The military in the Chamber of Deputies 1851-1870 – corporative lines of action in defense of the army

Based on our reading of the minutes of the parliamentary sessions, we shall attempt in this study to analyze the performance of army officers in the Chamber of Deputies, which, from 1851 to 1870, represented one of the most important settings for the military’s participation in politics

La defensa judicial de la Constitución en el constitucionalismo colombiano. Balances y perspectivas después de dos décadas (Tema Central)

Este artículo pretende explicar el auge que, en Colombia, ha tenido la defensa judicial de la Constitución. Para tal efecto, se hace una breve caracterización del constitucionalismo colombiano, identificando y explicando ocho de sus rasgos: la existencia de una historia y de una tradición de control constitucional, la defensa de la Constitución como asunto público, la Carta Política como norma invasiva de la vida social, económica y política del país, la desconcentración del control constitucional, la construcción permanente y progresiva del constitucionalismo por vía judicial, el diálogo con otros sistemas constitucionales, la existencia de una identidad constitucional, y la continuidad relativa con el sistema y la tradición jurídica. Con fundamento en esta caracterización, se obtendrán algunas conclusiones sobre la defensa judicial de la Constitución.

A new interpretation of the defense glands of neotropical Ruptitermes (Isoptera, Termitidae, Apicotermitinae)

Suicidal altruism has been reported for some species of eusocial insects, in which the individual dies in defense of the society. The termites of the genus Ruptitermes are known for the suicidal behavior of the workers which liberate a sticky defensive secretion by body bursting. In the present paper it is given a new interpretation of the defense glands of Neotropical Ruptitermes based on the morphological analysis of three species collected at Rio Claro, SP, Brazil. Before the current study, the suicidal defensive behavior was attributed to the dehiscence of the salivary gland reservoirs. The defense or dehiscent glands of Neotropical Ruptitermes are pair structures rounded in shape that are independent of the salivary glands. The dehiscent glands consist of multiple secretory units that are kept together by thin connective tissue. Each secretory unit is composed of one cell generally with one peripheral nucleus and characteristic secretion. The three species studied here present some histological differences in the secretory units, probably related to the chemical composition of the secretion.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.

The constitution and laws of the Adelphoi Theologia, founded 1785, [1785-1847]

The volume includes manuscript versions of the constitution and laws from 1785, 1832, and amendments, as well as a list of members from the Class of 1786 through the Class of 1847.

The origin and growth of the English constitution; an historical treatise ... the gradual development of the English constitutional system, and the growth out of that system of the Federal Republic of the United States,

v. 1. The making of the constitution.--v.2. The after-growth of the constitution.

The debates in the several state conventions on the adoption of the Federal constitution : as recommended by the general convention at Philadelphia in 1787 ...

"Together with the Journal of the Federal convention, Luther Martin's letter, Yate's minutes, Congressional opinions, Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of '98-'99, and other illustrations of the Constitution."

Plato's Cretan Colony: Theology and Religion in the Political Philosophy of the Laws

The Laws is generally regarded as Plato’s attempt to engage with the practical realities of political life, as opposed to the more idealistic, or utopian, vision of the Republic. Yet modern scholars have often felt disquieted at the central role of religion in the Laws’ second-best city and regime. There are essentially the two dominant interpretations on offer today: either religion supports a repressive theocracy, which controls every aspect of the citizens’ lives to such an extent that even philosophy itself is discouraged, or religion is an example of the kind of noble lie, which the philosopher must deceive the citizens into believing—viz., that a god, not a man, is the author of the regime’s laws. I argue that neither of these interpretations do justice to the dialogue’s intricately dramatic structure, and therefore to Plato’s treatment of civil religion. What I propose is a third position in which Plato both takes seriously the social and political utility of religion, and views theology as a legitimate, and even necessary, subject of philosophical inquiry without going so far as to advocate theocracy as the second best form of regime.

I conclude that a proper focus on the dialogue form, combined with a careful historical analysis of Plato’s use of social and political institutions, reveals an innovative yet traditional form of civil religion, purified of the harmful influence of the poets, based on the authority of the oracle at Delphi, and grounded on a philosophical conception of god as the eternal source of order, wisdom, and all that is good. Through a union of traditional Delphic theology and Platonic natural theology, Plato gives the city of the Laws a common cult acceptable to philosopher and non-philosopher alike, and thus, not only bridges the gap between religion and philosophy, but also creates a sense of community, political identity, and social harmony—the prerequisites for political order and stability. The political theology of the Laws, therefore, provides a rational defense of the rule of law (νόμος) re-conceived as the application of divine Reason (νοῦς) to human affairs.

