The Kremlin plays the immigration card. OSW Commentary No. 112, 2013-08-19

Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international migrants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the largescale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increases competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elections scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the actions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine: An attempt to understand the reasons. OSW Study 18/2005

The Ukrainian society in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election was in a state which political science literature characterises as an almost "ideal" condition for an outbreak of social unrest. Growing expectations, both economic and political, seemed vain due to mounting impediments. The victory of Viktor Yanukovych was perceived by many opinion-makers as a nail in the coffin of such aspirations.

Testing for Subsidiarity. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 13/2006

In the EU circuit (especially the European Parliament, the Council and Coreper) as well as in national parliaments of the EU Member States, one observes a powerful tendency to regard 'subsidiarity' as a 'political' issue. Moreover, subsidiarity is frequently seen as a one-way street : powers going 'back to' Member States. Both interpretations are at least partly flawed and less than helpful when looking for practical ways to deal with subsidiarity at both EU and Member states' levels. The present paper shows that subsidiarity as a principle is profoundly 'functional' in nature and, hence, is and must be a two-way principle. A functional subsidiarity test is developed and its application is illustrated for a range of policy issues in the internal market in its widest sense, for equity and for macro-economic stabilisation questions in European integration. Misapplications of 'subsidiarity' are also demonstrated. For a good understanding, subsidiarity being a functional, two-way principle neither means that elected politicians should not have the final (political!) say (for which they are accountable), nor that subsidiarity tests, even if properly conducted, cannot and will not be politicised once the results enter the policy debate. Such politicisation forms a natural run-up to the decision-making by those elected for it. But the quality and reasoning of the test as well as structuring the information in a logical sequence ( in accordance with the current protocol and with the one in the constitutional treaty) is likely to be directly helpful for decisionmakers, confronted with complicated and often specialised proposals. EU debates and decision-making is therefore best served by separating the functional subsidiarity test (prepared by independent professionals) from the final political decision itself. If the test were accepted Union-wide, it would also assist national parliaments in conducting comparable tests in a relatively short period, as the basis for possible joint action (as suggested by the constitutional treaty). The core of the paper explains how the test is formulated and applied. A functional approach to subsidiarity in the framework of European representative democracy seeks to find the optimal assignment of regulatory or policy competences to the various tiers of government. In the final analysis, this is about structures facilitating the highest possible welfare in the Union, in the fundamental sense that preferences and needs are best satisfied. What is required for such an analysis is no less than a systematic cost/benefit framework to assess the (de)merits of (de)centralisation in the EU.

Greece in limbo: Post-election 2015 scenarios. EPIN Commentary No. 22/ 21 January 2015

In the run-up to elections in Greece on January 25th, this EPIN commentary explores the likelihood and consequences of four potential post-election scenarios: 1. Syriza single-party majority government or Syriza-led coalition government with anti-austerity parties 2. Syriza-led coalition government with pro-austerity parties or Syriza minority government 3. New Democracy government or ND-led coalition government 4. No government is formed.

Grexit 2015: A primer. CEPS Commentary, 22 January 2015

In the run-up to the Greek elections on January 25th and the subsequent renegotiation of the country's economic adjustment programme with the troika, Daniel Gros writes in this Commentary that "nobody officially wants Grexit": not Syriza, which wants Greece to stay in the euro. It is ‘only’ asking for a reduction in Greece’s official debt and an end to austerity. The German government also does not favour Grexit because European unification remains the central project for German policy-makers across all mainstream parties. Only some protest parties and vocal economists think Greece (and Germany) would better off with a new Drachma. In his view, the substantive issues are thus the demands for a reduction of the official debt of Greece and an end to austerity, both of which he describes as eminently fudgeable. In any event, change in policy will be minor if a Syriza government is as successful in fulfilling its promise to spend as the previous government was in promising not to spend.

