Synopolies: The use of cryptographic technologies to impede competition in multiple jurisdictions

Many jurisdictions have developed mature infrastructures, both administratively and legislatively, to promote competition. Substantial funds have been expended to monitor activities that are anticompetitive and many jurisdictions also have adopted a form of "Cartel Leniency Program", first developed by the US Federal Trade Commission, to assist in cartel detection. Further, some jurisdictions are now criminalizing cartel behaviour so that cartel participants can be held criminally liable with substantial custodial penalties imposed. Notwithstanding these multijurisdictional approaches, a new form of possibly anticompetitive behaviour is looming. Synergistic monopolies („synopolies‟) involve not competitors within a horizontal market but complimentors within separate vertical markets. Where two complimentary corporations are monopolists in their own market they can, through various technologies, assist each other to expand their respective monopolies thus creating a barrier to new entrants and/or blocking existing participants from further participation in that market. The nature of the technologies involved means that it is easy for this potentially anti-competitive activity to enter and affect the global marketplace. Competition regulators need to be aware of this potential for abuse and ensure that their respective competition frameworks appropriately address this activity. This paper discusses how new technologies can be used to create a synopoly.

Competition laws and policies in China and Hong Kong : a tale of two regulatory journeys

Reviews the background to China's enactment of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 2007 and compares the debate surrounding the proposed introduction of similar legislation in Hong Kong. Examines the main issues arising during the Law's 13 year drafting stage, its key provisions and the remaining areas of uncertainty concerning its enforcement. Discusses ongoing efforts to introduce competition law regulations in Hong Kong, the main features of the draft General Competition Law and the shortcomings of its approach to penalties and exemptions.

The economics of credence goods: An experimental investigation of the role of verifiability, liability, competition and reputation in credence goods markets

Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.

Post-WTO China : competition and technology transfer laws in the 'new' socialist market economy

China has been the focus of much academic and business scrutiny of late. Its economic climate is changing and its huge new market opportunities seem quite tantalizing to the would-be 'technology entrepreneur'. But China's market is a relatively immature one; it is still in the process of being opened up to real competition. The corollary of this is that, at this stage of the transitional process, there is still significant State control of market function. This article discusses Chinese competition law, the technology transfer system, how the laws are being reformed and how the technology entrepreneur fares under them. The bottom line is that while opportunities beckon, the wise entrepreneur will nevertheless continue to exercise caution.

The nine lives of Vietnam's new competition law

Vietnam's present draft of the proposed new Law on Competition is currently in its ninth version. Although there is a need to enact legislation as quickly as possible, Vietnam cannot rush the drafting process. Under its Bilateral Trade Agreement with the USA, Vietnam has committed to improve the quality of its laws and consistency of its legislative framework. Since the Law on Competition will be fundamental in establishing the legal framework for a more coherent and effective competition regime, and will have profound influences on Vietnam's objective of becoming a socialist-oriented market economy, its provisions must be well constructed and well considered, and this takes time. This article shows how the proposed Law is being crafted as compared to older drafts which sheds light on changes in policy during the drafting process. Where possible, the Draft is also compared with the laws in other jurisdictions for any assistance they might lend. In this author's opinion not all the changes are positive but any defects in the draft are not intractable and can be remedied prior to promulgation.

More legislative traffic on the 'Doi Moi' superhighway : technology transfer, IP and competition law in Vietnam

Since 1986 Vietnam has been engaged in the transition from a centrally-controlled economy to a socialist-oriented market economy (the 'doi moi' renovation). The process for global economic integration has been slow given the magnitude of necessary reforms. Consequently technology entrepreneurs often discount Vietnam as a possible commercialization base which means that it is not realising its economic potential as a hub of technology transfer in the Asia-Pacific region. Three significant factors in the current uncertainty are Vietnam's laws on competition, intellectual property and technology transfer. Another problem is the lack of literature on these laws. This article first discusses the conceptual relationship between competition, intellectual property and technology transfer. Hopefully the article will provide some guidance for the technology entrepreneur considering foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam. The bottom line is that these laws still need further reform to bolster entrepreneurial confidence.

