A költségvetési politika fenntarthatósága és a szabályalapú gazdaságpolitika (The sustainability of fiscal policy and a rule-based economic policy)

A költségvetési pénzügyek irodalmában a fenntarthatóság koncepciója csak az elmúlt két-három évtizedben került újra a vizsgálódás fókuszába. Ennek oka kettős. Az 1960-as évek végéig a fegyelmezett fiskális politikai gyakorlat nem igényelte annak állandó napirenden tartását. Csak az olajválságok idejére eső és azután állandósulni látszó költségvetési hiányok és a növekvő államadósság-állományok, illetve az ezek okán erősödő adósságkockázat irányította újra a figyelmet a költségvetési fegyelem fenntartásának fontosságára. Ezt a változást a közgazdaságtudományi elmélettörténetben beállott gyökeres változás kísérte. Az aktív keresletmenedzsment bírálataként megfogalmazódó monetarista kritika, illetve annak radikálisabb újklasszikus változata, a politikai döntéshozókról (és így a diszkrecionális költségvetési politika hatásosságáról) lesújtó véleményt fogalmazott meg, ami azután az aktív intézkedések korlátozásának irányába terelte a gazdaságpolitika alakítóit is. A következőkben e kettős – a fiskális politikai gyakorlat és a közgazdasági elméletek területén bekövetkezett –fordulat bemutatására vállalkozunk az Akadémiai Kiadónál megjelenő Költségvetési pénzügyek – Hiány, államadósság, fenntarthatóság című kötetünk bizonyos részeinek felhasználásával.

Interaction Between Fiscal And Monetary Policy In A Dynamic Nonlinear Model.

The objective of this study is to verify the dynamics between fiscal policy, measured by public debt, and monetary policy, measured by a reaction function of a central bank. Changes in monetary policies due to deviations from their targets always generate fiscal impacts. We examine two policy reaction functions: the first related to inflation targets and the second related to economic growth targets. We find that the condition for stable equilibrium is more restrictive in the first case than in the second. We then apply our simulation model to Brazil and United Kingdom and find that the equilibrium is unstable in the Brazilian case but stable in the UK case.

Interactions between fiscal and monetary policy

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira

Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/01, January 2013

Europe has responded to the crisis with strengthened budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, liquidity provisioning by resilient economies and the European Central Bank and a process towards a banking union. However, a monetary union requires some form of budget for fiscal stabilisation in case of shocks, and as a backstop to the banking union. This paper compares four quantitatively different schemes of fiscal stabilisation and proposes a new scheme based on GDP-indexed bonds. The options considered are: (i) A federal budget with unemployment and corporate taxes shifted to euro-area level; (ii) a support scheme based on deviations from potential output;(iii) an insurance scheme via which governments would issue bonds indexed to GDP, and (iv) a scheme in which access to jointly guaranteed borrowing is combined with gradual withdrawal of fiscal sovereignty. Our comparison is based on strong assumptions. We carry out a preliminary, limited simulation of how the debt-to-GDP ratio would have developed between 2008-14 under the four schemes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and an ‘average’ country.The schemes have varying implications in each case for debt sustainability

Fiscal trends and policy issues and implications for the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Fiscal Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2015: Policy space and dilemmas. Executive Summary

The present document provides an up-to-date overview of public debt and fiscal space in the region. The main conclusions show that public debt levels are low in Latin America and high in the Caribbean. Overall, the region has enough fiscal space to apply countercyclical policies and boost production development and the fiscal management of non-renewable natural resources needs to be modernized. It explains that fiscal policy has a very limited impact on the distribution of disposable income and in a volatile macroeconomic environment, reforms should aim to strengthen personal income tax.

Interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in a dynamic nonlinear model

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Economic Policy Coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact. CEPS Working Document No. 381, August 2013

This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a longer perspective of the sharing of competences for macroeconomic policy-making within the EU. It then presents the main features of the new so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’ and its relationship to the SGP and draws some conclusions as regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy coordination. It concludes that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in EMU, which was already well identified in the Delors report in 1989 and regularly emphasised ever since and is now seriously aggravated due to the crisis in the eurozone. Furthermore, implementation of this Treaty may under certain circumstances contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the Commission and the Council.

How EU Fiscal Norms Will Become a Safety Net for the Failure of National Golden Rules. European Policy Brief No. 6, January 2012

If introduced successfully, national Golden Rules will completely overturn fiscal governance in the eurozone. Golden Rules would almost always be more stringent than EU-level fiscal norms. EU fiscal norms will hence evolve into a safety net in case a Golden Rule fails. The possibility of such a failure is, indeed, not to be dismissed. Because of the severity of the Golden Rules, eurozone leaders should reflect on their design. There is a real risk that they will undercut public investment, which would be at the cost of the EU’s other long-term challenges.

A case for adjusting fiscal consolidation in the eurozone. European Policy Brief No. 14, January 2013

Fiscal consolidation is essential to ensure the sustainability of eurozone countries’ public debt. However, as a principle, consolidation should not be pursued at a pace unnecessarily undermining growth in the short term. Repeated downward revisions of growth call for the use of the flexibility foreseen in the EU fiscal framework. The Commission should adapt the deadlines for fiscal correction to prevent excessive, pro-cyclical adjustment in 2013. In turn, adequate surveillance and coordination must ensure structural adjustments constitute the core of fiscal consolidation plans.

Contractual arrangements: the overlooked step towards a fiscal union. European Policy Brief No. 18, December 2013

‘Contractual arrangements’ were proposed as an initial step towards a fiscal union that would consolidate the EMU. At this stage, the debate should be centred on the cornerstone of these contracts: the solidarity mechanism. The form of the financial support should not be limited to loans, and include the possibility for grants. Only the countries with the greatest adjustment needs should benefit from the financial support of other countries. This solidarity could be justified in principle by the intensity of the ‘shocks’ they experienced. In this way, contractual arrangement would facilitate the completion of the necessary adjustment in the current crisis – thanks both to more structural reforms and more mutual support within the eurozone.

Which fiscal union for the euro area? Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/05, February 2016

At the current level of political and societal integration, a large federal budget is unrealistic in the euro area. The authors make three recommendations that would lead national fiscal policies to be more stabilising with respect to the economic cycle, while achieving long-term sustainability. They also recommend a move towards a European unemployment insurance scheme targeted at ‘large’ shocks, and a minimum set of labour-market harmonisation criteria.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.