126 resultados para Honesty
Resumo:
In the middle of the twentieth century, banks changed from ‘closed’ designs signifying wealth, security, and safety to ‘open’ designs signifying hospitality, honesty, and transparency as the perception of money changed from a passive physical substance to be slowly accumulated to an active notational substance to be kept in motion. If money is saved, customers must trust that the bank is secure and their money will be there when they want it; if money is invested, customers must trust that it is being done openly and honestly and they are being well-advised. Architecture visually communicates that the institution can be trusted in the requisite way.
Resumo:
I am truly honored to have been given the amazing opportunity to create this original piece, this powerful journey through memory and emotive exploration of the loss of childhood. How do we feel about the loss of our child-self? Could we ever get them back? How long, how deep would one have to dig in the graveyards, the playgrounds of memory, to uncover what was buried there... to un-erase what waserased? shading silhouettes of smaller ones will ultimately encourage a reconnection with the Inner Child hidden inside all of us, as well as an intimate awareness of the adult version of the self by looking back to the smaller ones. The main inspiration for this piece is then of course, Inner Child Work. Most people may not be familiar with this therapeutic exploration of childhood... It wasimportant to me then, to present this concept in an imaginative, theatrical way, as a gift to you - a comprehensive and intensely moving gift. Speaking from experience, working on my Inner Child - my little Bianca - has been the most painful, frightening, yetrewarding and powerful experience within my personal life. Some people spend their entire lives trying to love themselves, to prove themselves, or be accepted. Some are too afraid to look back to where it all began. The characters within this piece will face thatfear... in a regression from the complexities of adulthood to the confusion of adolescence, all the way back to the wonder and bliss of childhood. They will reveal memories, of both joy and pain, love and abandonment, journeying backwards through time - through memory - through a playground - back to the beginning... We will enter a world where a push of a merry-go-round spins us to games of Truth or Dare after a high school dance at 16 - or the slam of a metal fence reminds us of the door Dad slammed in our face at 9 - where the sound of chain links swings us back to scrapping our knee by the sandbox at 5 This piece will attempt to connect everyone, both cast and audience, through a universal understanding and discussion of what it means to grow up, as well as a discovery of WHY we are the way we are - how experiences or relationships from our childhood have shaped our adult lives. We will attempt to challenge your honesty and nerve by inviting you to ask questions of yourselves, your past - to remember what it's like to have the innocence and hope of a child, to engage with and discover your Inner Child, to realize when or why you left them behind, and if you want to this magical part of yourself. It is my hope that you will join us in a collective journey - gather the courage to dig up the little kid you buried so long ago...* The creation, design, choreography, and direction for shading silhouettes of smaller ones mark the culminating experience of a year-long independent study in Theatre.
Resumo:
The response of some Argentine workers to the 2001 crisis of neoliberalism gave rise to a movement of worker-recovered enterprises (empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores or ERTs). The ERTs have emerged as former employees took over the control of generally fraudulently bankrupt factories and enterprises. The analysis of the ERT movement within the neoliberal global capitalist order will draw from William Robinson’s (2004) neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony. The theoretical framework of neo-Gramscian hegemony will be used in exposing the contradictions of capitalism on the global, national, organizational and individual scales and the effects they have on the ERT movement. The ERT movement has demonstrated strong level of resilience, despite the numerous economic, social, political and cultural challenges and limitations it faces as a consequence of the implementation of neoliberalism globally. ERTs have shown that through non-violent protests, democratic principles of management and social inclusion, it is possible to start constructing an alternative social order that is based on the cooperative principles of “honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others” (ICA 2007) as opposed to secrecy, exclusiveness, individualism and self-interestedness. In order to meet this “utopian” vision, it is essential to push the limits of the possible within the current social order and broaden the alliance to include the organized members of the working class, such as the members of trade unions, and the unorganized, such as the unemployed and underemployed. Though marginal in number and size, the members of ERTs have given rise to a model that is worth exploring in other countries and regions burdened by the contradictory workings of capitalism. Today, ERTs serve as living proofs that workers too are capable of successfully running businesses, not capitalists alone.
