Speaking with One Voice?: Ethno-national Division on the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The challenge of designing institutions to manage ethno-national conflict is one of the enduring concerns of political science. One important but relatively understudied aspect of this challenge is the design of constitutional courts. Courts are likely to play a key role in the maintenence of a constitutional settlement. But this role can be especially onerous in a deeply divided and post-conflict setting where the rule of law is weak and judges have ethno-national affiliations that may undermine the appearance of judicial neutrality. In such contexts, a court’s authority (including compliance with its decisions) cannot be taken for granted.

With reference the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and using an original dataset of the Court's non-unanimous plenary decisions, we test several hypotheses about the degree to which ethno-national affiliation influences judicial behavior. We find that (1) judges on the Constitutional Court do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, (2) that these patterns are robust to changes in the tenure system, and (3) are independent of party political background.

The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence: Valiuliene v Lithuania

This article analyses the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of domestic violence, with a particular focus on Valiuliene v Lithuania. It seems that to date the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue is somewhat inconsistent, and with Valiuliene v Lithuania the Court was given an opportunity to clarify its approach in this area. There are certainly a number of positive aspects to the Court’s judgment, however there are also difficulties with the approach of the Court in this case. Overall it is to be hoped that the judgment in Valiuliene v Lithuania will mark the beginning of a more coherent jurisprudence as regards domestic violence.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has begun to refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to support its reasoning for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in a particular way. But the EU Charter does not yet have any special status in that regard, being treated by the Court as on a par with numerous other documents of international law. The Court’s use of the Charter began in connection with arts 8 and 12 of the Convention (the right to a family life and the right to marry) but in subsequent years it has been extended to many other Articles of the Convention. It is in relation to art.6 (the right to a fair trial) that the Charter’s influence has been most noticeable so far, the Court having changed its position on two important aspects of Article 6 partly because of the wording of the EU Charter. But the influence on art.3 (in relation to the rights of asylum seekers), art.7 (in relation to retroactive penal laws), art.9 (in relation to the right to conscientious objection) and art.11 (in relation to rights of trades unions) has also been significant. The potential for the Charter to have greater influence on the Court’s jurisprudence in years to come remains considerable.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

Digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice

This article discusses the use of digital evidence as a means of proof before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The absence of specific Court rules and procedures for digital evidence (with the exception of Practice Direction IX bis) is not necessarily an obstacle to its production and evaluation before the ICJ, as the general evidentiary rules can also be applied to digital evidence. The article first looks at the rules on the production of documentary evidence and then examines the specific issues related to audiovisual evidence. Finally, it examines the admissibility of digital evidence unlawfully obtained by a litigant through unilateral transborder access to data. The article concludes that, even if specific regulation may be needed as to the specific way in which authenticity and accuracy of digital evidence are to be established, the particular facts of the case and the grounds of challenge can vary widely, and it is doubtful that any regulation could be sufficiently flexible to deal with this in advance.

Limiting rights, Canadian style : the Supreme Court of Canada, American jurisprudence and section 1 of the Charter /

The addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms represented a fundamental shift in Canadian governance. Many saw the tabling of such a document as a further, even fmal, step towards the Americanization of the Canadian polity. While the Charter's presence has significantly altered the relationship between citizens, government and the courts, it has done so by maintaining the traditional values and experiences that has been the hallmarks of Canadian constitutionalism. This is in contrast to the fears harboured by critics suggesting that the Charter was a further Americanization of the Canadian Polity, notwithstanding the very different natures of the American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. Analyzing American Supreme Court precedent use by the Canadian Supreme Court has demonstrated that such an Americanization has not, in fact, occurred. In the present analysis of American precedent use in section 1 limitation of rights cases, the citation of these precedents are at best episodic, at least on the quantitative level. Qualitatively, the Canadian Supreme Court generally uses American jurisprudence to further support broad definitions of 'great rights' . As for the more intricate details of rights limitations and the process involved in detennining how Charter rights are limited, one would be hard pressed to find even cursory references to American case law.

Proceedings of a court of inquiry, convened on board the United States frigate the President, in the harbour of New York, on the thirteenth day of August, 1811, pursuant to the following warrant : To Stephen Decatur, esquire, a captain in the Navy of the United States. --

Caption title.

Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry 1811

Full Title:Proceedings of a court of inquiry, convened on board the United States frigate the President, in the harbour of New York, on the thirteenth day of August, 1811, pursuant to the following warrant : To Stephen Decatur, esquire, a captain in the Navy of the United States.

A review of the case of Alexander McLeod: recently determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the state of New York (1841)

Alexander McLeod, a British subject, was tried for the murder of Amos Durfee and as an accomplice in the burning of the steamer Caroline, in the Niagara River, during the Canadian rebellion in 1837-1838.

Case of Colonel Booker. The Court of Inquiry

A four sided pamphlet written by Alexander Somerville, and printed by Lawson & Co., Hamilton, Ont. The list of contents for the article reads: "Evidence Suppressed, Newspapers Silenced, Statement of Captain McGrath, General Manager of the Welland Railway, as to Colonel Booker's apparent mental aberration, on June 3rd, at 4 A.M. Squire Larne's statement. Other evidence."

Driedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization

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Regulatory History Material as an Extrinsic Aid to Interpretation: An Empirical Study on the Use of RIAS by the Federal Court of Canada

Since 1986, the Canadian Public Administration is required to analyze the socio-economic impact of new regulatory requirements or regulatory changes. To report on its analysis, a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS) is produced and published in the Canada Gazette with the proposed regulation to which it pertains for notice to, and comments by, interested parties. After the allocated time for comments has elapsed, the regulation is adopted with a final version of the RIAS. Both documents are again published in the Canada Gazette. As a result, the RIAS acquires the status of an official public document of the Government of Canada and its content can be argued in courts as an extrinsic aid to the interpretation of a regulation. In this paper, an analysis of empirical findings on the uses of this interpretative tool by the Federal Court of Canada is made. A sample of decisions classified as unorthodox show that judges are making determinations on the basis of two distinct sets of arguments built from the information found in a RIAS and which the author calls “technocratic” and “democratic”. The author argues that these uses raise the general question of “What makes law possible in our contemporary legal systems”? for they underline enduring legal problems pertaining to the knowledge and the acceptance of the law by the governed. She concludes that this new interpretive trend of making technocratic and democratic uses of a RIAS in case law should be monitored closely as it may signal a greater change than foreseen, and perhaps an unwanted one, regarding the relationship between the government and the judiciary.