`Counter-terrorism`, human security and globalisation - from welfare to warfare state?

The continuing erosion of civil liberties in Western democracies, and in particular Australia, as a response to the threat of terrorist attack - the position taken that laws eroding civil liberties will ultimately fail in its attempt to combat terrorist activity while adding to human insecurity and violence - counter-terrorism measures resulting in the militarisation of law enforcement and provoking terrorism - linking counter-terrorism with globalisation.

Preventative detention and the right of personal liberty and security under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966

Preventive detention enables a person to be deprived of liberty, by executive determination, for the purposes of safeguarding national security or public order without that person being charged or brought to trial. This paper examines Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to assess whether preventive detention is prohibited by the phrase 'arbitrary arrest and detention '. To analyse this Article, this paper uses a textual and structural analysis of the Article, as well as reference to the travaux preparatoires and case law of the Human Rights Committee. This paper argues that preventive detention is not explicitly prohibited by Article 9(1) ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. If preventive detention is 'arbitrary', within the wide interpretation of that term as argued in this paper, it will be a permissible deprivation of personal liberty under Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. Preventive detention will, however, always be considered 'arbitrary' if sajeguards for those arrested and detained are not complied with, in particular the right to judicial review of the lawfulness of detention.

A comparative analysis of opinions of Americans, Australians and Malaysians on the use of biometric devices in workplaces for security and monitoring of worker productivity

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the use of biometric devices such as fingerprint scans, retina and iris scans and facial recognition in everyday situations for national security and border control, have become commonplace. This has resulted in the biometric industry moving from being a niche technology to one that is ubiquitous. As a result. more and more employers are using biometrics to secure staff access to their facilities as well as for tracking staff work hours, maintaining 'discipline' and carry out surveillance against thefts. detecting work hour abuses and fraud. However, the data thus collected and the technologies themselves are feared of having the potential for and actually being misused - both in terms of the violating staff privacy and discrimination and oppression of targeted workers. This paper examines the issue of using biometric devices in organisational settings their advantages, disadvantages and actual and potential abuses from the point of view of critical theory. From the perspectives of Panoptic surveillance and hegemonic organisational control, the paper examines the issues related to privacy and identification, biometrics and privacy, biometrics and the 'body', and surveillance and modernity. The paper also examines the findings ofa survey carried out in Australia. Malaysia and the USA on respondents' opinions on the use of biometric devices in everyday life including at workplaces. The paper concludes that along with their applications in border control and national security, the use of biometric devices should be covered by relevant laws and regulations. guidelines and codes of practice. in order to balance the rights to privacy and civil liberties of workers with employers' need for improved productivity, reduced costs, safeguards related to occupational health and safety, equal opportunity, and workplace harassment of staff and other matters, that employers are legally responsible for.

Responding to terrorism through networks at sites of critical infrastructure : a case study of Australian airport security networks

The importance of effective multilateral security networks is widely recognised in Australia and internationally as being essential to facilitate the large-scale sharing of information required to respond to the threat of terrorism. Australian national security agencies are currently constructing networks in order to bring the diverse national and international security agencies together to achieve this. This paper examines this process of security network formation in the area of critical infrastructure protection, with particular emphasis on airport security. We address the key issues and factors shaping network formation and the dynamics involved in network practice. These include the need for the networks to extend membership beyond the strictly defined elements of national security; the integration of public and private ‘nodes’ in counter-terrorism ‘networks’; and the broader ‘responsibilisation’ of the private sector and the challenges with ‘enabling’ them in counter-terrorism networks. We argue that the need to integrate public and private agencies in counter-terrorism networks is necessary but faces considerable organisational, cultural, and legal barriers.

The impact of security surveys within Australia and New Zealand

Information security is portrayed as a global problem that impacts all countries that are considered as part of the Information Society. Recent surveys show that there are increased concerns about computer crime. The paper will focus upon recent national security surveys from Australia and New Zealand and the trends that this research shows. Is it fair to assume the security practices are the same all over the world? The paper looks at security practices from a number of different countries perspectives and shows that security practices are not generic and vary from country to country. The paper will also evaluate the worth that National Security Surveys have in the field of Information Security Surveys.

