Positive self-image and incentives in organizations

This paper investigates the implications of individuals’ mistaken beliefs of their abilities on incentives in organizations using the principal-agent model of moral hazard. The paper shows that if effort is observable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability are always favorable to the principal. However, if effort is unobservable, then an agent’s mistaken beliefs about own ability can be either favorable or unfavorable to the principal. The paper provides conditions under which an agent’s over estimation about own ability is favorable to the principal when effort is unobservable. Finally, the paper shows that workers’ mistaken beliefs about their coworkers’ abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic incentive schemes.

Positive self-image in tournaments

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.

Forecasts of relative performance in tournaments: Evidence from the field

This paper uses a field experiment to investigate the quality of individuals’ forecasts of relative performance in tournaments. We ask players in luck-based (poker) and skill-based (chess) tournaments to make point forecasts of rank. The main finding of the paper is that players’ forecasts in both types of tournaments are biased towards overestimation of relative performance. However, the size of the biases found is not as large as the ones often reported in the psychology literature. We also find support for the “unskilled and unaware hypothesis” in chess: high skilled chess players make better forecasts than low skilled chess players. Finally, we find that chess players’ forecasts of relative performance are not efficient.

Collusion and reciprocity in infinitely repeated games

This paper extends the standard industrial organization models of repeated interaction between firms by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The main finding of the paper is that, for plausible perceptions of fairness, preferences for reciprocity facilitate collusion in infinitely repeated market games, that is, the critical discount rate at wish collusion can be sustained tends to be lower when firms have preferences for reciprocity than when firms are selfish. The paper also finds that the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with reciprocal firms is worse for consumers than the best collusive outcome that can be sustained in the infinitely repeated Cournot game with selfish firms.

Majoritarian delays

This paper illustrates how delayed debt stabilizations can arise in a society without any emerging conflict of interests among its members. We argue that, under a majority voting rule, the economy may generate excessive levels of government spending and larger debts over time, and that this delay is increasing in income inequality. The intuition for this result is simple: a majority of citizens may find in delaying stabilizations a way to increase government expenditures, transferring in this way resources from the richest to the poorest citizens in the economy. This process may explain the upward trend and the difficulty to reduce public expenditures, the so called "ratchet effect."

Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays

We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, only equilibria with finite call prices and receiving prices exist. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero.

The strength of the waterbed effect depends on tariff type

We show that the waterbed effect, i.e. the pass-through of a change in one price of a firm to its other prices, is much stronger if the latter include subscription rather than only usage fees. In particular, in mobile network competition with a fixed number of customers, the waterbed effect is full under two-part tariffs, while it is only partial under linear tariffs.

Return Migration, Self-Selection and Entrepreneurship in Mozambique

Does return migration affect entrepreneurship? This question has important implications for the debate on the economic development effects of migration for origin countries. The existing literature has, however, not addressed how the estimation of the impact of return migration on entrepreneurship is affected by double unobservable migrant self-selection, both at the initial outward migration and at the final inward return migration stages. This paper uses a representative household survey conducted in Mozambique in order to address this research question. We exploit variation provided by displacement caused by civil war in Mozambique, as well as social unrest and other shocks in migrant destination countries. The results lend support to negative unobservable self-selection at both and each of the initial and return stages of migration, which results in an under-estimation of the effects of return migration on entrepreneurial outcomes when using a ‘naïve’ estimator not controlling for self-selection. Indeed, ‘naïve’ estimates point to a 13 pp increase in the probability of owning a business when there is a return migrant in the household relative to non-migrants only, whereas excluding the double effect of unobservable self-selection, this effect becomes significantly larger - between 24 pp and 29 pp, depending on the method of estimation and source of variation used.

Do Migrants Send Remittances as a Way of Self-Insurance?

