifth part focuses on single rating decisions of four selected rating agencies and investigates whether the timing of decisions gives reason for herding behavior. The final chapter presents a reform proposal for the future regulation of the rating industry in light of the aforementioned flaws.rn

Focal points and fiscal discipline. ACES Cases No. 2013.2

Many studies suggest that balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign borrowing costs, even if those rules are never enforced in court. Typically, this is explained as a result of a legal deterrence logic, in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters sovereigns from violating the rules. By contrast, we argue that balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets, rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement. Therefore, the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule, rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, determines its effectiveness. We develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument, and we assess this model using data on US states. We then consider implications of our argument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in the Fiscal Compact Treaty.

Hegemony Without Stability: The fiscal and political vulnerabilities of monetary union. ACES Cases No. 2011.2

The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.

A macro-financial analysis of the euro area sovereign bond market. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 259, June 2014

We estimate the 'fundamental' component of euro area sovereign bond yield spreads, i.e. the part of bond spreads that can be justified by country-specific economic factors, euro area economic fundamentals, and international influences. The yield spread decomposition is achieved using a multi-market, no-arbitrage affine term structure model with a unique pricing kernel. More specifically, we use the canonical representation proposed by Joslin, Singleton, and Zhu (2011) and introduce next to standard spanned factors a set of unspanned macro factors, as in Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2013). The model is applied to yield curve data from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain over the period 2005-2013. Overall, our results show that economic fundamentals are the dominant drivers behind sovereign bond spreads. Nevertheless, shocks unrelated to the fundamental component of the spread have played an important role in the dynamics of bond spreads since the intensification of the sovereign debt crisis in the summer of 2011

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

Firmer foundations for a stronger European Banking Union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/13, November 2015

The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and resolution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking.The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data, however, suggests the decline has been halted. About 14 percent of the assets of banks in Banking Union come from other EU countries, while about a quarter of the assets of the top 25 banks in the Banking Union are held in other EU countries.While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely been completed, the crisis-management framework remains incomplete, potentially creating instability. There is no governance mechanism to resolve disputes between different levels of crisis-management agencies, and incentives to promote optimum oversight are lacking. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of clarity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out.To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions should move to the euro-area level, breaking the sovereign-bank loop. A fully-fledged single deposit insurance (and resolution) fund should be favoured over a reinsurance scheme for reasons of cost and simplicity.

Greece is solvent but illiquid. What should the ECB do? CEPS Commentary, 15 June 2015

There is one feature of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece that is widely misunderstood, namely the effective debt burden of the country’s government. Since the start of the crisis, its sovereign debt has been subjected to several restructuring efforts