Eurozone Crisis and Social Models: What We Can Learn from Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #20, 2013-2014

This paper considers the role of social model features in the economic performance of Italy and Spain during the run-up to the Eurozone crisis, as well as the consequences of that crisis, in turn, for the two countries social models. It takes issue with the prevailing view - what I refer to as the “competitiveness thesis” - which attributes the debtor status of the two countries to a lack of competitive capacity rooted in social model features. This competitiveness thesis has been key in justifying the “liberalization plus austerity” measures that European institutions have demanded in return for financial support for Italy and Spain at critical points during the crisis. The paper challenges this prevailing wisdom. First, it reviews the characteristics of the Italian and Spanish social models and their evolution in the period prior to the crisis, revealing a far more complex, dynamic and differentiated picture than is given in the political economy literature. Second, the paper considers various ways in which social model characteristics are said to have contributed to the Eurozone crisis, finding such explanations wanting. Italy and Spain ́s debtor status was primarily the result of much broader dynamics in the Euro- zone, including capital flows from richer to poorer countries that affected economic demand, with social model features playing, at most, an ancillary role. More aggressive reforms responding to EU demands in Spain may have increased the long term social and economic costs of the crisis, whereas the political stalemate that slowed such reforms in Italy may have paradoxically mitigated these costs. The comparison of the two countries thus suggests that, in the absence of broader macro-institutional reform of the Eurozone, compliance with EU dictates may have had perverse effects.

A close call before Paris. CEPS Commentary, 2 November 2015

Following the final negotiating session in Bonn, October 19-23, and in the run-up to COP21 in Paris, which is expected to culminate in a new global climate agreement in December, Andrei Marcu offers his assessment of this immensely complicated and important project and its chances to succeed. In his view, the latest version of the text allows all countries to feel ownership and can succeed if sufficient political will can be summoned.

Response of coastal groundwater table to offshore storms

Large groundwater table fluctuations were observed in a coastal aquifer during an offshore storm. The storm induced significant changes of the mean shoreline elevation, characterized by a pulse-like oscillation. This pulse propagated in the aquifer, resulting in the water table fluctuations. A general analytical solution is derived to quantify this new mechanism of water table fluctuation. The solution is applied to field observations and is found to be able to predict reasonably well the observed storm-induced water table fluctuations. Based on the analytical solution, the damping characteristics and phase shift of the oscillation as it propagates inland are examined.

Swash overtopping and sediment overwash on a truncated beach

New experimental laboratory data are presented on swash overtopping and sediment overwash on a truncated beach, approximating the conditions at the crest of a beach berm or inter-tidal ridge-runnel. The experiments provide a measure of the uprush sediment transport rate in the swash zone that is unaffected by the difficulties inherent in deploying instrumentation or sediment trapping techniques at laboratory scale. Overtopping flow volumes are compared with an analytical solution for swash flows as well as a simple numerical model, both of which are restricted to individual swash events. The analytical solution underestimates the overtopping volume by an order of magnitude while the model provides good overall agreement with the data and the reason for this difference is discussed. Modelled flow velocities are input to simple sediment transport formulae appropriate to the swash zone in order to predict the overwash sediment transport rates. Calculations performed with traditional expressions for the wave friction factor tend to underestimate the measured transport. Additional sediment transport calculations using standard total load equations are used to derive an optimum constant wave friction factor of f(w)=0.024. This is in good agreement with a broad range of published field and laboratory data. However, the influence of long waves and irregular wave run-up on the overtopping and overwash remains to be assessed. The good agreement between modelled and measured sediment transport rates suggests that the model provides accurate predictions of the uprush sediment transport rates in the swash zone, which has application in predicting the growth and height of beach berms. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Large scale experiments on gravel and mixed beaches: Experimental procedure, data documentation and initial results

This paper provides information on the experimental set-up, data collection methods and results to date for the project Large scale modelling of coarse grained beaches, undertaken at the Large Wave Channel (GWK) of FZK in Hannover by an international group of researchers in Spring 2002. The main objective of the experiments was to provide full scale measurements of cross-shore processes on gravel and mixed beaches for the verification and further development of cross-shore numerical models of gravel and mixed sediment beaches. Identical random and regular wave tests were undertaken for a gravel beach and a mixed sand/gravel beach set up in the flume. Measurements included profile development, water surface elevation along the flume, internal pressures in the swash zone, piezometric head levels within the beach, run-up, flow velocities in the surf-zone and sediment size distributions. The purpose of the paper is to present to the scientific community the experimental procedure, a summary of the data collected, some initial results, as well as a brief outline of the on-going research being carried out with the data by different research groups. The experimental data is available to all the scientific community following submission of a statement of objectives, specification of data requirements and an agreement to abide with the GWK and EU protocols. (C) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Long wave generation by the shoaling and breaking of transient wave groups on a beach

