Análise da formação de Complexos Regionais de Segurança (CRS): um estudo comparativo entre a América do Sul e o leste asiático

Pós-graduação em Relações Internacionais (UNESP - UNICAMP - PUC-SP) - FFC

Zonas Estratégicas e Estruturais para os Trânsitos Ilícitos (ZEETI): desafios à zona de paz na América do Sul

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Pratas, lacoste, grana e novinhas: um estudo sobre a construção social da adolescência através do ato infracional

Pós-graduação em Serviço Social - FCHS

La cooperazione dell'UE nella creazione di uno spazio sicuro nella globalizzazione come possibile modello per la regione dell'Asia Centrale

Gli ultimi anni hanno visto importanti cambiamenti positivi nella cooperazione interstatale in Asia centrale. Crescenti minacce come il terrorismo internazionale, l'estremismo religioso e politico, il traffico di droga, ecc, causati dagli interessi geopolitici e geo-economici delle potenze mondiali, hanno contribuito alla formazione di una politica estera più coordinata e coerente degli Stati della regione. Questo processo si manifesta nella partecipazione attiva dell’istituzionalizzazione della Shanghai Organizzazione del Commonwealth (SOC), Conferenza sulle misure di costruzione d’interazione e fiducia in Asia (CICA) e Organizzazione del Trattato di Sicurezza Collettiva (CSTO). Problemi moderni di sicurezza in Asia centrale dovrebbero essere risolti in dei nuovi modi, non convenzionali. Le nuove minacce alla sicurezza richiedono modi non standard per risolvere il problema. Considerate le differenze fondamentali dell'Unione europea e degli Stati dell'Asia centrale nei valori e dal punto di vista in materia di sicurezza. I paesi dell'Asia centrale non sono pronti per l'integrazione politica. Nonostante questo, nell’Asia centrale sono state adottate misure per contrastare le minacce non convenzionali. L’esperienza europea di unire gli sforzi della regione per garantire la sicurezza interna, può essere utilizzata dai paesi dell'Asia centrale, soprattutto, in primo luogo sulla formazione del quadro istituzionale e giuridico per la cooperazione operativa delle forze dell'ordine per le seguenti aree: • prevenzione del traffico di droga attraverso gli Stati dell'Asia centrale; • lotta contro nuove forme di terrorismo ed estremismo; • limitare la dimensione della migrazione clandestina; • migliorare la protezione giuridica dei cittadini. Fino a poco tempo fa, questi temi hanno ricevuto poca attenzione, sia nella teoria sia nella pratica, poiché i problemi di sicurezza della società erano principalmente ridotti per evitare il pericolo di guerra.

Assessment of total uncertainty in cocaine and benzoylecgonine wastewater load measurements

To check the effectiveness of campaigns preventing drug abuse or indicating local effects of efforts against drug trafficking, it is beneficial to know consumed amounts of substances in a high spatial and temporal resolution. The analysis of drugs of abuse in wastewater (WW) has the potential to provide this information. In this study, the reliability of WW drug consumption estimates is assessed and a novel method presented to calculate the total uncertainty in observed WW cocaine (COC) and benzoylecgonine (BE) loads. Specifically, uncertainties resulting from discharge measurements, chemical analysis and the applied sampling scheme were addressed and three approaches presented. These consist of (i) a generic model-based procedure to investigate the influence of the sampling scheme on the uncertainty of observed or expected drug loads, (ii) a comparative analysis of two analytical methods (high performance liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry), including an extended cross-validation by influent profiling over several days, and (iii) monitoring COC and BE concentrations in WW of the largest Swiss sewage treatment plants. In addition, the COC and BE loads observed in the sewage treatment plant of the city of Berne were used to back-calculate the COC consumption. The estimated mean daily consumed amount was 107 ± 21 g of pure COC, corresponding to 321 g of street-grade COC.

Porto Seguro – Bahia – turismo predatório e (in) sustentabilidade social

A cidade de Porto Seguro que se localiza no Brasil, no sul da Bahia, apresenta potencial de grande atração turística. O turismo em Porto Seguro é marcado por contradições que potencializam desigualdades e violências, associadas ao tráfico de drogas. Tal paradoxo eleva Porto Seguro a décima posição entre as cidades mais violentas do Brasil, situação de vulnerabilidade social, negação de direitos humanos e efetivação de um turismo predatório. O trabalho compreende pontualmente os dois lados desta situação, o primeiro apresenta a fetichização de Porto Seguro como um lugar idílico, o outro lado apresenta os elevados índices de criminalidade ligada ao tráfico de drogas. A metodologia deste estudo utilizou o cruzamento de dados estatísticos oficiais e pesquisas de campo. O estudo conclui que há um grande abismo entre a cidade ideal vendida e fetichizada como paraíso turístico reificado por uma mídia mercantil, e a cidade real ignorada por esta mesma mídia, e onde a população vive ao meio de um fogo cruzado que se monta e um diagrama de controles negociados, ilegalismos na expansão do tráfico de drogas e de uma economia ilícita que se inclui na economia turística.

