Are conventions solutions to uncertainty? Contrasting visions of social coordination

In recent years, there has been an increase in research on conventions motivated by the game-theoretic contributions of the philosopher David Lewis. Prior to this surge in interest, discussions of convention in economics had been tied to the analysis of John Maynard Keynes's writings. These literatures are distinct and have very little overlap. Yet this confluence of interests raises interesting methodological questions. Does the use of a common term, convention, denote a set of shared concerns? Can we identify what differentiates the game theoretic models from the Keynesian ones? This paper maps out the three most developed accounts of convention within economics and discusses their relations with each other in an attempt to provide an answer.

Cultivating mangement? Managing culture?

Jean Battersby, the founding executive officer of the Australia Council of the Arts from 1968, delivered a lecture in May 2005 which bemoaned a situation in which the focus and funding of the arts appears to have more to do with managers than with artists. Cultural policy and cultural economics have become the staple of the day, so much so that the thought of an economist actually proposing an Arts Council protected from political manipulation and scrutiny—‘with antennae sensitive to public opinion or political advantage’ and ever ready to apply the ‘child of three’ test (Battersby, 2005: 2)—seems an absurdity. Yet, in July 1945, Maynard Keynes proposed that Britain have an Arts Council without government and its bureaucracy intervening in the relationship between artists and their public. The task, as Battersby records it, ‘is not to teach or to censor, but to give courage, confidence and opportunity’ without prescription (2005: 6).

Comportamento dos preços dos contratos agropecuários negociados na BM&F : a hipótese de "normal backwardation" no mercado futuro brasileiro

O presente trabalho objetivou a realização de testes a fim de verificar a hipótese de normal backwardation no mercado futuro brasileiro dos contratos agropecuários negociados no período compreendido entre os anos de 1994 a 2001. Foram analisados os preços de ajuste de seis contratos: soja, milho, boi gordo, açúcar cristal, café e algodão. Tal hipótese foi defendida primordialmente por Keynes, e preconiza que os preços futuros são uma estimativa viesada do preço à vista no futuro e devem crescer até a data de vencimento, momento em que se equiparam ao preço à vista. A justificativa para esse comportamento centra-se no fato de que os especuladores exigem um prêmio pelo risco que incorrem, e somente aceitarão negociar mediante um desconto nos preços. Os resultados desse estudo mostram indícios para a confirmação da hipótese de normal backwardation no mercado futuro brasileiro, principalmente pelos resultados do teste de proporções e da regressão.

O pragmatismo em economia: bases filosóficas para uma interpretação do discurso econômico

O trabalho tem por objetivo trazer elementos da corrente filosófica do pragmatismo para a discussão metodológica em economia, particularmente no que diz respeito a teoria da verdade e suas implicações para o debate epistemológico. Após apresentar as contribuições dos pioneiros do pragmatismo William James, John Dewey e Charles S. Peirce e discutir aspectos da obra de W. Quine e Richard Rorty, procuramos identificar influências dessa corrente filosófica em importantes economistas tais como J. M. Keynes, M. Friedman e T. Veblen. Por fim concluímos com algumas reflexões possivelmente úteis para a prática da ciência econômica.

Fundamentos para uma teoria de expectativa econômica

O Principal Objetivo deste Trabalho é Identificar Bases Plausíveis para uma Teoria de Formação de Expectativa Econômica. Argumentamos que a Incorporação de Expectativa em Qualquer Tratamento Analítico, Deve Envolver, Principalmente, Fundamentos Epistêmicos. Duas Perspectivas de Análise Foram Consideradas: a Abordagem Contextualista de Bhargava(1992) e a Tese da Modernidade Reflexiva, Desenvolvida por Anthony Giddens. Concluímos que a Expectativa Econômica Resulta do Processo de Apropriação de Conhecimento Especializado, que É, em Grande Extensão, Mediado Através da Mídia.

Os dois métodos da teoria econômica

Economic theory deals with a complex reality, which may be seen through various perspectives, using different methods. Economics’ three major branches – development economics, macroeconomics, and microeconomics – cannot be unified because the former two use preferentially a historical-deductive, while the later, an essentially hypothetical-deductive or aprioristic method. Smith, Marx and Keynes used an essentially the method of the new historical facts, while Walras, an aprioristic one to devise the neoclassical general equilibrium model. The historical-deductive method looks for the new historical facts that condition the economic reality. Economic theory remains central, but it is more modest, or less general, as the economist that adopt principally this method is content to analyze stabilization and growth in the framework of a given historical phase or moment of the economic process. As a trade off, his models are more realistic and conducive to more effective economic policies, as long as he is not required to previously abandon, one by one, the unrealistic assumptions required by a excessively general theory, but already starts from more realistic ones

Normal backwardation é normal no mercado futuro brasileiro?