Resumo:
Theory suggests that carotenoid-based signals are used in animal communication because they contain specific information about parasite resistance or immunocompetence. This implies that honesty of carotenoid-based signals is maintained by a trade-off between pigmentation and immune function for carotenoids, assuming that the carotenoids used for coloration are also immunoenhancing. We tested this hypothesis by altering the diets of nestling great tits (Paris major) with supplementary beadlets containing the carotenoids that are naturally ingested with food or beadlets containing the carotenoids that are incorporated into the feathers; a control group received beadlets containing no carotenoids. We simultaneously immune challenged half of the nestlings of each supplementation group, using a two-factorial design. Activatior of the immune system led to reduced color expression. However, only nestlings fed with the naturally ingested carotenoids and not with the carotenoids deposited in the feathers showed an increased cellular immune response. This shows that the carotenoids used for ornamentation do not promote the immune function, which conflicts with the trade-off hypothesis. Our results indicate that honesty of carotenoid-based signals is maintained by an individual's physiological limitation to absorb and/or transport carotenoids and by access to carotenoids, indicating that preferences for carotenoid-based traits in sexual selection or parent-offspring interactions select for competitive individuals, rather than specifically for immune function.
Resumo:
In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.
Resumo:
We examined the relation between low self-esteem and depression using longitudinal data from a sample of 674 Mexican-origin early adolescents who were assessed at age 10 and 12 years. Results supported the vulnerability model, which states that low self-esteem is a prospective risk factor for depression. Moreover, results suggested that the vulnerability effect of low self-esteem is driven, for the most part, by general evaluations of worth (i.e., global self-esteem), rather than by domain-specific evaluations of academic competence, physical appearance, and competence in peer relationships. The only domain-specific self-evaluation that showed a prospective effect on depression was honesty-trustworthiness. The vulnerability effect of low self-esteem held for male and female adolescents, for adolescents born in the United States versus Mexico, and across different levels of pubertal status. Finally, the vulnerability effect held when we controlled for several theoretically relevant 3rd variables (i.e., social support, maternal depression, stressful events, and relational victimization) and for interactive effects between self-esteem and the 3rd variables. The present study contributes to an emerging understanding of the link between self-esteem and depression and provides much needed data on the antecedents of depression in ethnic minority populations
Resumo:
Driven by privacy-related fears, users of Online Social Networks may start to reduce their network activities. This trend can have a negative impact on network sustainability and its business value. Nevertheless, very little is understood about the privacy-related concerns of users and the impact of those concerns on identity performance. To close this gap, we take a systematic view of user privacy concerns on such platforms. Based on insights from focus groups and an empirical study with 210 subjects, we find that (i) Organizational Threats and (ii) Social Threats stemming from the user environment constitute two underlying dimensions of the construct “Privacy Concerns in Online Social Networks”. Using a Structural Equation Model, we examine the impact of the identified dimensions of concern on the Amount, Honesty, and Conscious Control of individual self-disclosure on these sites. We find that users tend to reduce the Amount of information disclosed as a response to their concerns regarding Organizational Threats. Additionally, users become more conscious about the information they reveal as a result of Social Threats. Network providers may want to develop specific mechanisms to alleviate identified user concerns and thereby ensure network sustainability.