The EU, China and Southeast Asia: Divergent Views of Dealing with Human Security. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 8, May 2014

Introduction. This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), China, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s respective approaches to dealing with non-traditional security (NTS) challenges by investigating their policies toward Burma/Myanmar—a source country of numerous such challenges. It argues that, although all, as members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), see the need for multilateral solutions to fight organized crime, provide disaster relief, combat terrorism, prevent drug trafficking, etc., they differ with respect to the steps to be taken to protect human security in Asia-Pacific. China, initially hesitant to join the ARF for fear that other members might try to contain it, has come to value the principal forum for NTS challenges in the Asia-Pacific region since, like many ASEAN countries, it is a big proponent of non-interventionism, non-use of force, consensus decision-making, that is, the confidence-building mechanisms commonly referred to as the ‘ASEAN way’.2 The EU, as a strong proponent of human rights and the rule of law, repeatedly, has criticized ARF members for allowing sovereignty-related norms to get in the way of the protection of human rights, but it has refrained from assuming the role of norm exporter. As will be seen in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU does make its opinions heard and, when necessary, will take unilateral steps not supported by the ASEAN members of the ARF but, cognizant of the history of the region, for the most part, settles for supporting economic development and aiding in capacity-building, understanding that it would be counter-productive to exert pressure on reluctant ARF members to modify the non-interference norm. The chapter then speculates about the ‘ASEAN way’s’ longevity, arguing that, increasingly, there are internal and external dynamics that seem to indicate that the ‘ASEAN way,’ at least in its current form, may not be here to stay. The conclusion looks at what might be in store for Burma/Myanmar in the years to come.

Democratic governance and the rule of law : lessons from Colombia /

"Colombia has experienced conflict for decades. In the 1990s it was a paradigm of the failing state, beset with all manner of troubles: terrorism, kidnapping, murder, drug trafficking, corruption, an economic downturn of major scope, general lawlessness, and brain drain. Today the country is much safer, and the agents of violence are clearly on the defensive. Nonetheless, much work lies ahead to secure the democratic system. Security and the rule of law are fundamental to the task. As the monopoly over the legitimate use of force is established, democratic governance also needs the architecture of law: ministry of justice, courts, legislative scrutiny, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies, public defenders, police, correctional system, legal statutes, contracts, university level academic education to train lawyers, judges, and investigators, along with engagement with civil society to promote a culture of lawfulness. Security without the rule of law puts a society at risk of falling into a Hobbesian hell."--P. v.

Medierad narkotikahandel på internets skuggsida : En fallstudie kring svenska säljares erfarenheter

I studien undersöks huruvida en grupp narkotikasäljare på den svenska hemsidan Flugsvamp drivs av andra motivationer än ett grundläggande vinstintresse. Sidan bygger på de teknologiska verktyg som utvecklades av den libertarianskt inspirerade Cypherpunkrörelsens arbete med stark kryptografi i slutet av 1990-talet. Dessa verktyg skyddar både brottslingar och frihetskämpar, men har främst associerats med de som använder anonymiteten i kriminella syften och således har verktygen fått ett dåligt rykte som riskerar äventyra kryptografins framtid. Genom semistrukturerade onlineintervjuer med fem säljare av skiftande karaktär samlade jag information gällande deras upplevelse av sidan, relationerna till kunder och administratörer, hur de rent moraliskt rationaliserade sin verksamhet och vilken påverkan de såg sig ha på samhället och kryptografin. En bild framträdde där majoriteten av säljarna uppvisade ansvarskänsla och eftertänksamhet genom att agera med transparens och professionalitet. Genom att utkonkurrera oärliga aktörer och med ett nära kollegialt samarbete med varandra använde dessa säljare sin roll för att utmana den traditionella majoritetsinställningen till narkotika och visa hur den ansvarsfulla digitala försäljningen i längden kan vara samhällsförändrande. En minoritet uppgav att de endast använde sidan för att tjäna extrapengar och egentligen tyckte att det var en rimlig idé för staten att förbjuda de kryptoanarkistiska verktygen då de främst anses användas i kriminella syften. Studien når fram till slutsatserna att samhället som helhet tjänar på att det narkotikarelaterade våldet försvinner från gatorna, visar på hur en inkonsekvent och konservativ lagstiftning gör sig mottaglig för starka motargument samt understryker att den framtida digitala mänskligheten kommer ha en betydande användning för de kryptoanarkistiska verktygen.

