Romanian glocalization : Case study on the Rosia Montana Gold Corporation Mining Project

At the end of the communist era, which was characterised as a closed social experiment, Romania found itself in the middle of a globalization process. Its industrial capacities have been considerably reduced through a poor and spendthrift management. There was a mass exodus of the labour force abroad and the educational background for the remaining part was no longer in agreement with the labour market. On these grounds, the vectors of globalization, in the form of foreign investments, entered Romania effortlessly. There even were local communities where the arrival of foreign investors was expected like a second coming of Christ. This is the context in which a Canadian company set forth the mining project Rosia Montana Gold Corporation. The implementation of the project should have started in 2005. Nevertheless, the project has not been effectively launched yet. This situation is based on what we call Romanian glocalization, namely a specific confrontation between global and local on Romanian land

Romanian glocalization : Case study on the Rosia Montana Gold Corporation Mining Project

At the end of the communist era, which was characterised as a closed social experiment, Romania found itself in the middle of a globalization process. Its industrial capacities have been considerably reduced through a poor and spendthrift management. There was a mass exodus of the labour force abroad and the educational background for the remaining part was no longer in agreement with the labour market. On these grounds, the vectors of globalization, in the form of foreign investments, entered Romania effortlessly. There even were local communities where the arrival of foreign investors was expected like a second coming of Christ. This is the context in which a Canadian company set forth the mining project Rosia Montana Gold Corporation. The implementation of the project should have started in 2005. Nevertheless, the project has not been effectively launched yet. This situation is based on what we call Romanian glocalization, namely a specific confrontation between global and local on Romanian land

Industrial Policy in Asia

This paper examines three types of industrialization that have occurred in East Asia: the Japanese, Chinese and generic Asian models. Industrial policies in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) initially protected local companies from foreign investors by imposing high tariffs on foreign investors. But Japan began introducing liberalization policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1960s, and the ROK began to welcome foreign technology in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the governments of the ASEAN countries and Taiwan established export-processing zones (EPZ) to invite FDI by offering preferential treatment, such as tax deductions and exemptions. China adopted similar industrial policies and also established EPZs, attracting the capital and know-how of multinationals and thereby strengthening the international competitiveness of local enterprises. This paper reaches the following three conclusions. First, it would have been difficult for East Asian countries to grow without FDI. Second, central governments were a crucial factor in these countries' growth strategies. Third, EPZs offering preferential treatment can effectively enhance aggregate growth in developing countries, and the Asian experience shows that this strategy can be applied to other countries that satisfy certain preconditions.