Australia-Indonesia security relationship

[No Abstract]

The nexus between cultural and mainstream perceptions of security

Mainstream security analyses and security models are discussed. The central argument is that the multi-dimensional conditions, which are considered by analysts as central to the security of all collectives, are not representative of all cultures. Therefore, mainstream models are not suitable for every security collective's cultural security requirements.

Australian national critical infrastructure protection : a case study

Australia has developed sophisticated national security policies and physical security agencies to protect against current and future security threats associated with critical infrastructure protection and cyber warfare protection. This paper will discuss some of the common security risks that face Australia and how their government policies and strategies have been developed and changed over time, for example, the proposed Australian Homeland Security department. This paper will discuss the different steps that Australia has undertaken in relation to developing national policies to deal with critical infrastructure protection.

Australia’s strategic culture: constraints and opportunities in security policymaking

 This article draws on fourth generation strategic culture debates to show the gap between the rhetoric of Australian defence and the more modest reality. Our analysis shows that these limits derive from tensions between national strategic culture and organizational strategic subcultures. There are serious debates in the nation regarding the preferred course of the Australian military and security policy. This article frames these debates by examining the ‘keepers’ of Australia's national strategic culture, the existence of several competing strategic subcultures, and the importance of norm entrepreneurs in changing defence and national security thinking. Strategic subcultures foster compartmentalization, constraints, and bureaucratic silos that narrow national conceptions of security threats and opportunities, and impinge on the formation of coherent foreign and defence policy in relation to the Asia-Pacific region. This analysis shows that a distinct national strategic culture and organizational strategic subcultures endure beyond individual governments, placing potential limits on Australia's interface with other Asia-Pacific strategic cultures in the future.

Integrated luminescent chemical microsensors based on GaN LEDs for security applications using smartphones

Development of PCB-integrateable microsensors for monitoring chemical species is a goal in areas such as lab-on-a-chip analytical devices, diagnostics medicine and electronics for hand-held instruments where the device size is a major issue. Cellular phones have pervaded the world inhabitants and their usefulness has dramatically increased with the introduction of smartphones due to a combination of amazing processing power in a confined space, geolocalization and manifold telecommunication features. Therefore, a number of physical and chemical sensors that add value to the terminal for health monitoring, personal safety (at home, at work) and, eventually, national security have started to be developed, capitalizing also on the huge number of circulating cell phones. The chemical sensor-enabled “super” smartphone provides a unique (bio)sensing platform for monitoring airborne or waterborne hazardous chemicals or microorganisms for both single user and crowdsourcing security applications. Some of the latest ones are illustrated by a few examples. Moreover, we have recently achieved for the first time (covalent) functionalization of p- and n-GaN semiconductor surfaces with tuneable luminescent indicator dyes of the Ru-polypyridyl family, as a key step in the development of innovative microsensors for smartphone applications. Chemical “sensoring” of GaN-based blue LED chips with those indicators has also been achieved by plasma treatment of their surface, and the micrometer-sized devices have been tested to monitor O2 in the gas phase to show their full functionality. Novel strategies to enhance the sensor sensitivity such as changing the length and nature of the siloxane buffer layer are discussed in this paper.

Environmental Information Access as a Security Risk

The United Sates was founded on the principles of freedom. Events in recent history have threatened the freedoms we as individuals enjoy. Notably, changes to government legislation and policies regarding access to environmentally sensitive information following September 11, 2001, are troubling. The government has struggled with a difficult balancing act. The public has the right of access to information, yet, information some view as sensitive or dangerous must be kept out of the hands of terrorists. This project examines and discusses the information access debate within the United States and how to best provide the public environmentally sensitive information.

Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, 6 November 2013

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this paper assesses the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of these practices, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the paper contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of the balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The paper argues that these programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be analysed from an EU law perspective via i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights and judicial oversight constitute key norms; ii) the risks posed to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners and iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The paper then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

Arms industries : new suppliers and regional security /

Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-189) and index.

Commission on Government Security : hearings ... Eighty-fourth Congress, first session, on S.J. Res. 21, a joint resolution to establish a commission on government security. March 8-11, 14-18, 1955.

Mode of access: Internet.

Coordinated information sharing and homeland security : hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, second session, June 7, 2002.

"Serial no. 107-182."