The constitution of the state of Iowa and amendments from 1857 to 1919 with historical introduction

Includes an historical review of the Constitution of Iowa along with a copy of constitution and amendments from 1857-1919

Journal of the State Convention on Repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, July 10, 1933

Proposing an amendment to the constitution of the United States. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by conventions in three-fourths of the several states. "Article-"Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitutionof the United States is hereby repealed. "Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. "Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven yearsfrom the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.” Jno. Garner, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Charles Curtis, Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate

Only if “je est un autre” Can I Recognise You: Reflections on Canada’s Process of Constitutional Recognition of the “Preexistence of Distinctive Aborignial Societies”

1er Prix du concours d'initiation à la recherche organisé par le Regroupement Droit et Changements. La Loi sur les Indiens institutionnalise toujours de nombreuses facettes de ce qu’est être « Indien » pour beaucoup d’individus au Canada et un changement de perspective doit être opéré. Cet essai puise dans la pensée du philosophe Theodor Adorno pour réfléchir aux tentatives de reconnaissance juridique par le Canada des individus et sociétés autochtones en vertu de l’article 35 de la Constitution. L’auteur présente la théorie de la dialectique négative d’Adorno de 1966 sur le rapport à l’altérité, à partir de l’analyse de la professeure Drucilla Cornell, afin d’identifier ce que sa pensée prescrit pour établir des rapports non-oppressants entre Autochtones et non-Autochtones et leurs gouvernements aujourd’hui. La dialectique négative est particulièrement appropriée à la tentative de reconnaissance juridique de l’existence des sociétés autochtones par le Canada, du fait de leur statut marginalisé et de leurs revendications à la spécificité. Après avoir établi un tel cadre, l’auteur souligne que des précédentes tentatives de reconnaissances se sont soldées par des échecs en raison des désaccords au niveau des valeurs impliquées et des concepts utilisés auxquels elles ont donné lieu. Le processus de signature des traités numérotés de 1871-1921 est employé comme illustration en raison de son résultat souvent décrit aujourd’hui comme coercitif et injuste en dépit du discours de négociation sur un pied d’égalité l’ayant accompagné. Les critiques contemporaines de la politique en vigueur de mise en œuvre de l’autonomie gouvernementale autochtone par des accords négociés sont également présentées, afin d’illustrer que des désaccords quant à la manière dont l’État canadien entend reconnaître les peuples autochtones persistent à ce jour. L’auteur ajoute que, du point de vue de la dialectique négative, de tels désaccords doivent nécessairement être résolus pour que des rapports moins oppressifs puissent être établis. L’auteur conclut que la dialectique négative impose à la fois de se considérer soi-même (« je est un autre ») et de considérer l’autre comme au-delà des limites de sa propre pensée. La Cour suprême a déjà reconnu que la seule perspective de la common law n’est pas suffisante pour parvenir à une réconciliation des souverainetés des Autochtones et de la Couronne en vertu de la Constitution. Le concept de common law de fiduciaire présente un véhicule juridique intéressant pour une reconfiguration plus profonde par le gouvernement canadien de son rapport avec les peuples autochtones, priorisant processus plutôt que résultats et relations plutôt que certitude. Il doit toutefois être gardé à l’esprit que la reconnaissance de ces peuples par l’État canadien par le prisme de la pensée d’Adorno présente non seulement le défi d’inclure de nouvelles perspectives, mais également de remettre en cause les prémisses fondamentales à partir desquelles on considère la communauté canadienne en général.

Social Justice and Weaker Sections: Role of the Judiciary

The Constitution of India. which has been described by an eminent writer as a "Corner stone of a nation". Has bestowed sufficient thought on the underprivileged. A number of provisions incorporated in it for their benefit tell the tale of statesmanship of the framers of the Constitution. for the vitality of a Constitution depends on the extent to which it affords protection to the under—priveleged. One such laudable provision in the Constitution relates to "weaker sections of the people", which has directed the State to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of such people. Besides. the Constitution has laid great stress on social justice. No comprehensive analysis in a single work seems to have been made so far of the connotations of social justice and the scope of the constitutional safeguards provided in favour of the weaker sections of the people. This thesis is the result of an attempt to analyse the connotations of social justice and the scope of the constitutional provisions made for the benefit of the weaker sections and the role played by the judiciary in this field The weaker sections, which are sought to be covered in this work, are "Backward C1asses". socially and educationally Backward Classes", "Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes" and women. The first two categories of weaker sections have not been defined in the Constitution. So, their meaning and the criteria to determine them have to be gathered from the reports submitted by various Backward Class Commissions and judicial decisions rendered in a number of cases. The main thrust in this work is to understand the meaning and contents of social justice, identify the relevant weaker sections and to examine the extent to which the social justice has been rendered to the said weaker sections. The scope of this thesis is confined to the examination of the role of the judiciary in this field. So, the enquiry has been focussed mainly on the decisions of the judiciary bearing on the subject with a view to assessing the role of the judiciary in rendering social justice meaningful to the weaker sections in particular and to the Indian Society in general.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Revised ordinances of the City of Chillicothe, Mo., embracing all ordinances ... in force Jan. 1, 1907 ...

On cover: Charter and ordinances.

The Western rural rules of order and rallying song book : also a history of the Farmers Alliance movement, which began in 1880.

Includes an account of the organizational meeting, and a copy of the constitution, of the Cook County Alliance, No. 1, of the State of Illinois.