Industrialization in Indonesia since the 1970s

Introduction: During the period from the latter half of the 1980s until just before the Asian currency crisis in 1997, Indonesia’s economic development had drawn expectations and attention from various quarters, along with Malaysia and Thailand within the same Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In fact, the 1993 report by the World Bank, entitled “East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,” recognized Indonesia as one of the East Asian economies with the strong economic performance, i.e. sustained economic growth (World Bank [1993]). And it was the manufacturing industry that had been the driving force behind Indonesia’s economic growth during that period. Since the 1997 outbreak of the Asian currency crisis, however, the manufacturing sector in Indonesia has been mired in a situation that rules out the kind of bright prospects it had emanated previously. The Indonesian economy is still in the developing stage, and in accordance with the history of industrial structural changes in other countries, Indonesia’s manufacturing industry can still be expected to serve as the engine of the country’s economic development. But is it really possible in an environment where economic liberalization and globalization are forging ahead? And, what sort of problems have to be dealt with to make it possible? To answer these questions, it is necessary to know the current conditions of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, and to do that, it becomes important to think back on the history of the country’s industrialization. Thus, this paper is intended to retrace and unlock the track of Indonesia’s industrialization up until the establishment of the manufacturing sector in its present form, with the ultimate goal being to give answers to the above-mentioned questions. Subject to an analysis in this paper is the period from the installment of President Soeharto’s administration onward when industrialization of the modern industrial sector2 moved into high gear. 　　　The composition of this paper is outlined below. Section 1 first shows why it is important to examine import substitution and export orientation, both of which are used as the measures of the analysis in this paper, in tracking the history of the industrialization, and then discuss indicators of import substitution and export orientation as well as statistical data and resources needed to develop those indicators. Section 2 clarifies the status of the manufacturing industry among all industries by looking at the composition ratio of the manufacturing industry in terms of value added, imports and exports. Section 3 to 5 cover three periods between 1971 and 1995 and make an analysis of import substitution, export orientation and changes in the industrial structure for each period. Section 3 analyzes the period from 1971 through 1985, when Indonesia pursued the import substitution policy amid the oil boom. Section 4 covers the period from 1985 through 1990, when the packages of deregulatory measures were announced successively under structural adjustment policies made necessary by the fall in oil prices. Section 5 examines the period from 1990 through 1995, which saw the alternate shifts between the overheating of the economy by sharply rising investment by both domestic and foreign investors in the wake of the liberalization of investment, trade and financial services, and polices to cool down the economy. Section 6, which covers the 1995-1999 period straddling the economic crisis, is designed for an analysis of the changes in production trends before and after the economic crisis as well as the changes in the industrial structure. Section 7, after summing up the history of Indonesia’s industrialization examined in the previous sections, discusses problems found in respective sectors and attempts to present future prospects for the country’s manufacturing industry.

The role of home and host country characteristics in FDI: firm-level evidence from Japan, Korea and Taiwan

There is a large and growing empirical literature that investigates the determinants of outward foreign direct investment (FDI). This literature examines primarily the effect of host country characteristics on FDI even though home country characteristics also influence the decision of firms to invest abroad. In this paper, we examine the role of both host and home country characteristics in FDI. To do so, we constructed a firm-level database of outward FDI from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Our empirical analysis yields two main findings. First, host countries with better environment for FDI, in terms of larger market size, smaller fixed entry costs, and lower wages, attract more foreign investors. Second, firms from home countries with higher wages are more likely to invest abroad. An interesting and significant policy implication of our empirical evidence is that policymakers seeking to promote FDI inflows should prioritize countries with higher wages.

Chapter 3 Industrial Location in Cambodia: Industrial Policies and Economic Statistics

Cambodia has experienced high economic growth in the last decade. Because most of its industries were destroyed during the Pol Pot regime and civil war, in the last 20 years the country has been working hard to liberalize its economy to attract foreign investors With its efforts to join the regional and international community and with changes in the international trade environment, Cambodia started to grow its economy in the late 1990s. Now, in the early 21st century, the Cambodian economy seems to be prepared to take off. We can observe a kind of industrial agglomeration occurring, even though still at a small scale. In this paper, first, I will review the history of Cambodia’s economic development since the late 1980s. Second, I will examine the economic policies, laws, rules, and other environmental factors which have influenced industrial development and industrial location in Cambodia. Third, I will introduce industrial location in the late 2000s. Lastly, I will introduce some statistical data for the future analysis of industrial location in Cambodia.

FDI and investment barriers in developing economies

Does investment liberalization in developing economies affect FDI decisions differently across individual firms? To address this question, we simulate the response of individual firms to reductions in investment costs across developing economies. We explore two policy experiments: elimination of setup-procedure requirements for foreign investors and a reduction in corporate tax rates on foreign-owned multinationals. We find that a relaxing of discriminatory foreign investment procedures induces middle productive firms to increase their entry and production in developing economies substantially, but the most productive firms to expand moderately. Multinationals expand their entry and production in developing economies more substantially following a decline in entry barriers than following a decrease in corporate tax rates.

A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom's monopoly on exports. OSW Commentary No. 121, 26.11.2013

An act restricting Gazprom’s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conducted for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom’s competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. The ‘liberalisation’ they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom’s competitors, they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia’s share on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road to breaking Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system.

