La goutte de sang.... Perdues dans Paris / Jules Mary

Collection : Le livre national ; n° 71-72

La charmeuse d'enfants / Jules Mary

Collection : Le livre national ; n° 25

Le démon de l'amour / Jules Mary

Collection : Le livre national ; n° 26

Soldats de demain. Les filles du général / Jules Mary

Collection : Le livre national ; n° 217-218

Soldats de demain. La bataille d'avant la guerre / Jules Mary

Collection : Le livre national ; n° 217-218

Budjetti v. 1947, Lk

Puhe

An experiment on Nash implementation

We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nashimplementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.

Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about the game. In fact, players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs and, in a variant of the strategy, players need not even know that their payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for general finite games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learningrule introduced by Foster and Young.