Attitudinal and demographic determinants of diet quality and implications for policy targeting

Background:  Poor diet quality is a major public health concern that has prompted governments to introduce a range of measures to promote healthy eating. For these measures to be effective, they should target segments of the population with messages relevant to their needs, aspirations and circumstances. The present study investigates the extent to which attitudes and constraints influence healthy eating, as well as how these vary by demographic characteristics of the UK population. It further considers how such information may be used in segmented diet and health policy messages. Methods:  A survey of 250 UK adults elicited information on conformity to dietary guidelines, attitudes towards healthy eating, constraints to healthy eating and demographic characteristics. Ordered logit regressions were estimated to determine the importance of attitudes and constraints in determining how closely respondents follow healthy eating guidelines. Further regressions explored the demographic characteristics associated with the attitudinal and constraint variables. Results:  People who attach high importance to their own health and appearance eat more healthily than those who do not. Risk-averse people and those able to resist temptation also eat more healthily. Shortage of time is considered an important barrier to healthy eating, although the cost of a healthy diet is not. These variables are associated with a number of demographic characteristics of the population; for example, young adults are more motivated to eat healthily by concerns over their appearance than their health. Conclusions:  The approach employed in the present study could be used to inform future healthy eating campaigns. For example, messages to encourage the young to eat more healthily could focus on the impact of diets on their appearance rather than health.

Language capital and development: the case of African language publishing for children in South Africa

In recognizing 11 official languages, the 1996 South African Constitution provides a context for the management of diversity with important implications for the redistribution of wealth and power. The development and implementation of the language-in-education policies which might be expected to flow from the Constitution, however, have been slow and ineffective. One of the casualties of government procrastination has been African language publishing. In the absence of well-resourced bilingual education, most learners continue to be taught through the medium of English as a second language. Teachers are reluctant to use more innovative pedagogies without the support of adequate African language materials and publishers are cautious about producing such materials. Nonetheless, activity in this sector offers many opportunities for African language speakers. This paper explores the challenges and constraints for African language publishing for children and argues that market forces and language policy need to work in mutually reinforcing ways. Further progress is necessarily dependent on the political will to implement language-in-education policies that promote additive bilingualism and, in the process, guarantee sales for risk-averse publishers.

El papel del género en la toma de decisiones bajo incertidumbre

We study gender differences in individual decision making under uncertainty. we use the lottery panel test introduced in Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002). We find that females are more risk averse than males. Moreover, females are less sensitive to risk premia than males.

Um modelo de competição baseada em tempo nos mercados financeiros

O objetivo deste trabalho é modelar o comportamento estratégico dos indivíduos diante de um choque estocástico que desloca o preço de determinado ativo financeiro do seu equilíbrio inicial. Investiga-se o caminho do preço de mercado em direção ao novo equilíbrio, conduzido pelas sucessivas negociações dos agentes em busca de oportunidades de obter lucros imediatos. Os operadores, que por suposição possuem funções de utilidade avessas ao risco, devem escolher a quantidade ótima transacionada e quanto devem aguardar para executar as suas ordens, tendo em vista a diminuição da volatilidade do preço do ativo à medida que as transações se sucedem após o choque. Procura-se demonstrar que os operadores que aceitam incorrer em riscos mais elevados negociam com maior frequência e em volumes e velocidades maiores, usufruindo lucros esperados mais altos que os demais.

Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

A composição da dívida pública mobiliária federal interna e os fundos de investimento no Brasil: análise dos fatores de influência

This work intends to study the relationship between Brazilian Internal Public Debt mix and Mutual Funds. In the theoretical framework, the discussion about liquidity preference theories implies considering risk averse investors. Portfolio selection is also discussed, particularly Markowitz efficient frontier. Historical data from November of 1999 to December of 2004 of Brazilian Internal Public Debt mix and Mutual Funds portfolio are analyzed. Official goals concerning Public Debt's mix and its actual composition are presented, as well as Mutual Fund preferences as buyers of public debt securities. Time series of three securities (LFT, LTN and NTN-C) in Public Debt mix and Mutual Funds portfolio are compared and a similar behavior is identified. Relevant facts of the macroeconomic context which may have affected Public Debt or Mutual Funds are discussed. Some indications of a possible influence of Mutual Funds upon Public Debt Mix are obtained and hypothesis to be tested in future studies are proposed.

Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence

In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. This auction mechanism shares some important features with that used in the sale of the companies constituted through the partial division of the Telebras System - the government-owned Telecom holding in Brazil. We designed an experiment where individuals participate in a sequence of independent …rst-price auctions followed by a sequence of hybrid auctions. Several conclusions emerged from this experimental study. First, ex-post e¢ciency was achieved overwhelmingly by the hybrid auctions. Secondly, although overbidding (with respect to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium) was a regular feature of participants’ bidding behavior in the …rst-price auctions — as it is commonly reported in most experimental studies of …rst-price auctions, it was less frequent in the hybrid auctions. By calibrating the results to allow for risk-averse behavior we were able to account for a signi…cant part of the overbidding. Finally, we compared the revenue generated by the hybrid auction with that generated by a standard …rst-price sealed bid auction and the results were ambiguous.

Prospect theory, diversificação ingênua e propensão a risco de especialistas em mercado: evidência empírica no Brasil

The Prospect Theory is one of the basis of Behavioral Finance and models the investor behavior in a different way than von Neumann and Morgenstern Utility Theory. Behavioral characteristics are evaluated for different control groups, validating the violation of Utility Theory Axioms. Naïve Diversification is also verified, utilizing the 1/n heuristic strategy for investment funds allocations. This strategy causes different fixed and equity allocations, compared to the desirable exposure, given the exposure of the subsample that answered a non constrained allocation question. When compared to non specialists, specialists in finance are less risk averse and allocate more of their wealth on equity.

Contratos de performance sob risco e na ausência de incentivo

Este trabalho mostra que a solução ótima do contrato de remuneração do empregado não é de salário fixo quando sua utilidade reserva é uma função de um fator que pode variar. A remuneração ótima do empregado incluirá um bônus que será também uma função do mesmo fator que modifica sua utilidade reserva, mesmo que tal fator não dependa do seu esforço e que o agente seja avesso ao risco. Esse resultado contrasta com a teoria clássica segundo a qual só se deveria alocar risco ao funcionário quando tal contrato fosse necessário para prover os incentivos para um esforço maior do agente. Outra conclusão desse trabalho é que existe um limite para o tamanho do risco que o funcionário assume no contrato ótimo, ou seja, o valor do bônus é uma função crescente da diferença dos valores da utilidade reserva nos diferentes cenários possíveis até certo ponto apenas e a partir de determinado valor para essa diferença, a magnitude do bônus se mantém estável.

Non-monotone insurence contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of t.his paper is to show the possibility of a non-monot.one relation between coverage and risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuou.'l parameter which is correlated with lenience and, for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cost of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and implies a positive correlation between coverage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the sep be broken, but also the monotonicity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (Iow) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case t,here are some coverage leveIs associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation bet,ween coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to disentangle single crossing and non single crossing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function of riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric informat, ion), coverage is a monotone function of riskiness, this also gives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirica! tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variabIes (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variabIes conditioning on ali observabIe variabIes. We show that this may be t,he case when the omitted variabIes have a non-monotonic reIation with t,he observable ones. Moreover, because this non-monotonic reIat,ion is deepIy reIated with the failure of the SCP in one-dimensional screening problems, the existing lit.erature on asymmetric information does not capture t,his feature. Hence, our main result is to point Out the importance of t,he SCP in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

Stabilization, volatility and the equilibrium real exchange rate

In a general equilibrium model. we show that the value of the equilibrium real exchange rate is affected by its own volatility. Risk averse exporters. that make their exporting decision before observing the realization of the real exchange rate. choose to export less the more volatile is the real exchange rate. Therefore the trude balance and the variance of the real exchange rate are negatively related. An increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate for instance deteriorates the trade balance and to restore equilibrium a real exchange rate depreciation has to take place. In the empirical part of the paper we use the traditional (unconditional) standard deviation of RER changes as our measure of RER volatility.We describe the behavior of the RER volatility for Brazil,Argentina and Mexico.Monthly data for the three countries are used. and also daily data for Bruzil. Interesting patterns of volatility could be associated to the nature of the several stabilization plans adopted in those countries and to changes in the exchange rate regimes .

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.

Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2002

Includes bibliography

Preliminary overview of the economies of the Caribbean 2012-2013

Includes bibliography