Estonia in the eurozone - a strategic success. OSW Commentary No. 53, 2011-06-20

The adoption of the euro in January 2011 topped off Estonia’s integration policy. In the opinion of Estonian politicians, this country has never been so secure and stable in its history. Tallinn sees the introduction of the euro primarily in the political context as an entrenchment of the Estonian presence in Europe. The process of establishing increasingly close relations with Western European countries, which the country has consistently implemented since it restored independence in 1991, has been aimed at severing itself its Soviet past and at a gradual reduction of the gap existing between Estonia and the best-developed European economies. The Estonian government also prioritises the enhancement of co-operation as part of the EU and NATO as well as its principled fulfilment of the country’s undertakings. It sees these as important elements for building the country’s international prestige. The meeting of the Maastricht criteria at the time of an economic slump and the adoption of the euro during the eurozone crisis proved the determination and efficiency of the government in Tallinn. Its success has been based on strong support from the Estonian public for the pro-European (integrationist) policy of Estonia: according to public opinion polls, approximately 80% of the country’s residents declare their satisfaction with EU membership, while support for the euro ranges between 50% and 60%. Since Estonia joined the OECD in 2010 and adopted the euro at the beginning of 2011, it has become the leader of integration processes among the Baltic states. The introduction of the euro has reinforced Estonia’s international image and made it more attractive to foreign investors. The positive example of this country may be used as a strong argument by the governments in Lithuania and Latvia when they take action to meet the Maastricht criteria. Vilnius and Riga claim they want to adopt the euro in 2014. The improving economic situation in the Baltic states will contribute to the achievement of this goal, while an excessively high inflation rate, as in 2007, may be the main impediment1.

Russia in Crisis: Year One. OSW Report, January 2010

Economic conditions which had favoured Russia’s development suddenly changed in mid-2008. The Russian economy was hit, on the one hand, by a drastic slump in oil prices (which fell from nearly US$150 to US$50 between July 2008 and January 2009), and on the other by the outflow of investors (a net of US$130 billion of capital left Russia in the fourth quarter of 2008). Within several months, the financial crisis became an economic crisis affecting the entire economy. The financial reserves accumulated in times of prosperity (more than US$162 billion in the stabilisation funds and nearly US$598 billion in the currency and gold reserve) alleviated the negative impact of the crisis, although this failed to prevent the deep declines in macroeconomic indicators. Russia is one of the states most severely affected by the crisis. In the first half of 2009, its GDP fell by 10.4% compared to the same period in the previous year, while industrial production dropped by nearly 15%, and a decrease in investments of over 18% was reported. The poor economic performance has strongly affected the Russian budget, which reported a deficit for the first time in ten years in 2009. During the first year of the crisis (August 2008 – September 2009), Russia’s financial reserves were seriously reduced as a result of the government’s anti-crisis policy and interventions from the central bank: the reserve fund decreased by nearly 45% to US$76 billion, and the central bank’s reserves shrunk by nearly US$200 billion to US$409 billion. Meanwhile, however, the money in the National Welfare Fund, which had been intended almost entirely to subsidise the Pensions Fund between 2010 and 2015, rose almost three-fold (to US$90 billion). According to government forecasts, the money from the reserve fund is also supposed to be spent fully in 2010. The financial crisis has triggered a dynamic outflow of capital from the Russian market. So-called speculative capital was the first to demonstrate the lack of confidence in the Russian market. In the first half of 2009, the growth rate of long-term investments also decreased noticeably, although no spectacular withdrawal of direct investments from Russia has been observed. The economic crisis has also halted the foreign expansion of Russian private capital, while state-owned capital strengthened its position as an investor. Russia’s raw materials companies continue to be the main category of foreign investors; however, new technologies are gaining prominence as the second main direction of Russian investments.

