Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgments?

Article 260(2) TFEU (ex 228(2) EC) enables the European Court of Justice to enforce compliance with its judgements. This article analyses its use in doing so and questions whether it could be applied more effectively. It commences by highlighting the principally economic and environmental context of the case-law, and by examining the initiatives taken to tackle delays in bringing these cases before the Court. The article then critically evaluates the effectiveness of the financial sanctions available to the Court. In doing so, it aims to fill a gap in present research by looking beyond the procedural measures through which the Court and the Commission operate to examine the practical impact of Article 260(2) itself.

A multiagent network for peer norm enforcement

In a multiagent system where norms are used to regulate the actions agents ought to execute, some agents may decide not to abide by the norms if this can benefit them. Norm enforcement mechanisms are designed to counteract these benefits and thus the motives for not abiding by the norms. In this work we propose a distributed mechanism through which agents in the multiagent system that do not abide by the norms can be ostracised by their peers. An ostracised agent cannot interact anymore and looses all benefits from future interactions. We describe a model for multiagent systems structured as networks of agents, and a behavioural model for the agents in such systems. Furthermore, we provide analytical results which show that there exists an upper bound to the number of potential norm violations when all the agents exhibit certain behaviours. We also provide experimental results showing that both stricter enforcement behaviours and larger percentage of agents exhibiting these behaviours reduce the number of norm violations, and that the network topology influences the number of norm violations. These experiments have been executed under varying scenarios with different values for the number of agents, percentage of enforcers, percentage of violators, network topology, and agent behaviours. Finally, we give examples of applications where the enforcement techniques we provide could be used.

Bogeymen, lunatics and fanatics: collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.

UK: general - UK enforcement.

Reports that the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) began operations in "shadow form" on October 1, 2013 prior to it taking over the mandates of the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading in April 2014. Outlines the CMA's draft guidance, issued for consultation on September 17, 2013, on prosecutions for the cartel offence. Presents links to other CMA communications.

Attitudes and Ethics: Evaluating Knowledge and Regulatory Constructs in Planning Enforcement Practice

The departure point for the paper is the need to scrutinise previously unconsidered dimensions which are fundamental to understanding the dynamics of the planning enforcement system. Drawing upon emerging themes in regulation theory the paper fuses these with knowledge constructs. The rationale is that regulatory regimes must be informed by knowledge imparted from a range of sources and the resultant quality of decision making is inextricably linked to the robustness and completeness of the evidence base collated.
The theoretical analysis, coupled with proposed radical legislative changes, provides a lens for an empirical investigation which scrutinises tactics, strategies, operational mechanisms, attitudinal dimensions and ethics with a view to identifying key factors impacting upon enforcement efficacy. Prizes and pitfalls are identified in the course of the analysis and evaluation, with evidence-based remedies suggested where appropriate. The paper concludes by reflecting on the importance of theoretical synergy, epistemological advancement, taking cognisance of ethical and attitudinal challenges facing the planning profession; and, stresses the importance of identifying and bringing to book those who flagrantly breach the Code of Professional Conduct.

Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement

While transnational antitrust enforcement is becoming only more common, the access to foreign-based evidence remains a considerable practical challenge. This article appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, and looks into ways of their possible accommodation. It further identifies and critically evaluates the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. The article outlines the shortcomings of the current framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts, also without any underlying bilateral agreement and on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.