Guatemala: A Failing State?

 Guatemala is not a failed state and is unlikely to become one in the near future. Although the state currently fails to provide adequate security to its citizens or an appropriate range of effective social programs, it does supply a functioning electoral democracy, sound economic management, and a promising new antipoverty program, My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO).  Guatemala is a weak state. The principal security threats represented by expanding Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), criminal parallel powers, and urban gangs have overwhelmed the resources of the under-resourced and compromised criminal justice system. The UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), however, has demonstrated that progress against organized crime is possible.  The principal obstacles to strengthening the Guatemalan state lie in the traditional economic elite’s resistance to taxation and the venal political class’ narrow focus on short-term interests. Guatemala lacks a strong, policyoriented, mass-based political party that could develop a coherent national reform program and mobilize public support around it.  The United States should strengthen the Guatemalan state by expanding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and by strongly supporting CICIG, MIFAPRO, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

Reframing reporting of childhood sexual exploitation: three journalists reflect

This article explores three national and local journalists’ experiences of reporting on child sexual exploitation by so-called “Asian street grooming gangs” in UK towns and cities, with a particular emphasis on journalists framing journalists. In response to coverage of a series of cases, journalists have been accused by academics, policymakers and rival media organizations of fixating on perpetrators’ ethnicity and creating distorted, racist media frames. Few, if any, studies have garnered practitioners’ perspectives on how framing occurs, so we interview three prominent journalists who have covered such cases in order to deepen our understanding of the processes and causative factors behind particular editorial angles. While offering only a snapshot view, our findings reveal these individual journalists to be caught at the nexus of a range of factors that impact upon their work, both internally and externally driven.

Les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés chez les jeunes contrevenants

Chaque année, des adolescents québécois sont soumis à des sanctions judiciaires en raison de leurs actes de délinquance (Association des centres jeunesse du Québec, 2015). Plusieurs recherches récentes indiquent que ces jeunes sont plus à risque de répondre aux critères diagnostiques d’au moins un trouble mental que les adolescents de la population générale (Fazel, Doll, & Langstrom, 2008; Vermeiren, 2003). Les jeunes contrevenants sont également plus nombreux à présenter des symptômes et des troubles intériorisés (Abram et al., 2014; Skowyra & Cocozza, 2007; Teplin et al., 2006), soit des comportements anxieux, dépressifs, de retrait et des plaintes somatiques (Achenbach & McConaughy, 1992). Cette thèse contribue aux connaissances quant aux symptômes et aux troubles intériorisés chez les jeunes contrevenants en traitant de deux sujets peu étudiés : les problèmes intériorisés des jeunes contrevenants associés aux gangs de rue et l’identification de ces problèmes par les intervenants travaillant auprès d’eux. Le premier article composant la thèse présente une étude descriptive où le nombre de symptômes et de troubles intériorisés a été comparé entre des jeunes contrevenants révélant être ou avoir été associés aux gangs de rue (n = 62) et des jeunes contrevenants n’ayant pas révélé une telle association (n = 41). Les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés ont été mesurés à l’aide d’un questionnaire et d’une entrevue diagnostique semi-structurée. Les résultats indiquent que les jeunes associés aux gangs présentent davantage de symptômes de dépression-anxiété et sont plus nombreux à répondre aux critères diagnostiques d’au moins un trouble anxieux que ceux qui n’y sont pas associés. De plus, près de la moitié des participants, associés ou non aux gangs de rue, répondent aux critères diagnostiques d’au moins un trouble intériorisé. Cette forte prévalence de troubles intériorisés soulève l’importance que ceux-ci soient dépistés par les intervenants travaillant auprès des jeunes contrevenants. En effet, considérant que les troubles mentaux non traités entrainent de la souffrance, nuisent au fonctionnement et sont liés à des taux de tentatives de suicide, d’arrestations et de récidive plus élevés (Abram et al., 2014; Cottle, Lee, & Heilbrun, 2001; Hoeve, McReynolds, & Wasserman, 2013; Schonfeld et al., 1997), leur identification s’avère primordiale afin qu’ils puissent bénéficier des services dont ils auraient besoin. Le deuxième article de cette thèse est une étude exploratoire où sont recensés les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés mentionnés par les intervenants au rapport prédécisionnel (RPD) de 22 participants. La concordance entre ces symptômes et troubles intériorisés et ceux autorapportés par les jeunes contrevenants par un questionnaire et une entrevue semi-structurée est ensuite évaluée. Plusieurs symptômes et troubles intériorisés seraient « sous-identifiés » dans le RPD des jeunes contrevenants en comparaison de ce qui est révélé par les participants. Les résultats de ces deux études laissent croire qu’il serait pertinent d’offrir de la formation aux intervenants quant aux symptômes et aux troubles intériorisés chez les adolescents, d’implanter une procédure de dépistage systématique des troubles mentaux, et d’inclure les symptômes et les troubles intériorisés dans les programmes de prévention et de traitement offerts aux jeunes contrevenants.

