The metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, collected, arranged and abridged for the use of colleges and private students.

Mode of access: Internet.

The state of history and the empire of metaphysics [Review]

One of the curious things about this challenging book is that its ostensible subject— the Saxon medical and political scientist Hermann Conring (1606–1681)— is not mentioned in the title. Constantin Fasolt argues that we cannot know what Conring really thought or meant in his writings, which means that his topic cannot be Conring as such and must instead be that which occludes our knowledge of him, the titular limits of history. Given that we do in fact learn a good deal about Conring from Fasolt’s book, we can only hope that the decapitation of its subject will be rectified in a subsequent edition, or perhaps by the restorative work of librarians putting together subject headings. And yet Fasolt’s decision is understandable, for Conring is indeed a stalking-horse for a much bigger quarry: historiography and the historical consciousness. By “history” Fasolt understands a way of imposing intelligibility on the world, which is founded on the twin assumptions that the past is gone and unchangeable, and that the meaning of texts can be determined by placing them in their historical contexts (ix). In challenging this mode of intelligibility, Fasolt is not attempting to improve professiona history—it’s already as good as it can be—but to displace it. He regards his work as a declaration of “independence from historical consciousness” (32). At the same time, Fasolt insists that he is not simply jumping from historiography to philosophy, or attempting to preempt history with ontology (37-39). That has been tried by Nietzsche and Heidegger, who have been tainted by Nazism (Fasolt thinks unfairly). It has also been attempted by modern philosophers from Gadamer to Foucault and Charles Taylor who, in failing to address the “violence” that its mode of intelligibility does to the world, have not succeeded in outflanking history. Perhaps, Fasolt wonders, it is only the personal experience of those who have been subject to this violence—the experience of those who have been subject to historical examination—that can break the spell of history. Fasolt’s disclaimer notwithstanding, in the course of these remarks I shall argue that he is indeed jumping from history to philosophy, or attempting to outflank history by subjecting it to a particular metaphysical understanding. I shall do so in part by sketching the recent intellectual history of this move—a historical examination that I hope inflicts as little violence as possible on Fasolt’s argument.

WAKING (TO) THINKING BEING: A STUDY OF EDUCATION, METAPHYSICS, MIND, AND LANGUAGE

This dissertation articulates the basic aims and achievements of education. It recognizes language as central to thinking, and philosophy and education as belonging profoundly to one another. The first step is to show that although philosophy can no longer claim to dictate the foundations of knowledge or of disciplines of inquiry, it still offers an exceptionally general level of self-understanding. Education is equally general and faces a similar crisis of self-identity, of coming to terms with reality. Language is the medium of thought and the repository of historical mind; so a child’s acquisition of language is her acquisition of rational freedom. This marks a metaphysical change: no longer merely an animal, she comes to exercise her powers of rationality, transcending her environment by seeking and expressing reasons for thinking and doing. She can think about herself in relation to the universe, hence philosophize and educate others in turn. The discussion then turns to the historical nature of language. The thinking already embedded in language always anticipates further questioning. Etymology serves as a model for philosophical understanding, and demonstrates how philosophy can continue to yield insights that are fundamental, but not foundational, to human life. The etymologies of some basic educational concepts disclose education as a leading out and into the midst of Being. The philosophical approach developed in previous chapters applies to the very idea of an educational aim. Discussion concerning the substantiality of educational ideals results in an impasse: one side recommends an open-­ended understanding of education’s aims; the other insists on a definitive account. However, educational ideals exhibit a conceptual duality: the fundamental achievements of education, such as rational freedom, are real; but how we should understand them remains an open question. The penultimate chapter investigates philosophical thinking as the fulfillment of rational freedom, whose creative insights can profoundly transform our everyday activities. That this transformative self-understanding is without end suggests the basic aims of education are unheimlich. The dissertation concludes with speculative reflection on the shape and nature of language, and with the suggestion that through education reality awakens to itself.

Metaphysics of love in the religious philosophy of Pável Florensky

This article focuses on the analysis of the concept of love in the religious philosophy of Pavel Florensky, who shares the ontological approach to the consideration of love with other representatives of Russian religious philosophy (N. berdyaev and S. bulgakov). We pay more careful attention to the understanding of love-άγαπαν by Florensky. We have drawn the conclusion that, in the philosophy of P. Florensky, Love, closely connected with truth and beauty, is considered an ontological basis existence of personality. We develop the ideas of Pavel Florensky, and accordingly assume that it is possible to synthesise love-agape and love-eros around the idea of sacrificial love. Agapelogical and erotical ‘bezels’ of one jewel of love is aspects of united love, which is given by God. this gift of God, the gift of united love, is kept by humans through prayer and deeds of love.