Sales Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 14, February 2012

All agricultural markets are subjected to institutional regulations that – in one way or another –affect the functioning of these markets, and this is no different for the agricultural land market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the existing regulations in the sales markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on three types of sales market regulations and institutions: quantity regulations, price regulations and transaction costs. The differences in the regulatory framework between land acquisition and ownership by domestic and foreign investors are analysed, as well as the taxes associated with land sales and ownership, zoning regulations and market imperfections.

The choice of a destination to enter

A thorough literature review has shown that although there are many theories to explain international trade, researchers are unanimous in affirming that hotel chains' internationalisation is influenced by pull factors, related to specific characteristics of the host country (contextual and transactional environment), and by push factors, related to specific characteristics of the companies and of their home country. This chapter aims to identify which factors influence hotel chains choosing a destination to invest over another. With this purpose, a theoretical model, that included six pull factors related to the contextual environment and five factors linked to the tourism industry, was developed. This model was validated through questionnaire surveys applied to foreign investors running accommodation units in mainland Portugal. Fifty three questionnaires were considered valid, representing 64% of the universe of foreign investors in Portugal (accommodation sector).

Desempenho de longo prazo de IPOs no Brasil: um estudo para o período de 2004 a 2015

O objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar o desempenho de longo prazo das empresas que abrem o capital no Brasil. Os fenômenos de (1) valorização no primeiro dia de negócios pós-IPO (underpricing) seguido de (2) desempenho inferior ao mercado no longo prazo (long-run underperformance) foram amplamente documentados em trabalhos de outros autores. O foco do estudo está em verificar a persistência dessa baixa performance quando alongamos o período de avaliação para 5 anos. Adicionalmente, o estudo pretende entender que fatores são determinantes no desempenho destas ações no longo prazo. O trabalho analisa 128 IPOs ocorridos no período de 2004 a 2012 na Bovespa. Os resultados apontam para evidências estatisticamente significantes de underpricing. Este underpricing foi mais acentuado entre os anos de 2004 a 2008, período precursor da crise financeira do subprime. Quando se analisa a performance de longo prazo os resultados apontam que a carteira de IPOs apresentou performance abaixo do mercado até o 29° mês. Os IPOs lançados no período pré-crise do subprime tiveram performance abaixo do mercado após 3 anos, enquanto que os IPOs lançados no pós-crise tiveram retorno acima do mercado para 3 e 5 anos. Não foi identificada a persistência da baixa performance dos IPOs além do 29° mês. Três variáveis principais mostraram significância na explicação dos retornos de longo prazo: (1) o período de lançamento das ações, (2) o percentual de alocação de investidores estrangeiros, (3) e a reputação do coordenador da oferta. Os IPOs lançados no período pós-crise do subprime observaram melhor performance no longo prazo. Também apresentaram melhor performance os IPOs com maior presença de investidor estrangeiro. Adicionalmente, existe uma relação inversa entre a reputação do coordenador líder da oferta e a performance de longo prazo.

Evidências empíricas na proteção do investimento direto estrangeiro em Angola e o sistema de solução de controvérsias

Considerando que houve uma intensificação no fluxo de investimento estrangeiro direto (IED) tanto no mundo quanto especialmente em Angola nos últimos anos, é a intenção deste trabalho explorar quais ferramentas outorgam ao investidor privado um sistema de proteção do seu investimento bem como sistema institucionalizado de solução de controvérsias (e.g. ICSID) por meio de Acordos de Proteção e Promoção de Investimentos (APPIs) firmados por Angola comparados à proteção que poderá ser garantida aos investidores privados brasileiros na ausência de tais documentos legais. A pergunta inerente a este trabalho é, portanto, como certo grau de proteção é outorgado aos investidores brasileiros em Angola tendo em vista as atuais correntes e tendências no direito internacional do investimento e o fluxo crescente de investimento brasileiro em Angola.

Harnessing Natural Resources for Development: New Legal Regimes for Localized Benefit Sharing in the Mining Sector

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06