Production de la sécurité, rationalité et gouvernance locale : une ethnographie urbaine à Douala et Yaoundé (Cameroun)

Cette thèse se penche sur la rationalité sécuritaire qui organise les villes de Douala et Yaoundé. En effet, l’insécurité urbaine devient une question très préoccupante, encore plus dans les villes des pays du Sud notamment les villes camerounaises où la recrudescence de la criminalité et de la violence ont donné lieu à des initiatives de sécurisation de la part de l’État et de la population. Sur le plan de la théorie, plusieurs approches nous permettent de nous projeter dans l’environnement sécuritaire des villes à l’étude. Nous considérons les villes de Douala et Yaoundé comme des lieux de production culturelle où se construisent à la faveur des migrations, à partir de diverses cultures et de comportements issus des villages d’origine, des formes d’identités hybrides et des territoires urbains diversifiés. Cela donne donc à réfléchir sur les modes de gouvernance locale, à l’échelle des quartiers, dans le but de comprendre les modalités d’encadrement de cette dynamique culturelle urbaine. Dans le même ordre d’idées, la gouvernance locale fait appel aux acteurs, dans leurs rôles et leurs logiques. Ces logiques s’observent dans leurs dimensions cognitives et leurs rapports avec l’espace. Les dimensions cognitives évoquent les perceptions, le vécu et les représentations subjectives qui sont associées à l’insécurité. Ainsi, le sentiment d’insécurité, la peur, la marginalisation, la violence et la criminalisation sont des phénomènes qui laissent entrevoir des populations défavorisées, victimes d’insécurité. C’est à côté de ces dernières que se manifestent les logiques d’acteurs associées à l’espace, qui ouvrent l’observation sur l’informalité et la ségrégation non seulement comme instruments de contrôle de l’espace urbain, mais également comme cadres de production d’espaces sécurisés. L’informalité et la ségrégation sont aussi favorables au développement des identités, à la construction d’utopies, ces visions mélioratives qui motivent et transforment les acteurs. Ce sont ces logiques d’acteurs dans leurs rapports avec l’espace qui justifient les initiatives de sécurisation. Finalement, c’est dans cette dynamique de transformation que les acteurs entrent en processus de subjectivation pour se produire comme sujets. Sur le plan méthodologique, cette thèse repose sur une ethnographie critique et comparative de la sécurité et sur l’approche de l’action sociale, qui invite à s’attarder aux interactions sociales, pour rendre compte de la rationalité sécuritaire. Étudier la sécurité requiert de s’attarder à l’échelle des quartiers, objets principaux de la sécurisation et espaces d’expression de l’informalité. Les quartiers sont encadrés par les chefferies urbaines, dont les systèmes de gestion constituent la gouvernance locale. Face à la question de la sécurité, cette gouvernance se prononce entre autres en fonction de son identité, de sa culture et de ses représentations. Elle côtoie les logiques étatiques dont les techniques et les stratégies d’organisation matérialisent les politiques de sécurité. Douala et Yaoundé présentent des approches populaires de sécurisation qui diffèrent sur le plan de l’organisation locale des quartiers et du tempérament populaire. Elles se rapprochent par les logiques d’acteurs et la motivation que ces derniers ont à se produire en sujets. La recherche a permis de constater qu’une forme de rationalité régit l’ensemble des dynamiques et des stratégies de production de la sécurité qui ont cours à Douala et Yaoundé. Cette rationalité passe par une pluralité de logiques de sécurité, elles-mêmes tributaires de nombreux phénomènes qui contribuent à la production de l’insécurité, mais aussi à celle de la sécurité. En effet, les migrations de la campagne vers la ville, l’informalité, la ségrégation et la présence de gangs locaux sont des réalités urbaines qui donnent une forme particulière à l’insécurité, mais invitent également à une réadaptation des techniques et des groupes d’acteurs impliqués dans la production de la sécurité. Il ressort que la rationalité sécuritaire, cette intelligence de gouvernement qui s’organise dans les dispositifs de l’offre publique de sécurité, suscite aussi dans les procédés des acteurs populaires, des techniques d’identification aux forces de l’ordre. Dans son processus, elle aboutit à la production de sujets sécurisés et de sécurité. En saisissant les productions humaines comme des activités innovantes, nous comprenons que la sécurisation procède par rapprochement entre les forces de l’ordre et les populations, par la mise en oeuvre de mécanismes mis en place pour répondre à la menace mais aussi par la « confiscation de la sécurité » pour les besoins d’une élite. Ensuite, elle représente une instance de subjectivation où l’innovation se matérialise et où les acteurs se réalisent, créent la sécurité et recréent la ville. Finalement, cette thèse révèle une pluralité de logiques de sécurité construites autour d’une même rationalité sécuritaire.

