Financial regulation in the European Union: A research agenda. CES Papers - Open Forum #10, 2012

Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has become a central actor in financial regulation and developed complex institutions to fulfill its roles. Pre-financial crisis scholarship has provided key insights into the functioning of this institutional cobweb and its evolution over time. However, the financial crisis has highlighted four facets of EU financial regulation (EUFR) that deserve more scholarly attention than they have received so far: (1) the permissive pre-crisis consensus on the merits of financial liberalization and integration, (2) the embeddedness of financial regulation in the political economy of EU integration at large, (3) preference formation of public and private stakeholders in EUFR, and (4) the global economic and regulatory context of EUFR. This paper presents the key scholarly challenges across these four areas. Addressing them promises not only academic insights but also promotes the relevance of EUFR research for real-world policy dilemmas.

Az átalakuló globális pénzügyi szabályozórendszer kérdései = Dilemmas of the changing global financial regulation system

Erősődő igény van a jelenlegi sokoldalú nemzetközi felügyeleti rendszer reformjára úgy, hogy az a nemzeti gazdaságpolitikák nemzetközi hatásait is figyelembe vegye. Ehhez át kell reformálni a jelenlegi globális pénzügyi szabályozási rendszert, de ki kell alakítani a nemzeti gazdaságpolitikák egymásra hatásának koordinációját is. Ide tartozik a globális külső sokkok csillapítására szolgáló anti-ciklikus finanszírozás, a nemzetközi adózási együttműködés fokozása, a nemzetközi adósságfinanszírozás tökéletesítése, vagy a globális fizetésieszköz-tartalékok és a fizetési rendszer viszonya. Ez utóbbi területen az SDR kiterjedtebb használatának feltételeit kell kimunkálni. A jelenlegi globális intézmények – WTO, Nemzetközi Valutaalap, Világbank – alapos megújítása elkerülhetetlen. A globális gazdasági koordináció intézményi kereteinek kidolgozása viszont még várat magára. A G20-ak csoportja – bár fontos reformokat kezdeményezett –, nem tekinthető a világgazdasági egyensúlytalanságok megoldása letéteményesének. A cél csak olyan globális intézményi struktúra lehet, amely egyaránt képes a világ nagy számú gazdaságai közötti koordinációs feladatok megoldására, s a döntések végrehajtásának kikényszerítésére. / === / The present multilateral international surveillance system needs to be reformed with an eye on international repercussions of national economic policies. The present global financial architecture, the coordination of interplays of national economic policies must be modified. An anti-cyclical financing capable of absorbing global external shocks, strengthening of international tax cooperation, improving international debt financing or the relations between global financial reserves and the global payment system might be part and parcel of this process. A more extended use of SDR could be worked out. Reforms of the present global institutions – the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank – cannot be avoided any further. Institutional frameworks of global economic coordination mechanism have still not been worked out. The Group of 20 (G-20) cannot be seen as the sole player in fighting world economic disequlibria. A global institutional system is envisaged, which is able to implement economic coordination among national economic units and to enforce the implementation of decisions taken. At present there is no global institution dealing with coherence and consistency of global issues. Reforming present institutions and/or designing new ones are possible options. The basis for such an international coordination must involve general acceptance of principles, transparent implementation, and enforcement of decisions taken.

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.

Innovation, competition and financial vulnerability in economic development

The financial sector has been viewed traditionally as either providing the "oil" for the "wheels of commerce" or as a parasite on the real sector of the economy where real productivity gains provide for increasing real wages and per capita incomes. The present paper takes a different route and attempts to an analysis of financial institutions on a par with the production sector of the economy. It also develops a link which amalgamates "the knowledge-based" perspective on firms' operations with Schumpeterian financial leverage to exploit productivity enhancing innovations, and Minsky's tendency towards financial fragility. The analysis also leads to some policy recommendations concerning financial regulation, risk management and financial institution's building.

Contagion and regulation in endogenous bank networks

We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.

