Regional Determinants of Firm Entry in a Developing Country

Regional policies aiming to attract new firms are largely based on evidence that originates from Europe, the USA and Japan. This may raise doubts about the usefulness of such policies when applied to developing economies. This paper addresses this issue by providing estimates of the determinants of firm entry in the Argentinean provinces. We find that most of the determinants used in previous studies analysing developed countries are still relevant. However, there is a need for additional explanatory variables that reflect the specificities of developing economies. Key words: firm entry, regional economics, Argentina. JEL: R12; R30; C33

Measuring sustained superior performance at the firm level

This paper proposes a two-dimensional Strategic Performance Measure (SPM) to evaluate the achievement of sustained superior performance. This proposal builds primarily on the fact that, under the strategic management perspective, a firm's prevalent objective is the pursuit of sustained superior performance. Three basicconceptual dimensions stem from this objective: relativity, sign dependence, and dynamism. These are the foundations of the SPM, which carries out a separate evaluation of the attained superior performance and of its sustainability over time. In contrast to existing measures of performance, the SPM provides: (i) a dynamic approach by considering the progress or regress in performance over time, and (ii) a cardinal measurement of performance differences and its changes over time. The paper also proposes an axiomatic framework that ameasure of strategic performance should comply with to be theoretically and managerially sound. Finally, anempirical illustration of the Spanish banking sector during 1987-1999 is herein provided by discussing some relevant case

Relationships and knowledge in the firm internationalization process

Based on the variables relationship and knowledge, this article aimed at analyzing how a multinational enterprise selects an entry mode to operate in a particular international market and how this initial choice evolves over time. We devised a rather new theoretical framework to address it by combining three theoretical approaches that have dealt with the firm internationalization: the Uppsala model, the relational approach, and the subsidiary development literature. We constructed a qualitative backward-looking longitudinal case study of the internationalization process of a North-American multinational enterprise in the Brazilian market. Results show that four types of relationships and three types of knowledge played the role in the events that characterized the internationalization of this firm. Based on these results, five new hypotheses concerning the interplay between relationships and knowledge in the internationalization process of the firm are suggested for future empirical tests.

Entrepreneur's Overconfidence, Private Benefits and the Market Performance of the Firm

Many firms around the world are managed and partially owned by entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs hold under diversified portfolios and, therefore, bear idiosyncratic risk in addition to systematic risk. To compensate the additional risk borne, they extract private benefits. In this paper, we analyse how an entrepreneur's overconfidence affects the market performance of the firm, through the channel of private benefits. We show that two dimensions of overconfidence, namely overestimation of future cash-flows and underestimation of idiosyncratic risk (called miscalibration), have opposite effects on the private benefits extracted by the entrepreneur. As a consequence, firms managed and partially owned by overconfident entrepreneurs can deliver overperformance or underperformance, depending on the prevalence of overestimation or miscalibration of the beliefs of the entrepreneur.

Determinants of Decentralization within the Firm: Some Empirical Evidence from Spanish Small and Medium- Sized Enterprise

This paper examines empirically the determinants of decentralization of decision- making in the firm for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that tend to be highly centralized. By decentralization of decisions we mean the delegation of decision rights from the owner or manager to the plant supervisor or even to floor workers. Our findings show that the allocation of authority to basic workers or a team of workers depends on firm characteristics such as firm size, the use of internal networks or the number of workplaces, and workers characteristics, in particular, the composition of the laborforce in terms of education and seniority and whether or not workers receive pay incentives. External factors such as the intensity of competition and the firm s export intensity are also important determinants of the allocation of authority.

Innovation and firm growth: Does firm age play a role?

