Fundamental Dimensions of Social Judgment: Sociability and Morality as Distinct Characteristics of Social Warmth

The present dissertation focuses on the two basic dimensions of social judgment, i.e., warmth and competence. Previous research has shown that warmth and competence emerge as fundamental dimensions both at the interpersonal level and at the group level. Moreover, warmth judgments appear to be primary, reflecting the importance of first assessing others’ intentions before determining the other’s ability to carry out those intentions. Finally, it has been shown that warmth and competence judgments are predicted by perceived economic competition and status, respectively (for a review, see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). Building on this evidence, the present work intends to further explore the role of warmth and competence in social judgment, adopting a finer-grained level of analysis. Specifically, we consider warmth to be a dimension of evaluation that encompasses two distinct characteristics (i.e., sociability and morality) rather than as an undifferentiated dimension (see Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). In a similar vein, both economic competition and symbolic competition are taken into account (see Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). In order to highlight the relevance of our empirical research, the first chapter reviews the literature in social psychology that has studied the warmth and competence dimensions. In the second chapter, across two studies, we examine the role of realistic and symbolic threats (akin economic and symbolic competition, respectively) in predicting the perception of sociability and morality of social groups. In study 1, we measure perceived realistic threat, symbolic threat, sociability, and morality with respect to 8 social groups. In study 2, we manipulate the level and type of threat of a fictitious group and measure perceived sociability and morality. The findings show that realistic threat and symbolic threat are differentially related to the sociability and morality components of warmth. Specifically, whereas realistic threat seems to be a stronger predictor of sociability than symbolic threat, symbolic threat emerges as better predictor of morality than realistic threat. Thus, extending prior research, we show that the types of threat are linked to different warmth stereotypes. In the third and the fourth chapter, we examine whether the sociability and morality components of warmth play distinct roles at different stages of group impression formation. More specifically, the third chapter focuses on the information-gathering process. Two studies experimentally investigate which traits are mostly selected when forming impressions about either ingroup or outgroup members. The results clearly show that perceivers are more interested in obtaining information about morality than about sociability when asked to form a global impression about others. The fourth chapter considers more properly the formulation of an evaluative impression. Thus, in the first study participants rate real groups on sociability, morality, and competence. In the second study, participants read an immigration scenario depicting an unfamiliar social group in terms of high (vs. low) morality, sociability, and competence. In both studies, participants are also asked to report their global impression of the group. The results show that global evaluations are better predicted by morality than by sociability and competence trait ascriptions. Taken together the third and the fourth chapters show that the dominance of warmth suggested by previous studies on impression formation might be better explained in terms of a greater effect of one of the two subcomponents (i.e., morality) over the other (i.e., sociability). In the general discussion, we discuss the relevance of our findings for intergroup relation and group perception, as well as for impression formation.

Saving morality: Why we cannot, and why we must

Philosophers and laymen alike have often used morality to invite misconceptions of human life into ethics, and also of ethics into human life. The Kant/Williams discourse provides a rich backdrop on which to consider these misconceptions. But the misconceptionsof morality involved are just as numerous and just as serious. One thing that the Kant/Williams discourse shows is this: that ethics can be neither contained by nor cultivated without morality. Though much of Williams’ critique of Kantian morality is quite astute, thephilosophical and ethical wisdoms of morality abound in spite of these. Morality understands the fundamental condition of moral loss, and the sometimes irreducible quandaries that this condition places human beings in. It understands the nature of the moral law, and theintricacies that the levels of letter and spirit invite into human life. Perhaps more importantly, it understands the uncompromising relationship between moral loss and moral law, and how the human navigation of this relationship leads into the ethical realm via giving rise to ethical conviction. Finally, for all of its pressures, morality abounds in valuable wisdoms for the one discovering that the human soul occupies a place of ethical significance in the world. It is responsible for pointing out, grounding and providing a framework for some of the most fundamental truths about the world and human beings; and these are essential to any viable ethical theory and sensible conception of human life.

Islam and the Legal Enforcement of Morality

Over sixty years ago, British high court judge Patrick Devlin and legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart fought out a famous debate over the legal enforcement of morality, which was generated by the question whether homosexuality should be legalized or not. Jurists agree that this debate was won by Hart, also evidenced in the fact that the state has since been retreating from its previous role of moral watchdog. I argue in this paper that the two most conflicted and essentially unresolved issues in the integration of Islam, the regulation of the female body and of free speech, have reopened this debate anew, pushing the liberal state toward the legal regulation of morality, thus potentially putting at risk its liberalness. I use the Hart-Devlin debate as a template for comparing and contrasting the Muslim quest for restricting free speech with the host-society quest for restricting the Islamic veil. Accordingly, there is a double threat to liberalism, which this paper brings into view in tandem, one originating from Islam and another from a hypertrophied defense of liberalism.

Obstetrical Forceps: History, Mystery, and Morality

The history of obstetrical forceps has almost always been one cloaked in controversy after a long history of being shrouded in mystery. Forceps have a long history and have evolved from facilitating the delivery of dead fetuses to aiding in the delivery and survival of live babies. In the middle of all of this arises the story of the Chamberlain family whose contribution was enormous but whose behaviors pushed at the envelope of (at least) our present-day concepts of medical ethics. This lecture traces an interesting story that spans a millennium.