COMPREENSÃO DA VULNERABILIDADE CRIMINAL FEMININA A PARTIR DA ANÁLISE DO CARÁTER

O presente estudo teve por objetivos a) identificar aspectos da história de vida pessoal, das etapas de desenvolvimento evolutivo e das relações familiares e afetivas de mulheres que cumprem pena em regime fechado, com o intuito de colher elementos significativos e contributivos para a compreensão da vulnerabilidade criminal feminina; b) realizar uma análise sistematizada do caráter, segundo abordagem de Wilhelm Reich, a partir do conteúdo do discurso clínico dessas mulheres. Para tal foram estudados três casos de mulheres reclusas em regime fechado no Centro de Ressocialização Feminino, na cidade de São José do Rio Preto, que respondem pelos artigos 33 e 35 da Lei 11343/06, que refere-se ao tráfico de drogas ilícitas e a associação para o crime, e artigo 157 do Código Penal Brasileiro, que refere-se a roubo. O conteúdo das entrevistas realizadas indicou graves dificuldades no crescimento e desenvolvimento por ambiente desfavorável e por relações psico-afetivas empobrecidas ou insatisfatórias. Encontrou-se em comum nos casos estudados, segundo uma análise reichiana, indicativos de fixação na oralidade, ou seja, traços orais insatisfatórios relacionados à primeira infância, indicando pouca referência identificatória que lhes oferecesse base para defenderem-se da realidade. Entendeu-se que tais falhas desenvolvimentais podem indicar vulnerabilidade para ações criminais como forma de defesa contra angústia, fazendo com que atuem de forma mais imediata ou impulsiva na busca de satisfação.

The Security Challenges for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games

Brazilians greeted the long-awaited decision of making Rio de Janeiro the host of the 2016 Olympic Games with tremendous exhilaration. Although Rio’s fantastic natural beauty certainly added to its attraction in hosting the games, its alarming rates of urban crime and violence largely associated with drug trafficking immediately triggered worldwide criticism, and put at issue its ability to guarantee the security for the games. Brazilians have been vying for a position as an emerging global economy and understand the importance of the Games for international prestige. This makes the stakes very high when hosting the Olympic Games in the wake of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, which will also be held in Brazil. This paper explores these criticisms and assesses Rio’s ability to prepare for this important event. The paper further explores the consensus that Brazilians will be more equipped to address actions taken by organized crime capable of affecting the Olympic Games than to face a terrorist attack. Brazil – and Rio – does not figure in the “terrorism map” as a region particularly linked to terrorism. Aside from uncorroborated suspicions of activities by terrorist organizations on the Tri-Border region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Brazil does not elicit many concerns regarding terrorism.1 Yet, there is no way to guarantee that terrorist organizations will not try to make use of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to advance their agenda. This being in mind, Rio and Brazil in general face a long road ahead to prepare, prevent, protect and respond to a possible terrorist attack during the 2016 Olympics. It is clear that prevention and preparation towards potential threats to the Games must necessarily include cooperation and exchange of best practices with other countries. 1 U.S. Department of State has confirmed that this area may have been used to transport weapons and conduct financial affairs in the past. This type of activity has been made more difficult with the fortification of border controls in more recent times.

Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua

A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attachés in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen.

The Re-Emergence of Suriname’s Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety

This study examines some concerns that derive from Suriname‘s May-July 2010 elections, which resulted in the re-emergence of erstwhile military ruler and convicted drug trafficker, Désiré (Desi) Bouterse, as President of the Republic. The victory reflects Bouterse‘s political acumen in aggregating disparate political interests and in establishing a viable coalition government. But because of his history and profile, this triumph has generated anxiety in some places internationally. In this respect, the study examines anxieties related to three matters: (a) relations with Guyana, where there is an existing territorial dispute and a recently resolved maritime dispute, (b) illegal drug trafficking operations, and (c) foreign policy engagement with Venezuela. There has been a flurry of bilateral activities—including several presidential summits—with Guyana since President Bouterse‘s inauguration, albeit seemingly more about symbolism than substance. Although the maritime dispute was settled by a Tribunal of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 2007, the 15,000 km2 New River Triangle is still unresolved. Indeed, in June 2011 President Bouterse reasserted Suriname‘s claim to the Triangle. Suriname has upped the ante in that dispute by portraying internationally the map of Suriname as inclusive of the disputed area. In all likelihood that self-redefinition slowly will become the country‘s cartographic definition in the eyes of the world if Guyana does not successfully rebuff that move or pursue the definitive settlement of the dispute. A geonarcotics assessment shows Suriname to be still heavily implicated in trafficking, because of geography, law enforcement limitations, corruption, and other factors. But despite Bouterse‘s drug-related history and that of former senior military officers, several reasons suggest the inexpediency of a narco-state being created by Bouterse. As well, as part of Suriname‘s pursuit of increased Caribbean and South American engagement, it has boosted relations with Venezuela, which has included it in PetroCaribe and provided housing and agricultural aid. However, the engagement appears to be driven more by pragmatism and less by any ideological affinity with Hugo Chavez.

Guatemala: A Failing State?

 Guatemala is not a failed state and is unlikely to become one in the near future. Although the state currently fails to provide adequate security to its citizens or an appropriate range of effective social programs, it does supply a functioning electoral democracy, sound economic management, and a promising new antipoverty program, My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO).  Guatemala is a weak state. The principal security threats represented by expanding Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), criminal parallel powers, and urban gangs have overwhelmed the resources of the under-resourced and compromised criminal justice system. The UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), however, has demonstrated that progress against organized crime is possible.  The principal obstacles to strengthening the Guatemalan state lie in the traditional economic elite’s resistance to taxation and the venal political class’ narrow focus on short-term interests. Guatemala lacks a strong, policyoriented, mass-based political party that could develop a coherent national reform program and mobilize public support around it.  The United States should strengthen the Guatemalan state by expanding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and by strongly supporting CICIG, MIFAPRO, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.