Resumo:
This study critically analyzes and synthesizes community participation (CP) theory across disciplines, defining and beginning to map out the elements of CP according to a preliminary framework of structure, process, intermediate outcomes, and ultimate outcomes. The first study component sought to determine the impact of Sight N' Soul, a CP project utilizing neighborhood health workers (NHWs), on appointment missing in an indigent urban African-American population. It found that persons entering the vision care system through contact with an NEW were about a third less likely to miss an appointment than those persons entering the system through some other avenue. While theory in this area remains too poorly developed to hypothesize causal relationships between structure, process, and outcomes, a summary of the elements of Sight N' Soul's structure and process both developed the preliminary framework and serves as a first step to mapping these relationships. The second component of the study uncovered the elements of structure and process that may contribute to a sustained egalitarian partnership between community people and professionals, a CP program called Project HEAL. Elements of Project HEAL's structure and process included a shared belief in the program; spirituality; contribution, ownership, and reciprocation; a feeling of family; making it together; honesty, trust, and openness about conflict; the inevitability of uncertainty and change; and the guiding interactional principles of respect; love, care, and compassion; and personal responsibility. The third component analyzed the existing literature, identifying and addressing gaps and inconsistencies and highlighting areas needing more highly developed ethical analysis. Focal issues include the political, economic, and historical context of CP; the power of naming; the issue of purpose; the nature of community; the power to muster and allocate resources; and the need to move to a systems view of health and well-being, expanding our understanding of the universe of potential outcomes of CP, including iatrogenic outcomes. Intermediate outcomes might include change in community, program, and individual capacity, as well as improved health care delivery. Ultimate outcomes include increased positive interdependencies and opportunities for contribution; improved mental, physical, and spiritual health; increased social justice; and decreased exploitation. ^
Resumo:
Although physician recommendation has been significantly associated with colorectal cancer screening (CRCS), it still does not motivate all patients to get CRCS. Although improved physician recommendation for CRCS has been shown to increase patient CRCS screening, questions remain about what elements of that discussion may lead to screening. The objective of this study is to describe patients' perceptions and interpretations about their physician's recommendation for CRCS during their annual wellness exam. A subset of patients (n=51) participating in a supplement study of a behavioral intervention trial designed to increase CRCS completed a follow-up, open-ended interview two to four weeks after their annual wellness visit. Using qualitative methods, transcripts of these interviews were analyzed. Findings suggest that most patients would follow their physician's recommendation for CRCS despite not engaging in much discussion. Patients may refrain from CRCS discussion because of a commitment to CRCS, awareness of screening guidelines, and trust in physician's honesty and beneficence. Yet many patients left their wellness exams with questions, refraining because of future plans to consult with their physicians, perceived time constraints or a lack of a patient-physician relationship. If patients are leaving their wellness exams with unanswered questions, interventions should prepare physicians for patient reticence, teaching physicians how to assure patients that CRCS is a primary care activity where all questions and concerns, including cost and scheduling, may be resolved.^
Resumo:
El presente trabajo propone realizar un análisis interdisciplinario histórico-iufilosófico y de derecho tomando como eje el caso especial de los delitos contra la honestidad (actualmente delitos contra la integridad sexual) a la luz de cuatro aspectos de la teoría dworkiniana: el uso de la jurisprudencia y el precedente para resolver problemas jurídicos, el lugar de la moralidad en el derecho -especialmente en el argentino-, el concepto de "caso difícil" y el lugar del juez en su resolución. En este punto, pretendo mostrar cómo el objeto histórico se relaciona estrechamente con los desarrollos posteriores y problemas contemporáneos de la filosofía del derecho
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
Resumo:
El presente trabajo propone realizar un análisis interdisciplinario histórico-iufilosófico y de derecho tomando como eje el caso especial de los delitos contra la honestidad (actualmente delitos contra la integridad sexual) a la luz de cuatro aspectos de la teoría dworkiniana: el uso de la jurisprudencia y el precedente para resolver problemas jurídicos, el lugar de la moralidad en el derecho -especialmente en el argentino-, el concepto de "caso difícil" y el lugar del juez en su resolución. En este punto, pretendo mostrar cómo el objeto histórico se relaciona estrechamente con los desarrollos posteriores y problemas contemporáneos de la filosofía del derecho
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
Resumo:
El presente trabajo propone realizar un análisis interdisciplinario histórico-iufilosófico y de derecho tomando como eje el caso especial de los delitos contra la honestidad (actualmente delitos contra la integridad sexual) a la luz de cuatro aspectos de la teoría dworkiniana: el uso de la jurisprudencia y el precedente para resolver problemas jurídicos, el lugar de la moralidad en el derecho -especialmente en el argentino-, el concepto de "caso difícil" y el lugar del juez en su resolución. En este punto, pretendo mostrar cómo el objeto histórico se relaciona estrechamente con los desarrollos posteriores y problemas contemporáneos de la filosofía del derecho
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists