Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009. Second edition, revised

Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.

Russian army justifies its reforms. OSW Commentary No. 109, 2013-06-25

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been more active than usual since mid- -February this year, holding a number of previously unannounced military exercises aimed at testing combat readiness. They have also maintained, for many months, a Russian warship task force in the Mediterranean in connection with the civil war in Syria. Those activities stand out of the usual training routine of the Russian army. They have no precedent in Russia’s recent history in terms of the size of the forces involved, the measures employed, the territorial span, the number of exercises, or the scheduling and mode of carrying out the drills. The last combat-readiness tests on this scale were carried out by the Soviet army in the 1980s. The intensity of the Russian Navy’s activities in the Mediterranean and the military means engaged are comparable, in due proportion, with the activities of the Soviet fleet during the Vietnam war. The Russian leadership, including president Vladimir Putin, has been directly following the recent activities of the Russian Armed Forces and their evolution.

The single market and competitiveness - the challenges for the Juncker team. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

The announcement of the new European Commission is encouraging for single market supporters, especially in terms of how internal co-ordination and cross functional working will be organised. It is particularly significant that the responsibility for the single market in both goods and services is to be combined under one Commissioner portfolio. There is much to be gained from a combined focus, especially on enforcing the existing rules. A unified Consumer focus is also much welcomed. The European Parliament's Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO), which I had the privilege to Chair over the last five years, was extremely critical of the fragmented approach to consumer policy and legislation adopted by the outgoing Commission. A strong consumer focus underpins a dynamic and well-functioning market place and encourages more competition.

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.

Bulgarian-Russian games in the energy sector: an outcome is getting closer. OSW Commentary No. 61, 2011-10-5

Bulgaria and Russia are entering the final phase of setting the conditions of their co-operation in the energy sector. A new gas contract is being negotiated because the currently applicable agreements will have expired by the end of 2012. The fate of two major energy projects – whose implementation depends on good co-operation between Sofia and Moscow: the Burgas– –Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the construction of a Bulgarian nuclear power plant in Belene with Russian participation – is currently being decided. Another issue ever-present on the agenda is the future of the South Stream gas pipeline promoted by Russia, which is to run through Bulgarian territory. The outcome of all the aforementioned discussions and negotiations will determine for years the model of Bulgarian-Russian relations and may strongly affect the shape of the oil, gas and electricity markets in South-Eastern Europe.

Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09

In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or in South America). Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce their positions in international markets. The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen to twenty years at the earliest.

Cameron’s ‘renegotiations’ (or Russian roulette) with the EU: An interim assessment. CEPS Working Document No. 413/September 2015

Since the May 2015 general election when the Tory Party gained an absolute majority in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Cameron has put his campaign into high gear to get a ‘new settlement’ with the EU and invested much personal diplomacy to try to advance his objective. “What does he really want?” is still heard from other EU leaders, yet his agenda is taking rough shape with calls for results under four headings: “competitiveness, sovereignty, social security and economic governance”. These are only code words, however, for a mixed bag of more specific desiderata, which overall seem to be moderate. Impossible demands have been quietly dropped. Some items will still be tricky to negotiate while others can be placed on the agenda for ongoing EU ‘reform’ that can be widely supported. The Brussels side of the affair thus seems manageable, but the wild cards at home in the UK remain or are becoming even wilder. The standard hazards of the referendum instrument are now exacerbated by the unknown quantity of the new Labour leadership alongside the aggressively Eurosceptic majority of Tory MPs and the great migration crisis, which is translating now into a negative factor for the EU in UK opinion polls. This ostensibly very democratic process is looking more and more like a deadly serious game of Russian roulette.

Composition of airborne material from yellow snow fallen in the Russian North

Large amounts of dust responsible for bright colors of atmospheric precipitation in the temperate, subpolar and polar zones of the northern hemisphere have been rarely observed. In the twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty first century in the Northern European Russia such events were not registered up to March 25-26, 2008. At that time in some parts of the Arkhangel'sk region, Komi Republic, and Nenets Autonomous Area atmospheric precipitation as sleet and rain responsible for sand- and saffron colors of ice crust formation on the snow surface was observed. During detailed mineralogical, geochemical, pollen, diatom and meteorological investigations it was established that semidesert and steppe regions of the Northwest Kazakhstan, Volgograd and Astrakhan' regions, and Kalmykia are the main sources of the yellow dust.

The Russian story; the coming of age of a great people,

London edition (Hutchinson & co., ltd.) has title: The Russian glory.

Russian album. [music] : selected compositions for the pianoforte.

Gavotte pastorale / A. Arensky -- Golden wedding minuet / G. Karganoff -- Arabesque / G. Karganoff -- Berceuse / Alex Ilynsky -- Fantastic tale / H. Pachulski -- Slumber song / L. Arkadieff -- Album leaf, in C / Alexander Kopylow -- Romance in A[flat] / Nikolas Rimsky-Korsakoff -- Arabesque / B. Wrangell -- Canzonetta / Caesar Cui -- Nocturne / Ignace Krzyzanowski -- Berceuse / G. Karganoff -- Prelude / A. Kopylow -- The Cuckoo / A. Arensky -- Elegie / Sergei Yóuferoff -- Valse capricieuse / Boleslaus Grodzki -- Intermezzo / G. Karganoff -- Berceuse / S. Barmotine -- The Music box / Anatole Liadow -- Novellette / N. Rimsky-Korsakow -- Tarentelle / Gʹenari Karganoff -- By the sea / A. Arensky.

A little Russian suite : for the pianoforte /

No.1. Russian air.--No.2. Siberian waltz.--No.3. Dance.

The Russian economist.

No. 1 published by Williams, Lea & Co.

Illustrated technical dictionary in six languages, English, German, French, Russian, Italian, Spanish /

Vols. 7-13 have added t.p.: Schlomann-Oldenbourgh illustrierte technische wörterbücher, unter mitwirkung hervorragender fachieute des in- und auslandes, hrsg. von Alfred Schlomann ... Müchen und Berlin, Druck und verlag von R. Oldenbourg; London, Constable & Co., etc.

Memorie per servire alla storia della rivoluzione degli Stati Romano dall'elevazione di Pio IX al pontificato sino alla caduta della repubblica.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Russian Revolution as I saw it.

Mode of access: Internet.