New strength of competition and innovation : China’s independent television production

The state-owned media system in China has evolved considerably since 1994 when the first independent TV production company was officially registered. Today, there are thousands of independent TV production companies looking for market opportunities in China. Independent production companies have facilitated the circulation of program trade and investment, and in the process have encouraged innovation and professionalization. This paper focuses on the evolution of independents and the changing face of the television market. It discusses the ecology of independent television companies in China and how government regulations are impacting on the TV production market. It argues that independent TV is providing a new strength for China‟s TV market, one often suspected of being imitative, propagandistic and lacking colour.

Extending Alexander’s ecological dominance-social competition (EDSC) evolutional model

Alexander’s Ecological Dominance and Social Competition (EDSC) model currently provides the most comprehensive overview of human traits in the development of a theory of human evolution and sociality (Alexander, 1990; Finn, Geary & Ward, 2005; Irons, 2005). His model provides a basis for explaining the evolution of human socio-cognitive abilities. Our paper examines the extension of Alexander’s model to incorporate the human trait of information behavior in synergy with ecological dominance and social competition as a human socio-cognitive competence. This paper discusses the various interdisciplinary perspectives exploring how evolution has shaped information behavior and why information behavior is emerging as an important human socio-cognitive competence. This paper outlines these issues, including the extension of Spink and Currier’s (2006a,b) evolution of information behavior model towards a more integrated understanding of how information behaviors have evolved (Spink & Cole, 2006).

Extending Alexander’s ecological dominance-social competition model : information behavior adaptation

Alexander’s Ecological Dominance and Social Competition (EDSC) model currently provides the most comprehensive overview of human traits in the development of a theory of human evolution and sociality (Alexander, 1990; Finn, Geary & Ward, 2005; Irons, 2005). His model provides a basis for explaining the evolution of human socio-cognitive abilities. Our paper examines the extension of Alexander’s model to incorporate the human trait of information behavior in synergy with ecological dominance and social competition as a human socio-cognitive competence. This paper discusses the various interdisciplinary perspectives exploring how evolution has shaped information behavior and why information behavior is emerging as an important human socio-cognitive competence. This paper outlines these issues, including the extension of Spink and Currier’s (2006a,b) evolution of information behavior model towards a more integrated understanding of how information behaviors have evolved (Spink & Cole, 2006).

Standardisation and patent ambush : potential liability under Australian competition law

This article examines the problem of patent ambush in standard setting, where patent owners are sometimes able to capture industry standards in order to secure monopoly power and windfall profits. Because standardisation generally introduces high switching costs, patent ambush can impose significant costs on downstream manufacturers and consumers and drastically reduce the efficiency gains of standardisation.This article considers how Australian competition law is likely to apply to patent ambush both in the development of a standard (through misrepresenting the existence of an essential patent) and after a standard is implemented (through refusing to license an essential patented technology either at all or on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms). This article suggests that non-disclosure of patent interests is unlikely to restrained by Part IV of the Trade Practices Act (TPA), and refusals to license are only likely to be restrained if the refusal involves leveraging or exclusive dealing. By contrast, Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs) which seek to limit this behaviour through private ordering may face considerable scrutiny under the new cartel provisions of the TPA. This article concludes that SSOs may be best advised to implement administrative measures to prevent patent hold-up, such as reviewing which patents are essential for the implementation of a standard, asking patent holders to make their licence conditions public to promote transparency, and establishing forums where patent licensees can complain about licence terms that they consider to be unreasonable or discriminatory. Additionally, the ACCC may play a role in authorising SSO policies that could otherwise breach the new cartel provisions, but which have the practical effect of promoting competition in the standards setting environment.