This paper explores the relationship between firm growth, innovation and firm age. We hypothesize that young firms undertake riskier innovation activities and are more oriented towards employment growth than towards harvesting returns in the form of sales growth. Using an extensive sample of Community Innovation Survey for the period 2004-2010, we apply quantile regressions and a Heckman sample selection technique to study the impact of R&D activities on firm growth according to firm age. Our results show that R&D intensity is positively associated with firm growth. However, for young firms R&D shows an increasing influence across the quantiles, while for old firms R&D shows a stable or perhaps decreasing effect over the quantiles. Firm age shows a significant negative impact among young firms, while for the sample of old firms the impact of firm age becomes non-significant. Our Heckman estimations show the evolution of the impact of the R&D on firm growth confirming a significant impact on sales and productivity growth, while the impact is negligible for employment growth. Keywords: firm age, firm growth, innovation, quantile regression. JEL CODES: L25, L20

Multimarket contact externalities: the effect of rival's multimarket contacts on focal firm performance

Given that firms develop their activities in a network of multiple players, interfirm rivalry is not only a matter of direct competitors, but also of indirect competition. In spite of this, the literature on competitive dynamics tends to focus on analyzing rivalry as an exclusive function of the competitive relationship between a focal firm and its direct rivals. In this article, we extend competitive dynamics literature by considering how focal firms are affected by the relationships of their rivals with third-party firms. Specifically, we study the effect that the multimarket contacts of rivals produces on the performance of the focal firm. Additionally, we incorporate the idea that there are different strategic options for operating in an industry that affect the intensity of multimarket contact externalities. Our results show that multimarket contact among firms causes externalities that indirectly affect firms that are not directly involved in this competitive relationship. We find that multimarket contact externalities differ between and within strategic groups.

Firm-Specific Investment, Sticky Prices, and the Taylor Principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

Downsizing, Job Insecurity, and Firm Reputation

This paper studies how firms make layoff decisions in the presence of adverse shocks. In this uncertain environment, workers' expectations about their job security affect their on-the-job performance. This productivity effect on job insecurity forces firms to strike a balance between laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors' commitment when deciding on the amount and timing of downsizing. This framework offers an explanation of conservative employment practices (such as zero or reduced layoffs) based on firms having private information about their future profits. High retention rates and wages can signal that the firm has a bright future, boosting workers' confidence. Moreover, the model provides clear predictions about when waves of downsizing will occur as opposed to one-time massive cuts.

On the distribution of income and worker assignment under intra-firm spillovers, with an application to ideas and networks

We study the earnings structure and the equilibrium assignment of workers when workers exert intra-firm spillovers on each other.We allow for arbitrary spillovers provided output depends on some aggregate index of workers' skill. Despite the possibility of increasing returns to skills, equilibrium typically exists. We show that equilibrium will typically be segregated; that the skill space can be partitioned into a set of segments and any firm hires from only one segment. Next, we apply the model to analyze the effect of information technology on segmentation and the distribution of income. There are two types of human capital, productivity and creativity, i.e. the ability to produce ideas that may be duplicated over a network. Under plausible assumptions, inequality rises and then falls when network size increases, and the poorest workers cannot lose. We also analyze the impact of an improvement in worker quality and of an increased international mobility of ideas.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the Europeaninterbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find thatbanks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease theircredit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger forfirms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannotcompensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, theimpact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks.Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higherhoarding of liquidity.

Do agglomeration economies reduce the sensitivity of firm location to tax differentials?

Low corporate taxes can help attract new firms. This is the main mechanism underpinning the standard 'race-to-the-bottom'view of tax competition. A recent theoretical literature has qualified this view by formalizing the argument that agglomeration forces can reduce firms' sensitivity to tax differentials across locations. We test this proposition using data on firm startups across Swiss municipalities. We find that, on average, high corporate income taxes do deter new firms, but that this relationship is significantly weaker in the most spatially concentrated sectors. Location choices of firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are estimated to be twice as responsive to a given difference in local corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile. Hence, our analysis confirms the theoretical prediction: agglomeration economies can neutralize the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.

The persistence of abnormal returns at industry and firm levels

The present paper proposes a model for the persistence of abnormal returnsboth at firm and industry levels, when longitudinal data for the profitsof firms classiffied as industries are available. The model produces a two-way variance decomposition of abnormal returns: (a) at firm versus industrylevels, and (b) for permanent versus transitory components. This variancedecomposition supplies information on the relative importance of thefundamental components of abnormal returns that have been discussed in theliterature. The model is applied to a Spanish sample of firms, obtainingresults such as: (a) there are significant and permanent differences betweenprofit rates both at industry and firm levels; (b) variation of abnormal returnsat firm level is greater than at industry level; and (c) firm and industry levelsdo not differ significantly regarding rates of convergence of abnormal returns.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.