This paper presents new laboratory data on the generation of long waves by the shoaling and breaking of transient-focused short-wave groups. Direct offshore radiation of long waves from the breakpoint is shown experimentally for the first time. High spatial resolution enables identification of the relationship between the spatial gradients of the short-wave envelope and the long-wave surface. This relationship is consistent with radiation stress theory even well inside the surf zone and appears as a result of the strong nonlinear forcing associated with the transient group. In shallow water, the change in depth across the group leads to asymmetry in the forcing which generates significant dynamic setup in front of the group during shoaling. Strong amplification of the incident dynamic setup occurs after short-wave breaking. The data show the radiation of a transient long wave dominated by a pulse of positive elevation, preceded and followed by weaker trailing waves with negative elevation. The instantaneous cross-shore structure of the long wave shows the mechanics of the reflection process and the formation of a transient node in the inner surf zone. The wave run-up and relative amplitude of the radiated and incident long waves suggests significant modification of the incident bound wave in the inner surf zone and, the dominance of long waves generated by the breaking process. It is proposed that these conditions occur when the primary short waves and bound wave are not shallow water waves at the breakpoint. A simple criterion is given to determine these conditions, which generally occur for the important case of storm waves.

Measurement and modelling of controlled beach groundwater levels under wave action

New laboratory scale experimental data are presented on the forcing of beach groundwater levels by wave run-up. The experimental setup simulates a coastal barrier dividing the ocean from a relatively constant back beach water level, conditions approximating a closed off lagoon system or beach aquifer. The data are critically compared to an advanced numerical model for simulating wave and beach groundwater interaction in the coastal zone, and provide the first experimental verification of such a model. Overall model-data comparisons are good, but some systematic discrepancies are apparent, and reasons for these are discussed.

Integrated logistics and supply chain management:the state of practice in Ireland

The Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland were provided with aid to offset locational disadvantages in the run up to the Single European Market. Since then the Republic has emerged as the fastest growing member of the E.U. Success has not been underpinned by the transport system, suggesting that business has had to overcome locational disadvantages by strong performance elsewhere in the supply chain. The evidence indicates that there are Irish firms operating supply chain management techniques at a truly international standard. The problem is that there are so few in that category Meeting Ireland’s competitiveness challenge means closing the gap between the small group of large and foreign-owned firms, which display excellence in SCM, and the larger group of indigenous small and medium size businesses, which do not.

New Europe’s new development aid

This book examines the international development policies of five East Central European new EU member states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. These countries turned from being aid recipients to donors after the turn of the millennium in the run-up to EU accession in 2004. The book explains the evolution subsequent to EU accession and current state of foreign aid policies in the region and the reasons why these deviate from many of the internationally agreed best practices in development cooperation. It argues that after the turn of the millennium, a 'Global Consensus' has emerged on how to make foreign aid more effective for development. A comparison between the elements of the Global Consensus and the performance of the five countries reveals that while they have generally implemented little of these recommendations, there are also emerging differences between the countries, with the Czech Republic and Slovenia clearly aspiring to become globally responsible donors. Building on the literatures on foreign policy analysis, international socialization and interest group influence, the book develops a model of foreign aid policy making in order to explain the general reluctance of the five countries in implementing international best practices, and also the differences in their relative performance.

Arlette Laguiller:does the mainstay of the French political far-left enjoy linguistic parity with her male counterparts?

While language use has been argued to reflect gender asymmetry, increasing parity has been evidenced in official settings (Holmes, 2000; Dister and Moreau, 2006). Our hypothesis is that the French national press has developed a norm of equal linguistic treatment of men and women. In a corpus of articles from Libération, Le Monde, and Le Figaro, we examine the treatment of Arlette Laguiller, the female leader of the French extreme-left 'Worker's Struggle' Party (Lutte Ouvrière), during the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections. How Laguiller is referred to and described in comparison with her male counterparts evidences no asymmetry. Breaches to parity are only found in the right-wing Figaro newspaper. The ideological distance between the newspaper and the candidate suggests that power struggles are a primary source of asymmetrical treatments. The discursive functions of such treatments can be understood through an investigation based on a portable corpus linguistics methodology for the measure of discrimination. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.