How do risk preferences affect migrant remittance behaviour? Examination of this relationship has only begun to be explored. Using a tailored representative survey of 1500 immigrants in the Greater Dublin Area, Ireland, we find a positive and significant relationship between risk aversion and migrant remittances. Risk-averse individuals are more likely to send remittances home and are, on average, likely to remit a higher amount, after controlling for a broad range of individual and group characteristics. The evidence we obtain is consistent with a “purchase of self-insurance” motive to remit in that we also find support for more remittances being sent by risk-averse immigrants who face higher wage risks and to individuals with more financial resources.

Leadership paradoxes in Angolan organizations: Emic paradoxes, etic paradoxes, and paradox work

The study departs from two assumptions. First, it considers that organizations and their leadership are inherently paradoxical and that, in that sense, dealing with paradox is a necessary component of the leadership process. Second, it explores whether the paradoxes of leadership may manifest differently in different contexts. We explore the emergence of paradox in the leadership of Angolan organizations. Angola is an economy transitioning from a centrally-planned to a market mode, and this makes it a rich site for understanding the specificities of paradoxical processes in an under-researched, “rest of the world”, context. The findings of our inductive study led to the emergence of four interrelated paradoxes and highlight the importance of paradoxical work as a management requirement.

What makes people stay in or leave shrinking cities? An empirical study from Portugal

The relative attractiveness of cities as places to live determines population movements in or out of them. Understanding the appealing features of a city is fundamental to local governments, particularly for cities facing population decline. Pull and push attributes of cities can include economic aspects, the availability of amenities and psychological constructs, initiating a discussion around which factors are more relevant in explaining migration. However, a pull–push approach has been underexplored in studies of shrinking cities. In the present study, we contribute to the discussion by identifying pull and push factors in Portuguese shrinking cities. Data were collected using a face-to-face questionnaire survey of 701 residents in four shrinking cities: Oporto, Barreiro, Peso da Régua and Moura. Factor analysis and automatic linear modelling were used to analyse the data. Our results support previous findings that the economic activity of a city is the most relevant feature for retaining residents. However, other characteristics specific to each city, especially those related to heritage and natural beauty, are also shown to influence a city’s attractiveness as a place to live. The cause of population shrinkage is also found to influence residents’ assessments of the pull and push attributes of each city. Furthermore, the results show the relevance of social ties and of place attachment to inhabitants’ intention to continue living in their city of residence.

Determinants of success of Nova SBE’s undergraduate students

Applied Policy Analysis major

Attractiveness of European masters under Bologna constraints: The South American case

This paper studies strategies to attract students from outside Europe to European preexperience masters. We characterize the value added by such masters through interviews with key players at the universities and multinational recruiting corporations. We considered a strategy for segmenting international students in the US and extended it to the European market. We have analyzed data from international applications to Nova SBE as a proxy for applications in European institutions. Based on that analysis we conclude with recommendations to attract suitable candidates from outside Europe. In particular we also provided three different solutions to attract students from the southern hemisphere: we conclude that European institutions should (a) increase the spring semester intake, (b) provide bridging courses for some students, or (c) could place some accepted candidates in internships before starting classes.

História e Saber Tropical: Memória de Gago para além das suas políticas

A morte súbita de José Mariano Gago aos 66 anos gerou consternação nos seus numerosos amigos e admiradores em Portugal e no estrangeiro. Governante mais durável do regime, a sua obra recebeu tributos unânimes cá dentro, sendo amplamente creditado lá fora por ter criado o Conselho Europeu de Investigação (ERC). Estão disponíveis inúmeros testemunhos num sítio dedicado, foi publicada em sua memória um volume de estudos sobre ciência e ensino superior em Portugal e preparam-se mais homenagens. Esta destaca dois aspetos menos conhecidos do físico e político português, amor pela história pátria e consciência da relação desta com o saber tropical, antes de apreciar a retrospetiva oficial. Focando um retrato de Damião de Góis que desejava oferecer na Flandres e acreditava que eu poderia localizar, a minha homenagem a Mariano pretende ir para além do Palácio das Laranjeiras, onde governou, e da Europa, onde estudou.

Decision-making process of Nova Executivos’ students

Field lab: Consumer insights