The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

Beyond ‘best practices': the international regulation of capital markets

It is widely acknowledged that there is considerable international pressure for international ‘best practices’ to be adopted via national legislation. This would occur either by means of model laws or through the passing of country specific legislation that closely replicates foreign legal formats, administrative rules, and or regulation. These attempts to spread the implementation of ‘best practices’ have gained importance in the international debate due to the liberalization of international capital flows. The oversight, country reports, and technical assistance carried out by international organizations along with the growing internationalization of investors have also contributed to this growing pressure. In this respect, due to the constant evolution of transactions and the end objective of making sure that capital markets are developed with just rules, structures, and methods, this article looks to analyze the adoption of standardized models of capital market regulation. Furthermore it looks to examine the motivation and interest of states and other ‘stakeholders’ at the international level.

International asymmetries and the design of the International Financial System

Includes bibliography

Global financial rulemaking and small economies

This paper addresses some unintended consequences of global financial regulation and international tax evasion prevention and their impact on small economies. It explores how failure to recognize countries’ differing access to finance and varying costs of funding as well as the high costs of complying with financial regulations may overlook some unintended consequences, especially on smaller island countries Then, it discusses the global financial architecture and governance of standard setting bodies and the actions taken to improve representation and legitimacy and remediate some of the unintended deleterious effects on emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). Improving governance is ever more urgent at a time when financing the post-2015 agenda will require mobilization of both public and private funds at the national, regional and global levels.

Banking Regulation in Turkey and Russia: An Economic Analysis

The importance of the banks and financial markets relies on the fact that they promote economic efficiency by allocating savings efficiently to profitable investment opportunities.An efficient banking system is a key determinant for the financial stability.The theory of market failure forms the basis for understanding financial regulation.Following the detrimental economic and financial consequences in theaftermath of the crisis, academics and policymakers started to focus their attention on the construction of an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking sector. This dissertation aims at understanding the impact of regulations and supervision on banks’ performance focusing on two emerging market economies, Turkey and Russia. It aims at examining the way in which regulations matter for financial stability and banking performance from a law & economics perspective. A review of the theory of banking regulation, particularly as applied to emerging economies, shows that the efficiency of certain solutions regarding banking regulation is open to debate. Therefore, in the context of emerging countries, whether a certain approach is efficient or not will be presented as an empirical question to which this dissertation will try to find an answer.

The Structure of Financial Supervision: Consolidation or Fragmentation for Financial Regulators?

This research was designed to answer the question of which direction the restructuring of financial regulators should take – consolidation or fragmentation. This research began by examining the need for financial regulation and its related costs. It then continued to describe what types of regulatory structures exist in the world; surveying the regulatory structures in 15 jurisdictions, comparing them and discussing their strengths and weaknesses. This research analyzed the possible regulatory structures using three methodological tools: Game-Theory, Institutional-Design, and Network-Effects. The incentives for regulatory action were examined in Chapter Four using game theory concepts. This chapter predicted how two regulators with overlapping supervisory mandates will behave in two different states of the world (where they can stand to benefit from regulating and where they stand to lose). The insights derived from the games described in this chapter were then used to analyze the different supervisory models that exist in the world. The problem of information-flow was discussed in Chapter Five using tools from institutional design. The idea is based on the need for the right kind of information to reach the hands of the decision maker in the shortest time possible in order to predict, mitigate or stop a financial crisis from occurring. Network effects and congestion in the context of financial regulation were discussed in Chapter Six which applied the literature referring to network effects in general in an attempt to conclude whether consolidating financial regulatory standards on a global level might also yield other positive network effects. Returning to the main research question, this research concluded that in general the fragmented model should be preferable to the consolidated model in most cases as it allows for greater diversity and information-flow. However, in cases in which close cooperation between two authorities is essential, the consolidated model should be used.

The Pre-1980 Roots of Neoliberal Financial Deregulation

U.S. financial deregulation is often popularly presented as a fundamental attack on financial regulation that began with neoliberalism's Big Bang in 1980. This paper argues this position is wrong in two ways. First, it is a process that stretches back decades before 1980. Textbook mentions of 1970s precursor "financial innovations" fall far short of presenting the breadth and duration of the pre-1980 attack on the system of regulation. Second, it has not been an across-the-board attack on financial regulation in the name of market efficiency as required by its ideology and claimed by its advocates, but rather a focused attack on only one of the five pillars of the system of regulation. This paper develops both of these assertions through a presentation of the five central pillars of the pre-1980 system of financial regulation, and the four major attacks on the three different aspects of the restrictions on financial competition.