Modèle d'état à coefficient aléatoire: filtrage par densités approchées

Le filtrage de Bucy-Kalman s'applique au modèle d'état comprenant des équations linéaires bruitées, décrivant l'évolution de l'état et des équations linéaires bruitées d'observation . Ce filtrage consiste dans le cas gaussien, à calculer de façon récursive, la loi de probabilité, a posteriori, de l'état, au vu de l' observation actuelle et des observations passées . Le filtrage par densités approchées permet de traiter des équations d'état, non linéaires ou à bruits non Gaussiens. Pour un coefficient de rappel aléatoire, cas typique d'une situation de changements de modèles, l'article introduit une famille de lois de probabilité, paramétrées, bimodales servant, par ajustement des paramètres, à approcher les lois a posteriori de l'état aux divers instants . Les paramètres sont recalculés récursivement, lors des mises à jour et des prédictions.

Construction impossible et défense improbable : la tour du roi Vertigier dans l'Historia Brittonum de Nennius, l'Historia Regum Britanniae de Geoffroy de Monmouth, le Brut de Wace et le Merlin de Robert de Boron

La question architecturale de l'impossibilité de l'usurpateur Vertigier à construire sa tour se double d'une réflexion politique et morale déterminante. La tour branlante est en effet à l'image du royaume déchiré de Grande Bretagne : elle emblématise l'instabilité politique et les affrontements militaires qui déterminent l'ascension illégitime puis la chute de ce mauvais roi.

Façonner sa dame: amour et idolâtrie

The 'lady as idol' is a cliche of troubadour poetry, and of courtly love in general. Moving beyond the psychoanalytical theories of desire that have informed troubadour studies in the past few decades, this article examines a selection of poems by the troubadour Jausbert de Poicibot, as well as their well-known illustrations in one 14th-c. manuscript, in order to explore how the complex medieval understanding of idolatry interacted with that of "fin'amor".

La vraie "géographie fausse" du Cycle Indien

Malgré les nombreuses revendications de Duras à la véracité historique mais fort ambigüe, de son œuvre, les critiques ont toujours tendance à souscrire à l'affirmation influente de l’auteur selon laquelle «toutes les références à la géographie physique, humaine, politique, d’India Song, sont fausses. » Cet article se donne pour objectif de démontrer, à la lumière d’une perspective postcoloniale, que l’écriture durassienne est en effet loin d’être divorcée des réalités historiques et politiques de son époque. Il examine donc la nature des représentations géographiques dans son « Cycle indien » en répondant à la question centrale : Quelle est la relation entre les noms de lieux évoqués dans l’imaginaire « indien » de Duras et les réalités historiques de la région géographique que ceux-ci désignent ? Une telle relecture du territoire bien battu du Vice-Consul et d’India Song, révèle un croisement dense et complexe d’histoires coloniales oubliées, négligées ou occultées qui mérite d’être enfin mis au jour.

Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Profit, embezzlement, restitution. The role of the traitants in the Nine Years War and Chamillart’s tax on financial benefits The aim of this article is to revisit the question of the financiers in Old Regime France. It starts with an analysis of the discourses about the financiers under the Absolute monarchy that underlines the complexity of their relationship with the government and the public. It then reviews the secondary literature and highlights the existence of competing historical interpretations (functional, political, utilitarian), which raise the question of their overall capacity to account for the role and impact of the financiers at different times. On this ground, the article focuses on a specific group of financiers, the so-called traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, during the Nine Years War. Further to a description of the specific role and scope of the activities of the various financiers responsible for helping the monarchy to raise the funds it needed to pay for its peace and wartime expenditure, the article examines the conditions and profits granted by the king in his contracts with the traitants whose services were hired for the purpose of selling royal offices in the public and advancing the revenue to the Treasury. It also explores the contractual arrangements of the companies established by the financiers to manage their operations as well as the rights and the responsibilities of their various stakeholders. These bases being laid, the article relies on the administrative correspondence relating to the traités during the Nine Years War to address a range of issues, in particular the extent to which these contracts, and other control procedures, were robust enough to deter fraud. The accounts of two traitants’ companies offer an opportunity to analyse and compare the structure of their income and expenditure (including the volume and cost of the promissory notes sold in the public to finance their payments to the Treasury), to explore the strategies of the contractors, to calculate their net profits and further discuss the problem of embezzlement. The article ends with the study of the context and debates which led to the introduction by finance minister Michel Chamillart, in 1700, of a shortfall tax on the financial profits of the gens d’affaires or traitants, the method used to determine its rate (50 % of the net benefits), its distribution among the various stakeholders (including the bailleurs de fonds or backers), and the related procedures. In total, the article argues that the relationship between the monarchy, society and the financiers under the Ancien Regime was not static and, therefore, suggests that the broad question of control and fraud must be examined against changing circumstances. With regard specifically to the Nine Years War, the article concludes that within the constraints of the Absolute monarchy, contractors offered valuable services by raising capital for the benefit of a king who ruled over a country which, at the time, was by far the wealthiest in Europe, and where ministers failed to foresee long wars of attrition and whose financial strategy was limited by the very existence of privilege. Overall, the traités were too costly to be a viable system of war financing. In these conditions, the substantial fortunes made by a handful of very successful traitants suffice to explain that the government easily gave in to public criticism against the wealth of the financiers and felt compelled, when peace resumed, to cancel the advantageous conditions offered in the treaties by taxing financial profits.