What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attack the alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between value judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the connection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made from the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to some particular set of desires.

From physics to metaphysics: philosophy and style in the critical writings of T. S. Eliot (1913-1935)

This thesis considers Eliot's critical writing from the late 1910s till the mid-1930s, in the light of his PhD thesis - Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley - and a range of unpublished material: T S. Eliot's Philosophical Essays and Notes (1913- 4) in the Hayward Bequest (King's College, Cambridge University); T. S. Eliot's Family Papers in the T. S. Eliot Collection at the Houghton Library (Harvard University); and items from the Harvard University Archives at the Pusey Library. 'Me thesis offers a comprehensive view of Eliot's critical development throughout this important period. It starts by considering The Sacred Wood's ambivalence towards the metaphysical philosophy of F. H. Bradley and Eliot's apparent adoption of a scientific method, under the influence of Bertrand Russell. It will be argued that Eliot uses rhetorical strategies which simultaneously subvert the method he is propounding, and which set the tone for an assessment of his criticism throughout the 1920s. His indecision, in this period, about the label 'Metaphysical' for some poets of the seventeenth century, reveals the persistence of the philosophical thought he apparently rejects in 1916, when he chooses not to pursue a career in philosophy in Harvard. This rhetorical tactic achieves its fulfilment in Dante (1929), where Eliot finds a model in the medieval allegorical method and 'philosophical' poetry. Allegory is also examined in connection with the evaluation of Eliot's critical writings themselves to determine, for instance, the figurative dimension of his early scientific vocabulary and uncover metaphysical residues he had explicitly disowned but would later embrace. Finally, it is suggested that, the hermeneutics of allegory are historical and it is used here to test the relationship between Eliot's early and later critical writings, that is the early physics and the later metaphysics.

A formação humana na perspectiva histórico-ontológica

The theme of human formation is at the centre of the philosophy of education, whose aim is precisely the process of human promotion brought about by education. Starting from the critical vigilance proper to philosophy, the text sketches a phenomenology of the present time, verifying that the ideas prevailing in education at present are centred on the critique of reason and on the notions of truth and objectivity. This neo-pragmatism, which in the attempt to oppose metaphysics becomes deeply metaphysical, reducing everything to language, is contested by the authors with Marx's thoughts as a historicising philosophy that concerns not abstract subjects, but real individuals, historical subjects that are constituted as a synthesis of social relations. To that end, the authors resort to the historical ontological reflection on human formation contained in Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. The article concludes by defending the proposition that access to the classics is a necessary condition for human formation.

Práticas corporais alternativas e educação física : entre a formação e a intervenção

Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física

Trabalho, tempo livre e emancipação humana : os determinantes ontologicos das politicas sociais de lazer

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

A personagem desconstruida : argumentos para uma arte cenica não-logocentrica

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

John Waldridge, The Leaven of the Ancients: Suhrawardi and the Heritage of the Greeks, SUNY Series in Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). Pp. 323

In the Leaven of the Ancients, John Walbridge studies the appropriation of non–Peripatetic philosophical ideas by an anti–Aristotelian Islamic philosopher, Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi (d. 1191). He proposes a comprehensive explanation of the origin of Suhrawardi's philosophical system, a revival of the “wisdom of the Ancients” and its philosophical affiliations “grounded” in Greek philosophy (p. xiii). Walbridge attempts to uncover the reasons for Suhrawardi's rejection of the prevailing neo–Aristotelian synthesis in Islamic philosophy, Suhrawardi's knowledge and understanding of non–Aristotelian Greek philosophy, the ancient philosophers Suhrawardi was attempting to follow, the relationship between Suhrawardi's specific philosophical teachings (logic, ontology, physics, and metaphysics), and his understanding of non–Aristotelian ancient philosophy and the relationship between Suhrawardi's system and the major Greek philosophers, schools, and traditions—in particular the Presocratics, Plato, and the Stoics (p. 8). Copyright © 2003 Cambridge University Press

Person, existence and phenomenology: remarks on the conceptions of personalism of Emmanuel Mounier

This article aims to discuss the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier, especially his views on the person and existence, and its relation to phenomenology. Mounier does not refer to the influence of phenomenology on his thoughts. However, it is possible to notice that his philosophy was strongly influenced by phenomenological ideas. Personalism is a philosophy that says a person`s value as an absolute. The absolute here is understood as a purpose that gives meaning to all the political and social organization. Human existence is the starting point and fundamental postulate of personalism. This means that there is, therefore, a priority of the existence about the human nature, understanding this as an information ""ontological definitive"". This position is a requirement of epistemological reformulation, which means, within personalism, the attempt to develop a phenomenology of existence, located between the radical objectivism of the science and subjectivism of metaphysics.