Disappeared Persons and Homicide in El Salvador

During 2012-2013, the homicide rate in El Salvador came down from 69.9 to 42.2 per 100,000 population following a truce between the leaders of the two major gangs, “Mara Salvatrucha” and “Barrio 18”, and government. But despite the apparent successes of the truce, it was speculated that the drop in murders could have been due to the killers simply hid the bodies of their victims. This paper aims at determining whether gangs effectively disappeared their victims to cut down the official counts of murders, or they committed these crimes for other reasons. The results from this study suggest that Salvadoran gangs had been using disappearance as a resource to gain sustained social control among residents of already gang-dominated areas, that together with homicide, disappearance is part of a process of territorial spread and strategic strengthening by which these groups are enhancing their capabilities to interfere in the alliances of Mexican drug trafficking organizations with Central American criminal organizations specializing in the transshipment of drugs and in providing access to local markets to distribute and sell drugs. Our findings show that the risk for disappearance has been large even before the truce was in place and that actually, it continues as such and going through a process of geographic expansion.

L'identité ethnique chez les jeunes contrevenants

La présence accrue de jeunes appartenant à un groupe ethnoculturel minoritaire dans les institutions pour jeunes contrevenants au Québec est une problématique complexe et préoccupante. Lorsque les études scientifiques se penchent sur les questions liées à la délinquance juvénile et aux gangs de rue, l’accent est placé sur l’identification de groupes ethniques plus à risque de s’associer à un gang (van Gemert, Peterson, & Lien, 2008; Wortley & Tanner, 2006). L’association à un gang de rue est régulièrement considérée comme un phénomène qui toucherait principalement les groupes ethnoculturels minoritaires (Perreault & Bibeau, 2003 ; Spergel, 2009), sans toutefois préciser le rôle plus concret de l’ethnicité et de la culture dans l’association aux gangs de rue. Cette thèse, composée d’articles scientifiques, présente les résultats de deux études portant sur l’identité ethnique de jeunes contrevenants, mesurée par le Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure – Revised (MEIM-R) de Phinney et Ong (2007). La première étude explore les effets de l’identité ethnique et de la génération d’immigration sur les comportements délinquants autorévélés de jeunes contrevenants judiciarisés. (N = 71, âge 14-20 ans). Les comportements délinquants ont été mesurés à partir du Self-Report of Offending – Revised (SRO-R) de Huizingua, Esbensen et Weihar (1991). La seconde étude explore le rôle de l’identité ethnique et de l’appartenance à un groupe de minorités racisées dans l’association autorévélée à un gang de rue et dans l’adhésion à la culture de gang (N = 69; âge 14-20 ans). L’adhésion à la culture de gang a, quant à elle, été établie à partir de la Mesure d’adhésion à la culture de gang (MACg) de Fredette (2014). Les résultats indiquent une plus forte identité ethnique chez les jeunes contrevenants issus de la première et de la seconde génération d’immigration que ceux de la troisième génération d’immigration ou plus. Lorsqu’on tient uniquement compte de l’apparence ethnique, les jeunes contrevenants appartenant à une minorité racisée présentent aussi des plus hauts scores d’identité ethnique que ceux appartenant à la majorité caucasienne. Les résultats indiquent également que les jeunes contrevenants de l’échantillon ayant immigré avant l’âge de 6 ans et qui ont tendance à présenter une identité ethnique élevée rapportent davantage de crimes contre la personne. Afin de mieux cerner les mécanismes sous-jacents à l’effet de l’identité ethnique sur les crimes reconnus plus violents, il a été convenu de prendre l’association à un gang de rue comme variable dépendante de la seconde étude. En effet, les délinquants qui se disent associés aux gangs de rue présentent une problématique de délinquance plus sévère que les autres (Laurier, Guay, Lafortune, & Toupin, 2015), notamment en ce qui a trait à la délinquance violente (Guay et al., 2015). Plus un jeune contrevenant rapporte un niveau d’exploration de l’identité ethnique élevé, plus il adhère aux dimensions signes et symboles et règles et rituels de l’adhésion à la culture de gang, et ce, peu importe son âge, ou qu’il appartienne à une minorité racisée. Cette recherche fait ressortir l’importance de s’intéresser aux questions identitaires liées à l’ethnicité, à la race et à la culture lors d’interventions auprès de jeunes contrevenants, et ce, peu importe leurs origines.

