Promotion of cooperation in the form C0C1D classified by 'degree grads' in a scale-free network

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the public goods game (PGG) on a heterogeneous graph. By introducing a new effective topology parameter, 'degree grads' phi, we clearly classify the agents into three kinds, namely, C-0, C-1, and D. The mechanism for the heterogeneous topology promoting cooperation is discussed in detail from the perspective of C0C1D, which reflects the fact that the unreasoning imitation behaviour of C-1 agents, who are 'cheated' by the well-paid C-0 agents inhabiting special positions, stabilizes the formation of the cooperation community. The analytical and simulation results for certain parameters are found to coincide well with each other. The C0C1D case provides a picture of the actual behaviours in real society and thus is potentially of interest.

Enhancement on the hydrothermal stability of ZSM-5 zeolites by the cooperation effect of exchanged lanthanum and phosphoric species

It was explored by density functional calculations that exchanged La or P species exert great influence on the local Al sites as well as on the adjacent exchanged species. In partially exchanged La- or P/H-ZSM-5 zeolite, some of the Al sites will fall off from the zeolite framework even more easily than in H-form ZSM-5, consistent with our XRF experiments. However, when exchanged by both La and P species, Al at either of the two exchanged sites shows better stability compared to H-from. zeolite. La and P species will interact strongly with each other, as evidenced by the charge donation process and the shortening of P-O-1 bond length. It was just the cooperation of La and P species that enabled RSCC catalysts worked normally under severe conditions. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics

Booth, Ken, and N. J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp.xv+364 RAE2008

China's performance in Sino-African cooperation and the impact in Africa's development

Trabalho de Dissertação apresentado à Universidade Fernando Pessoa como parte dos requisitos para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Cooperação Internacional e Desenvolvimento

Christian cooperation in Latin America

http://www.archive.org/details/christiancoopera00inmauoft/

Cooperation and the world mission

http://www.archive.org/details/cooperationandth009506mbp

Cooperation between adsorbates accounts for the activation of atomic layer deposition reactions

Atomic layer deposition (ALD) is a technique for producing conformal layers of nanometre-scale thickness, used commercially in non-planar electronics and increasingly in other high-tech industries. ALD depends on self-limiting surface chemistry but the mechanistic reasons for this are not understood in detail. Here we demonstrate, by first-principle calculations of growth of HfO2 from Hf(N(CH3)2)4–H2O and HfCl4–H2O and growth of Al2O3 from Al(CH3)3–H2O, that, for all these precursors, co-adsorption plays an important role in ALD. By this we mean that previously-inert adsorbed fragments can become reactive once sufficient numbers of molecules adsorb in their neighbourhood during either precursor pulse. Through the calculated activation energies, this ‘cooperative’ mechanism is shown to have a profound influence on proton transfer and ligand desorption, which are crucial steps in the ALD cycle. Depletion of reactive species and increasing coordination cause these reactions to self-limit during one precursor pulse, but to be re-activated via the cooperative effect in the next pulse. This explains the self-limiting nature of ALD.

Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was not just about Iraq

Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally, if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject possible cooperation in the short run to improve their influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This need not be due to traditional relative gains concern. States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak negotiator will erode future bargaining power and subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve. This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in 2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

The evolution of authoritarian processes: Fostering cooperation in large-scale groups

Authoritarianism, comprising conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression, is an important factor underlying prejudice and social discrimination and therefore is typically perceived as socially problematic. In contrast, our work examines adaptive features of authoritarianism. Evolutionary game theoretical considerations (e.g., biased social learning) point to authoritarian psychological processes that establish and foster group life (e.g., high levels of ingroup cooperation). First, the evolution of social learning (particularly conformist and prestige biases) leads to the establishment of local and distinct cultural groups (conventionalism). Second, local cultural rules solve coordination dilemmas by transforming these rules into normative standards against which others are evaluated (authoritarian submission). Third, the common rules within a particular culture or group are reinforced by a tendency to reward norm compliance and punish norm deviations (authoritarian aggression). Implications regarding the deduction of novel research questions as well as dealing with authoritarianism as a social problem are discussed.