Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in Northern Ireland

In 2009, the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group (SARG) at Sheffield University developed the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model version 2.0 (SAPM) to appraise the potential impact of alcohol policies, including different levels of MUP, for the population of England. In 2013, SARG were commissioned by the DHSSPS and the Department for Social Development to adapt the Sheffield Model to NI in order to appraise the potential impact of a range of alcohol pricing policies. The present report represents the results of this work. Estimates from the Northern Ireland (NI) adaptation of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model - version 3 - (SAPM3) suggest: 1. Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) policies would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, alcohol related harms (including alcohol-related deaths, hospitalisations, crimes and workplace absences) and the costs associated with those harms. 2. A ban on below-cost selling (implemented as a ban on selling alcohol for below the cost of duty plus the VAT payable on that duty) would have a negligible impact on alcohol consumption or related harms. 3. A ban on price-based promotions in the off-trade, either alone or in tandem with an MUP policy would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, related harms and associated costs. 4. MUP and promotion ban policies would only have a small impact on moderate drinkers at all levels of income. Somewhat larger impacts would be experienced by increasing risk drinkers, with the most substantial effects being experienced by high risk drinkers. 5. MUP and promotion ban policies would have larger impacts on those in poverty, particularly high risk drinkers, than those not in poverty. However, those in poverty also experience larger relative gains in health and are estimated to marginally reduce their spending due to their reduced drinking under the majority of policies åÊ

How Wages and Employment Adjust to Trade Liberalization: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Austria

We study the response of regional employment and nominal wages to trade liberalization, exploiting the natural experiment provided by the opening of Central and Eastern European markets after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1990. Using data for Austrian municipalities, we examine differential pre- and post-1990 wage and employment growth rates between regions bordering the formerly communist economies and interior regions. If the "border regions" are defined narrowly, within a band of less than 50 kilometers, we can identify statistically significant liberalization effects on both employment and wages. While wages responded earlier than employment, the employment effect over the entire adjustment period is estimated to be around three times as large as the wage effect. The implied slope of the regional labor supply curve can be replicated in an economic geography model that features obstacles to labor migration due to immobile housing and to heterogeneous locational preferences.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

Multilateral Trade and Agricultural Policy Reforms in Sugar Markets, September 2005

We analyze the impact of trade liberalization, removal of production subsidies, and elimination of consumption distortions in world sugar markets using a partial-equilibrium international sugar model calibrated on 2002 market data and current policies. The removal of trade distortions alone induces a 27% price increase while the removal of all trade and production distortions induces a 48% increase by 2011/12 relative to the baseline. Aggregate trade expands moderately, but location of production and trade patterns change substantially. Protectionist OECD countries (the EU, Japan, the US) experience an import expansion or export reduction and significant contraction in production in unfettered markets. Competitive producers in both OECD countries (Australia) and non-OECD countries (Brazil, Cuba), and even some protected producers (Indonesia, Turkey), expand production when all distortions are removed. Consumption distortions have marginal impacts on world markets and location of production. We discuss the significance of these results in the context of mounting pressures to increase market access in highly protected OECD countries and the impact on non-OECD countries.

Union activism in an inclusive model of industrial relations : evidence from an Spanish case

In this article we analyze the reasons, within the context of Spanish industrial relations, for trade union members’ active participation in their regional union. The case of Spain is particularly interesting as the unions’ main activity, collective bargaining, is a public good. The text, based on research involving a representative survey of members of a regional branch of the “Workers” Commissions” (Comisiones Obreras) trade union, provides empirical evidence that the union presence in the workplace has a significant influence on members’ propensity for activism. By contrast, the alternative hypothesis based on instrumental reasons appears of little relevance in the Spanish industrial relations context.

The Impact of Trade on Technology and Skill Upgrading Evidence from Argentina

In the last 20 years, wage inequality has increased in many developing countries. Most research on this topic focuses on two alternative causes: trade or skill-biased technical change. Several empirical studies in both developed and developing countries document increases in skill intensity within all sectors, favoring the technological change explanation over trade. Instead, I present and test a model where bilateral trade liberalization increases exporting revenues inducing more firms to enter the export market and to adopt skilled-biased new technologies. I find that the increase in the relative demand of skilled labor does not come from labor reallocation across sectors or firms but from skill upgrading within firms. Firms that upgrade technology faster also upgrade skill faster. Finally, firms entering the export market after liberalization become more skill and technology-intensive than non exporters.

Global Prospects for Dairy in Argentina and Chile: Evidence from Field Visits and Model Simulations, August 2006

We assess the international competitiveness of the dairy industries in Argentina and Chile, combining recent market intelligence gathered from field visits with quantitative simulations of global policy reform scenarios. Both countries exhibit strong potential for export growth but face significant internal and external barriers to expanding their dairy industries. Global policy reforms would resolve some of the international obstacles to their expansion. Argentina has great potential, but it is handicapped by its current macroeconomic policies, trade policy distortions, and the uncertainty associated with policy implementation. Chile is more limited in terms of natural capacity for expansion, but it has a positive trade and investment environment.

Procompetitive Losses from Trade

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence that trade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk, December 2006

We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of two-way trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural trade. Multilateral integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading partners. Multilateral trade integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted by unilateral trade opening under the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework because domestic production (the base susceptible to damages) is likely to increase with expanding export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner characterized by relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages via expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a stylized model of the world wheat market.

The impact of trade liberalization on skill upgrading. Evidence from Argentina

In this paper I study the effects of a regional free trade agreement on the demand for skill.I start by documenting a series of facts to shed light on the determinants of a steep increasein the relative demand of skilled labor in a panel of Argentinean industrial firms covering thetrade liberalization period. First, this is not explained by labor reallocation across industriesor firms but by skill upgrading within firms. Second, exporters upgrade skill faster than nonexporters. Third, firms upgrading skill also upgrade technology. These findings are consistentwith a model where a reduction in trading partner s tariffs induces the most productive firms(exporters) to adopt skill-intensive production technologies. Indeed, I find that the reduction inBrazil s tariffs induces the most productive Argentinean firms to upgrade skill, while the leastproductive ones downgrade. One third of the increase in the relative demand for skill can beattributed to the reduction in Brazil s tariffs.

The skill bias of world trade

Under plausible assumptions about preferences and technology, the model in this papersuggests that the entire volume of world trade matters for wage inequality. Therefore,trade integration, even among identical countries, is likely to increase the skill premium.Further, we argue that empirical evidence of a falling relative price of skill-intensive goods can be reconciled with the fast growth of world trade and that the intersectoral mobility of capital exacerbates the effect of trade on inequality. We provide new empirical evidence in support of our results and a quantitative assessment of the skill bias of world trade.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presenceof private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from suchagreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is anecessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to internationaltransfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the currentworld trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidiesare prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might beoptimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the lastdecades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.