The Cuban Economy: A Current Evaluation and Proposals for Necessary Policy Changes

Politicians, social scientists and general readers have noted in both Cuban and international academic forums and periodicals that the well-being enjoyed by the Cuban people in the 1980s has been seriously compromised since the economic crisis of the 1990s. Even for the most skeptical of observers it is clear that this worsening of conditions can be attributed not only to external factors, such as the breakup of the international socialist system, the tightening of the US blockade, and the worldwide economic crisis suffered by underdeveloped countries, but also to internal factors that have kept the country from taking full advantage of the human and material potential available on the island. Although Cuba is currently experiencing an economic recovery from the collapse in GDP in the mid 1990s following the collapse of its ties with the Socialist Bloc, it continues to maintain high import coefficients due to longstanding structural.

Las mineralizaciones auríferas de Galicia Occidental en la Zona de Cizalla Busto-Limideiro (A Coruña)

Las mineralizaciones de oro de Galicia Occidental ligadas a grandes estructuras comienzan a ser interpretadas de manera más rigurosa, al mismo tiempo que la continuada elevación de las cotizaciones del oro han hecho más atractiva la reactivación de áreas hasta ahora casi olvidadas. El propósito de esta investigación participa de las razones anteriores. La zona de cizalla Busto Limideiro se inscribe en una de estas estructuras, la cizalla Santa Comba-Punta Langosteira, con la que se relacionan un importante número de yacimientos auríferos entre los que destacan Corcoesto y Monte Piñor. Por su situación geológica, estos indicios se enmarcan en el Macizo Ibérico, en la Zona de Galicia Tras-os-Montes. Este trabajo aporta más conocimiento sobre un modelo general del oro de los yacimientos del noroeste español, integrándolo en los yacimientos de oro orogénico del Varisco europeo. Este estudio ha supuesto un importante esfuerzo investigador centrado sobre de los procesos genéticos que han dado lugar a las mineralizaciones auríferas. Los estudios petrográficos, metalogénicos, geoquímicos, microtemométricos y el análisis de isótopos han permitido establecer un modelo general y otros más específicos sobre la existencia y condiciones de formación en la concentración del oro mineralógico. De esta forma se ha caracterizado su mineralogía, quimismo, edad, y naturaleza de los paleofluidos que han intervinieron en su formación. De los resultados obtenidos se destaca que estas mineralizaciones se encuentran fuertemente ligadas a las estructuras y transformaciones físicas y químicas de las rocas afectadas por la banda de cizalla. Derivada de esta situación, se comprende la disposición espacial, a diversas escalas, con estructuras claramente en la transición del dominio dúctil a frágil. Además, resulta evidente, a escala macro y microscópica, el emplazamiento preferente del oro en estructuras de deformación miloníticas. Los estudios anteriores posibilitan formalizar un modelo de génesis para el yacimiento de Monte Piñor que resulta compatible con el establecido por Groves (1998), e incluirlas en un mismo contexto, como yacimientos de oro orogénico mesotermales, válido para el conjunto de todos los de la zona de cizalla Busto Limideiro. El estudio no omite la consideración geoestadística de este yacimiento, justificando la elección de direcciones de anisotropía explicadas por consideraciones de carácter estructural. Con ello, buscando el lado práctico desde el punto de vista minero, esta investigación propone líneas generales de aplicación de actuación con sentido de exploración, contribuyendo a la puesta en valor del conocimiento de las mineralizaciones de oro del noroeste español. ABSTRACT Old and nearly forgotten gold mines from Western Galicia are currently attractive to be recovered due to both, the new strict interpretation of gold mineralization linked to Variscan large structures and the increasing gold prices. The shear zone Busto Limiderio is relevant as a part of a Variscan large structure, Santa Comba-Punta Langosteira, which is related with a high number of gold deposits as Corcoesto and Monte Piñor. For its geological situation, these signs are part of the Iberian Massif in the area of Galicia Tras-os-Montes. Hence, the main aim of this study is to provide additional and important knowledge of Busto Limiderio about the general model of gold deposits in the Spanish northwest, integrating them in the orogenic gold deposits of European Variscan, enabling to analyze the economic recovery possibility of this area. This thesis has been focused on the genetic processes that have led to the gold mineralization. Petrographic studies, metalogenic, geochemical, microthermometric and isotope analysis have allowed to establish a general and specific models about the existence and training conditions in the concentration of mineralogical gold. Consequently, the mineralogy, chemical characteristics, age, and nature of paleofluids that have participated in its formation have been characterized. The results showed that Busto Limiderio gold mineralization are strongly linked to the structures and physical and chemical transformations of affected rocks by the shear band. The mineralization spatial distribution at various scales is due to the link with the large structures in the ductile-to-brittle transition domain. Furthermore, this factor determine at macro and microscopic scale, the preferred location of the gold structures mylonitic deformation. Previous studies have permitted to establish a model of genesis for the site of Monte Piñor which is compatible with the established by Groves (1998), and also to include them in the same context as mesothermal orogenic gold deposits, valid throughout all of Busto Limideiro shear zone. This study does not omit consideration of the geostatistical deposit, justifying the choice of directions of anisotropy explained by structural considerations. This thesis concludes with general action guidelines for mining exploration, contributing to the enhancement of knowledge of Spanish gold mineralization northwest.

Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/03, 15 February 2013

• Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. • However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons: • First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored.Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery andthere has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. • Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/05, 24 September 2013

Recent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recovery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold policies are still needed. There are three central risks. Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt. Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities: Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted. Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.

Will the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership be a game-changer? EU Centre Singapore Policy Brief No. 5, April 2013

In February 2013, US President Barrack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso announced the decision to go for an ambitious and comprehensive trade and investment agreement between the US and the EU. To be called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), this agreement would lead to a new stage in the transatlantic relationship and be a much needed boost to the lacklustre economic recovery so far. Some analysts have even argued that TTIP would be a “game changer” – besides the economic gains, it would serve a bigger strategic purpose of promoting EU-US common objective to set higher standards of trade liberalisation, and thereby level the playing field in China and other key emerging markets. This policy brief examines the reasons behind the current push towards TTIP and the possible contents of such an agreement. It also discusses the possible obstacles to the realisation of TTIP, and at the same time, looks into what a successful conclusion of TTIP would mean for Asia and beyond.

The long haul: managing exit from financial assistance. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2014/03, 20 February 2014

Countries can make a clean exit from financial assistance, or enter a new programme or a precautionary programme, depending on the sustainability of their public debt and their vulnerability to shocks. Ireland made a clean exit in December 2013, supported by significant budgetary and current-account adjustment and signs of economic recovery. But Irish debt sustainability is not guaranteed and prudence will be needed to avoid future difficulties. A clean exit for Portugal is not recommended when its programme ends in May 2014, because compared to Ireland it faces higher interest rates, has poorer growth prospects and has probably less ability to generate a consistently high primary surplus. A precautionary arrangement would be advisable. In case debt sustainability proves difficult to achieve later, some form of debt restructuring may prove necessary. It is unlikely that Greece will be able to exit its programme in December 2014. A third programme should be put in place to take Greece out of the market until 2030, accompanied by enhanced budgetary and structural reform commitments by Greece, a European boost to economic growth in the euro-area periphery and willingness on the part of lenders to reduce loan charges below their borrowing costs, should public debt levels prove unsustainable despite Greece meeting the loan conditions. Even assuming all goes well, the three countries will be subject to enhanced post-pro-gramme surveillance for decades. Managing such long-term relationships will be a key challenge.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Social Europe. Can the EU again improve people's life prospects? CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22. Challenges and new beginnings; Priorities for the EU’s new leadership. September 2014

In the following, I will briefly review the main EU policies developed over the past five years in the field of employment and social affairs. I will put these in the context of the macroeconomic policy response during the same period and conclude by reflecting on systemic reforms which Europe needs to strengthen its economic recovery and to at last make progress towards the employment and social inclusion targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

One year after the Youth Guarantee: Policy fatigue or signs of action? EPC Policy Brief, 27 May 2015

In April 2013, the EU Council called on EU member states to establish Youth Guarantee (YG) schemes, ensuring that “all young people under the age of 25 years receive a good-quality offer of employment, continued education, apprenticeship or traineeship within a period of four months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education”. Implementation was meant to start more than a year ago, but political interest seems to have waned a bit. Is a ‘policy fatigue’ contaminating youth employment policies across the EU? Have some timid signs of economic recovery led to youth unemployment being less urgent or are we witnessing the usual policy developments whereby grand EU statements are worn down by political realities and resistance on the ground? In this Policy Brief, Claire Dhéret and Martina Morosi assess the implementation of the Youth Guarantee and provide suggestions on how to renew a sense of enthusiasm for such an ambitious tool across Europe.