A pesquisa testa a existência, no mercado futuro brasileiro, do fenômeno que Keynes denominou de normal backwardation, isto é, a hipótese de que os preços futuros não são estimadores não viesados (unbiased estimators) do preço à vista esperado para o futuro. Quatro contratos futuros negociados na BM&F Bolsa de Mercadorias e Futuros foram estudados, a saber, futuro de Ibovespa, futuro de dólar comercial, futuro de boi gordo e futuro de café arábica, cobrindo o período de julho de 1994 a setembro de 1997. Cada contrato futuro citado foi submetido a quatro testes, sugeridos pelas implicações da hipótese de Keynes. Nossos resultados indicam que normal backwardation não é normal no mercado futuro brasileiro, repetindo as conclusões de vários estudos internacionais.

Distribuição de renda e consumo agregado: uma avaliação para o Brasil

O propósito desta dissertação consiste, fundamentalmente, em averiguar se a distribuição de renda constitui-se, ou não, em um fator relevante para a determinação do consumo agregado no Brasil. Em meados da década de 30, como uma implicação da Teoria Geral de Keynes, a noção de que uma equalização na distribuição da renda tenderia a elevar o consumo agragado, ganhou destaque na Teoria Econômica. Entretanto, com o amplo debate suscitado pelas evidências apresentadas por Kuznets (1942) e Goldsmith (1955), para os EUA, e a posterios formulação de hipóteses alternativas acerca do comportamento do consumo, essa noção foi posta em dúvida

A ortodoxia e heterodoxia revistas em sua base : uma leitura de economia política

O presente trabalho busca avaliar, de uma perspectiva teórica, as bases fundamentais argumentativas que colocam a ciência econômica em patamares tão distintos de análise: De um lado, o forte aparato matemático e de microfundamentos que sustentam a visão do mainstream economics. De outro a avaliação de Keynes (da perspectiva pós-keynesiana) acerca do objeto da ciência econômica. Para isso, inicia-se no primeiro capítulo uma reconstrução da Economia ortodoxa em sua base. De tal perspectiva, o estudo proposto se concentra na chamada escola novo clássica, sobretudo as contribuições de Robert Lucas, expoente maior, acerca do processo de geração de renda e emprego. No segundo capítulo, apresenta-se o constructo heterodoxo, através de uma perspectiva pós-keynesiana que ao resgatar Keynes, sobretudo os trabalhos de Davidson, vai propor a volta ao olhar de economia política. No terceiro capítulo visa construir o debate acerca da metodologia econômica, objetos de estudo e seu posicionamento dentro da ciência.

Economic recovery from the Argentine great depression : institutions, expectations, and the change of macroeconomic regime

This work explores how Argentina overcame the Great Depression and asks whether active macroeconomic interventions made any contribution to the recovery. In particular, we study Argentine macroeconomic policy as it deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. As elsewhere, fiscal policy in Argentina was conservative, and had little power to smooth output. Monetary policy became heterodox after 1929. The first and most important stage of institutional change took place with the switch from a metallic monetary regime to a fiduciary regime in 1931; the Caja de Conversión (Conversion Office, a currency board) began rediscounting as a means to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflationary pressures, thus breaking from orthodox "mIes of the game." However, the actual injections of liquidity were small' and were not enough to fully offset the incipient monetary contractions: the "Keynes" effect was weak or negative. Rather, recovery derived from changes in beliefs and expectations surrounding the shift in the monetary and exchange-rate regime,and the delinking of gold flows and the money base. Agents perceivod a new regime, as shown by the path of consumption, investment, and estimated ex ante real interest rates: the "Mundell" effect was dominant. Notably, this change of regime predated a later, and supposedly more significant, stage of institutional reform, namely the creation of the central bank in 1935. Still, the extent of intervention was weak, and insufficient to fully offset externaI shocks to prices and money. Argentine macropolicy was heterodox in terms of the change of regime, but still conservative in terms of the tentative scope of the measures taken .

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

The economics of wage-led recovery: analysis and policy recommendations

The financial crisis and Great Recession have been followed by a jobs shortage crisis that most forecasts predict will persist for years given current policies. This paper argues for a wage-led recovery and growth program which is the only way to remedy the deep causes of the crisis and escape the jobs crisis. Such a program is the polar opposite of the current policy orthodoxy, showing how much is at stake. Winning the argument for wage-led recovery will require winning the war of ideas about economics that has its roots going back to Keynes’ challenge of classical macroeconomics in the 1920s and 1930s. That will involve showing how the financial crisis and Great Recession were the ultimate result of three decades of neoliberal policy, which produced wage stagnation by severing the wage productivity growth link and made asset price inflation and debt the engine of demand growth in place of wages; showing how wage-led policy resolves the current problem of global demand shortage without pricing out labor; and developing a detailed set of policy proposals that flow from these understandings. The essence of a wage-led policy approach is to rebuild the link between wages and productivity growth, combined with expansionary macroeconomic policy that fills the current demand shortfall so as to push the economy on to a recovery path. Both sets of measures are necessary. Expansionary macro policy (i.e. fiscal stimulus and easy monetary policy) without rebuilding the wage mechanism will not produce sustainable recovery and may end in fiscal crisis. Rebuilding the wage mechanism without expansionary macro policy is likely to leave the economy stuck in the orbit of stagnation.