The origins of formal collusion in Australian fire insurance 1870-1920

The market for insurance has become increasingly competitive in recent years. However, it has not always been so. At the end of the nineteenth century, it was characterized by a highly concentrated and tightly controlled oligopolistic market structure. As such, the history of the fire insurance industry provides an interesting case study in the development of collusive behaviour amongst firms. Up to 1897, pricing agreements among firms were generally short-lived, and were followed by periods of intense competition. After this point, an agreement was forged, which proved very resilient to market pressures and formed the basis of premium rate setting until the 1970s. This paper investigates the difference between this agreement and previous efforts to set premium rates, and points to some of the common features of the later compact, which explain its longevity.

Insuring for a crisis: deposit insurance and the GFC, the Australian and New Zealand experience

Deposit insurance schemes were an important element in policy responses to the global financial crisis (GFC). There has been considerable debate about the nature and efficacy of such policy measures in alleviating the fallout from financial crises. The GFC highlighted problems associated with deposit insurance schemes including moral hazard, coverage limits, co-insurance, cross border issues and market distortions. Despite these shortcomings, deposit insurance schemes were able to ameliorate the financial panic experienced and reduce contagion. This paper evaluates the Australian and New Zealand experience with deposit insurance introduced in response to the GFC, and compares this to the OECD experience. It reflects on the performance of deposit insurance schemes considered against the attributes of good policy design, and evaluates the specific problems and strengths encountered during the GFC.

Establishing insurance markets in settler economies. a comparison of Australian and South Africa insurance markets, 1820-1910

How did insurance markets in the settler economies of Australia and South Africa develop? This paper investigates the establishment of the local insurance industries in two settler economies in the wake of the absence of comparative studies in the emergence of insurance markets in the periphery. The paper compares conditions in these settler economies and notes the innovative role of local entrepreneurs. British insurance companies extended operations into the British colonies, but local interests emerged to challenge their dominance. Innovations in organisational form, product offerings and distribution channels afforded local entrepreneurs a competitive advantage in the life market. Collusion in the fire market restricted innovative practices and retained foreign control. This article explains the agency of local entrepreneurs in the emergence of insurance markets in two settler societies at the end of the nineteenth century. This historical development path has notable implications for the current development of insurance markets in Africa.

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.

Public policy for pensions, health and sickness insurance

Includes bibliography

Health benefits guarantees in Latin America: equity and quasi market restructuring at the beginning of the millennium

Includes bibliography

Public policy for pensions, health and sickness insurance: potential lessons from Sweden for Latin America

Includes bibliography

Essays on Unemployment Insurance

Can the potential availability of unemployment insurance (UI) affect the behavior of employed workers and the duration of their employment spells? After discussing few straightforward reasons why UI may affect employment duration, I apply a regression kink design (RKD) to address this question using linked employer-employee data from the Brazilian labor market. Exploiting the UI schedule, I find that potential benefit level significantly affects the duration of employment spells. This effect is local to low skilled workers and, surprisingly, indicates that a 1\% increase in unemployment benefits increases job duration by around 0.3\%. Such result is driven by the fact that higher UI decreases the probability of job quits, which are not covered by UI in Brazil. These estimates are robust to permutation tests and a number of falsification tests. I develop a reduced-form welfare formula to assess the economic relevance of this result. Based on that, I show that the positive effect on employment duration implies in a higher optimal benefit level. Moreover, the formula shows that the elasticity of employment duration impacts welfare just with the same weight as the well-known elasticity of unemployment duration to benefit level.

Heterogeneous Beliefs and the Demand for D&O Insurance by Listed Companies

This paper introduces a new rationale for the existence of “Directors’ and Officers’” (D&O) insurance. We use a model with volatile stock markets where shareholders design compensation schemes that incentivize managers to stimulate short-term increases in stock prices that do not maximize long run stock market value. We show that D&O insurance provides a convenient instrument for the initial shareholders of a company to take advantage of differences in beliefs between insiders and outsiders in capital markets. The empirical results support the idea that both the insurance coverage and the premium are higher in the presence of new shareholders and volatile markets. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications.

Measuring Unemployment Insurance Generosity

In this paper, we develop a methodology to summarize the various policy parameters of an unemployment insurance scheme into a single generosity parameter. Unemployment insurance policies are multdimensional objects. They are typically defined by waiting periods, eligibility duration, benefit levels and asset tests when eligible, which makes intertemporal or international comparisons difficult. To make things worse, labor market conditions, such as the likelihood and duration of unemployment matter when assessing the generosity of different policies. We build a first model with such complex characteristics. Our model features heterogeneous agents that are liquidity constrained but can self-insure. We then build a second model that is similar, except that the unemployment insurance is simpler: it is deprived of waiting periods and agents are eligible forever with constant benefits. We then determine which level of benefits in this second model makes agents indifferent between both unemployment insurance policies. We apply this strategy to the unemployment insurance program of the United Kingdom and study how its generosity evolved over time.

Unemployment Insurance Generosity: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison

The goal of this paper is to establish if unemployment insurance policies are more generous in Europe than in the United States, and by how much. We take the examples of France and one particular American state, Ohio, and use the methodology of Pallage, Scruggs and Zimmermann (2008) to find a unique parameter value for each region that fully characterizes the generosity of the system. These two values can then be used in structural models that compare the regions, for example to explain the differences in unemployment rates.

The Bankers', insurance managers', and agents' magazine.

Separately paged supplements accompany some numbers.

Labor market review.

Title from cover.

Labor market and employment security.

Not issued Oct.-Nov. 1940.