What drives household consumption in the EU-28? ECRI Commentary No. 19, 4 December 2015

Given that final consumption of households has contributed on average to broadly 60% of EU-28 GDP since 2001, an assessment of the drivers behind its dynamics is quite timely in a context of gradual economic recovery. The empirical analyses presented in this ECRI Commentary, covering 19 of the EU-28 economies, suggest that disposable income of households, consumer credit markets and the developments in housing markets have had a significantly positive impact on the growth of household final consumption since 2001. On the other hand, demographic trends do not seem to have played any significant role.

A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/07 MARCH 2016

Pro-cyclical fiscal tightening might be one reason for the anaemic economic recovery in Europe, raising questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework in achieving its two main objectives: public debt sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. • In theory, the current EU fiscal rules, with cyclically adjusted targets, flexibility clauses and the option to enter an excessive deficit procedure, allow for large-scale fiscal stabilisation during a recession. However, implementation of the rules is hindered by the badly-measured structural balance indicator and incorrect forecasts, leading to erroneous policy recommendations. The large number of flexibility clauses makes the system opaque. • The current inefficient European fiscal framework should be replaced with a system based on rules that are more conducive to the two objectives, more transparent, easier to implement and which have a higher potential to be complied with. • The best option, re-designing the fiscal framework from scratch, is currently unrealistic. Therefore we propose to eliminate the structural balance rules and to introduce a new public expenditure rule with debt-correction feedback, embodied in a multi-annual framework, which would also support the central bank’s inflation target. A European Fiscal Council could oversee the system.

The Labour Market in Spain: Problems, Challenges and Future Trends. Policy Brief #2015/01

Spain’s economy was hit particularly hard by the financial crisis. After severe austerity measures have been implemented in recent years to contain a strong public debt increase, first signs of economic recovery are emerging. However, as SIM Europe results show, very few measures to soften the social consequences have been enacted. Spain scores second to last in the ‘Labour Market Access’ dimension of the Social Justice Index 2015, with the greatest deterioration among all EU countries compared to 2008. According to the Reform Barometer 2015, the quality of labour market reforms in Spain ranks last in the EU. With economic recovery gaining momentum, high priority should be given to ameliorating labour market access through higher education improvements, professional training, investments into R&D and promotion of high added-value industries.

A legitimate paradox: Neo-liberal reform and the return of the state in Korea

This article examines the neo-liberal reforms that the Kim government implemented in post-crisis Korea. It argues that by embracing the reforms, the state, paradoxicaliy, re-legitimised itself in the national political economy. The process of enacting the reforms completed the power shift from a collusive state-chaebol alliance towards a new alliance based on a more populist social contract - but one that nonetheless generally conformed to the tenets of neo-liberalism. Kim and his closest associates identified the malpractices of the chaebols as the main cause of the crisis, so reforming the chaebols would be the key to economic recovery. Combining populism and neo-liberalism, they drew on support from both domestic and international sources to rein in, rather than nurture, the chaebols.

Doing business in... Indonesia

Indonesia's long stability of over three decades came to a sudden end after the regional economic crisis of 1997–1998. The economic crisis not only shattered the Indonesian economy but also resulted in political turmoil. The national leadership has changed three times over the last five years. In such conditions, the confidence of foreign investors is very low. The present government has initiated a number of steps to restore political stability and economic recovery. This article provides useful information on the complex business environment, aimed to help foreign investors to develop a good understanding on key background knowledge for being successful in Indonesia. It reviews Indonesian historical development, political structure and climate, regional relations, and economy and foreign trade. Indonesia's infrastructure, legal framework, sociocultural setup, as well as market structure and potential, are also analyzed.

The people dimension in logistics and supply chain management:its role and importance

It is widely recognised that the effective application of logistics and supply chain management (SCM) has a vital role to play in European economic recovery. Experience suggests that success in achieving higher levels of supply chain integration (SCI) depends on both physical and technical components (the hard-wiring), as well as human and behavioural components (the soft-wiring). There is significant evidence that the latter has been largely neglected by the logistics and SCM community. Furthermore, it appears that the majority of supply chain improvement initiatives by practitioners have been primarily concerned with technological, structural and process issues. This chapter argues that the difficulties often encountered in attempting to put logistics and SCM theory into practice are largely a consequence of a lack of focus and understanding of the people dimension. Based on this discussion, it offers some suggestions for improvement in this area to supply chain professionals.