Social and physical environmental factors influencing adolescents' physical activity in urban public open spaces: a qualitative study using walk-along interviews

Most previous studies examining physical activity in Public Open Spaces (POS) focused solely on the physical environment. However, according to socio-ecological models the social environment is important as well. The aim of this study was to determine which social and physical environmental factors affect adolescents' visitation and physical activity in POS in low-income neighbourhoods. Since current knowledge on this topic is limited, especially in Europe, qualitative walk-along interviews were used to obtain detailed and context-specific information. Participants (n = 30, aged 12-16 years, 64% boys) were recruited in POS in low-income neighbourhoods in Brussels, Ghent and Antwerp (Belgium). Participants were interviewed while walking in the POS with the interviewer. Using this method, the interviewer could observe and ask questions while the participant was actually experiencing the environment. All audio-recorded interviews were transcribed and analysed using Nvivo 10 software and thematic analysis was used to derive categories and subcategories using a grounded theory approach. The most important subcategories that were supportive of visiting POS and performing physical activity in POS were; accessibility by foot/bicycle/public transport, located close to home/school, presence of (active) friends and family, cleanliness of the POS and features, availability of sport and play facilities, large open spaces and beautiful sceneries. The most important subcategories that were unsupportive of visiting POS and physical activity in POS were; presence of undesirable users (drug users, gangs and homeless people), the behaviour of other users and the cleanliness of the POS and features. Social factors appeared often more influential than physical factors, however, it was the combination of social and physical factors that affected adolescents' behaviour in POS. Easily accessible POS with high quality features in the proximity of adolescents' home or school may stimulate physical activity, if adolescents also experience a safe and familiar social environment.

Perspectivas del trabajo institucional de la policía nacional en relación al fenómeno del pandillismo en Bogotá. sector del Codito. (2004-2015-1)

El pandillismo es un fenómeno social que se presenta en las principales ciudades de Colombia desde hace varias décadas, sin embargo, solo en los últimos años el fenómeno a comenzado a acaparar mayor atención mediática e institucional. El pandillismo se ha convertido en una preocupación para la seguridad ciudadana, especialmente en las áreas urbanas. La Policía Nacional, en conjunto a Instituciones locales y nacionales ha venido realizando un trabajo focalizado para hacerle pie al fenómeno. En este trabajo se realizó una revisión histórica del pandillismo en Bogotá y un panorama continental. De la misma manera, se hace una descripción de los programas y estrategias que la Policía Nacional y las entidades públicas han realizado desde el año 2004 hasta el año 2015. Por último se realiza una evaluación del trabajo institucional enfocado en el sector del Codito, en la localidad de Usaquén.

El papel del tráfico ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras como amenaza a la seguridad en Guatemala entre 2000 y 2005

El propósito del trabajo es exponer de qué manera el tráfico ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras constituye una amenaza a la seguridad en Guatemala durante el 2000 y 2005. La aproximación conceptual se centrará en las ideas de la Seguridad de Charles-Philippe David, puesto que servirá como herramienta para el análisis de la coyuntura guatemalteca. Así, se pretende dar cuenta del fortalecimiento de actores ilegales de crimen internacional organizado, narcotráfico, maras y pandillas, lo que da lugar al incremento de la violencia armada afectando diferentes esferas como la política, societal y económica.