The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

The effects of defendant account on damage award decisions

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the manner in which civil defendants account for their behavior influences compensatory and punitive damage awards. Jurors read three civil trial summaries, in which I manipulated injury severity (high vs. low), defendant reprehensibility (high vs. low), defendant status (individual vs. corporate), and account (concession, excuse, justification or refusal) in a factorial design. I also included four control groups in which the defendant stipulated liability. In all other conditions, participants read that a jury had found the defendant negligent. Only defendant reprehensibility influenced punitive awards. Both plaintiff injury and defendant reprehensibility influenced compensatory awards. When individuals offered justifications and when corporations offered excuses, jurors awarded lower compensatory awards against low reprehensibility defendants than against high reprehensibility defendants. Negligence stipulations led to lower damage awards for individuals than for corporations. Additionally, concessions tended to produce lower awards when combined with a stipulation of negligence as opposed to a jury decision. These findings support the hypothesis that in cases in which the defendant is clearly negligent, circumstances exist in which stipulating negligence and offering an apologetic account will lead to reduced damage awards decisions. Results indicate that individual and corporate defendants offering justifications and refusals should first consider the reprehensibility of their actions. In a broader realm, findings demonstrate that the manner in which a jury perceives the explanation given by the defendant is dependent upon defendant characteristics and case-specific factors. ^

Effect of delay of first interview and repetition of interview on accuracy and confidence of recall of a flashbulb -type memory

Hearing of the news of the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, in a traffic accident, is taken as an analogue for being a percipient but uninvolved witness to a crime, or a witness to another person's sudden confession to some illegal act. This event (known in the literature as a “reception event”) has previously been hypothesized to cause one to form a special type of memory commonly known as a “flashbulb memory” (FB) (Brown and Kulik, 1977). FB's are hypothesized to be especially resilient against forgetting, highly detailed including peripheral details, clear, and inspiring great confidence in the individual for their accuracy. FB's are dependent for their formation upon surprise, emotional valence, and impact, or consequentiality to the witness of the initiating event. FB's are thought to be enhanced by frequent rehearsal. FB's are very important in the context of criminal investigation and litigation in that investigators and jurors usually place great store in witnesses, regardless of their actual accuracy, who claim to have a clear and complete recollection of an event, and who express this confidently. Therefore, the lives, or at least the freedom, of criminal defendants, and the fortunes of civil litigants hang on the testimony of witnesses professing to have FB's. ^ In this study, which includes a large and diverse sample (N = 305), participants were surveyed within 2–4 days after hearing of the fatal accident, and again at intervals of 2 and 4 weeks, 6, 12, and 18 months. Contrary to the FB hypothesis, I found that participants' FB's degraded over time beginning at least as early as two weeks post event. At about 12 months the memory trace stabilized, resisting further degradation. Repeated interviewing did not have any negative affect upon accuracy, contrary to concerns in the literature. Analysis by correlation and regression indicated no effect or predictive power for participant age, emotionality, confidence, or student status, as related to accuracy of recall; nor was participant confidence in accuracy predicted by emotional impact as hypothesized. Results also indicate that, contrary to the notions of investigators and jurors, witnesses become more inaccurate over time regardless of their confidence in their memories, even for highly emotional events. ^

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^

Examining Moderators of the Hindsight Bias in the Context of Civil Legal Decision-Making: Counterfactuals, Causal Proximity, and Self-Referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF AMATEURS: THE CONTEXT OF SPORTS COACHING

The developing intersection between the law of negligence and sports coaching in the UK provides a profoundly distinctive context, as compared to that of the more traditional learned professions, in which to critically examine the issue of professional liability. More specifically, detailed consideration of the Bolam test in the context of sports coaching, where the majority of coaches are volunteers, reinforces the Bolam doctrine as a control mechanism designed to protect both claimants and defendants alike. Importantly, a fuller analysis of related jurisprudence, even in instances where defendant coaches lack a formal qualification, and/or may not have engaged in considered and reasoned decision-making, reveals the potential for the Bolam test to operate as a quasi-defence, thereby safeguarding coaches from negligence liability. Nonetheless, in discharging this heightened standard of care incumbent upon them, coaches must ensure that the coaching practices adopted are regular, approved, and capable of withstanding robust and logical scrutiny. Ultimately, this article’s analysis of the principles of professional liability, in the specific circumstances of sports coaching, should prove to be of appreciably wider interest and utility for practitioners specialising in personal injury law.

Stevens trial, May 12 - July 10, 1856, from Official Court records, 2nd District Court, Wash. Terr.

Prepared Feb. 17, 2001 by.Sherburne F. Cook, Jr. Proceedings of this trial are transcribed as they occurred on pp 112- 122, May 12- July 10, 1856.

Crime de incêndio urbano

Projeto de Graduação apresentado à Universidade Fernando Pessoa como parte dos requisitos para obtenção do grau de licenciado em Criminologia

Evaluating Public Knowledge of the NCRMD Defence

The not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) defence is used when claims can be made that offenders are not responsible for their actions due to symptoms of a mental disorder. Bill C-14, now enacted in Canada, has implemented changes making it more difficult for NCRMD defendants to be released back into the public. This enactment appears to have been primarily due to public perceptions rather than actual knowledge of the defence. Thus it seems important to assess what members of the public actually know about the defence. To assess this, 127 participants completed a survey assessing their knowledge of the illnesses generally involved in the NCRMD defence, crimes committed, and punishments received. On average, only 31.6% of responses were answered within 20% of the factual statistics. Results suggest a general lack of knowledge about the defence and demonstrate why important changes should be based on factual information rather than public opinion.

Unpacking insanity defence standards: an experimental study of rationality and control tests in criminal law

The present study investigated the impact of different legal standards on mock juror decisions concerning whether a defendant was guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. Undergraduate students (N = 477) read a simulated case summary involving a murder case and were asked to make an insanity determination. The cases differed in terms of the condition of the defendant (rationality deficit or control deficit) and the legal standard given to the jurors to make the determination (Model Penal Code, McNaughten or McNaughten plus a separate control determination). The effects of these variables on the insanity determination were investigated. Jurors also completed questionnaires measuring individualism and hierarchy attitudes and perceptions of facts in the case. Results indicate that under current insanity standards jurors do not distinguish between defendants with rationality deficits and defendants with control deficits regardless of whether the legal standard requires them to do so. Even defendants who lacked control were found guilty at equal rates under a legal standard excusing rationality deficits only and a legal standard excluding control and rationality deficits. This was improved by adding a control test as a partial defence, to be determined after a rationality determination. Implications for the insanity defence in the Criminal Justice System are discussed.

Criminal Case Processing of Sexual Assaults in Alaska

Discretion plays a role in nearly every facet of the American criminal justice system. It is widely regarded as necessary to do justice but is not without criticisms – especially when it leads to unfavorable or disparate treatment. The role of discretion in sexual assault cases has been particularly scrutinized. Since the majority of sexual assaults do not fit stereotypic beliefs about what constitutes a “real rape” and “genuine victim,” criminal justice officials use their discretion to filter these cases out of the justice system. This study explored this issue by examining two stages of the criminal justice process: the police decision to refer cases for prosecution and the prosecutorial decision to accept referred cases. In doing so, it contributes to this body of literature in three ways. First, it included sexual assault cases that involve Alaska Native victims and suspects. Second, it addressed a gap in the theoretical scholarship by examining the downstream nature of police decision-making. And finally, it examined the formal reasons prosecutors give for charge dispositions. This study found a significant amount of attrition of sexual assault cases as they progressed through the criminal justice system. Moreover, a combination of legally relevant and extralegal factors was found to be important, but not consistently across all types of sexual assaults. Among legal factors, the number of victim injuries was the most consistent predictor. Among extralegal factors, cases that involved Alaska Native suspects had significantly higher odds of case referral and case acceptance compared to white suspects. The effect of suspect race was particularly pronounced in cases with a white victim. Additionally, the findings suggest that not only are Native American defendants more likely to have their cases referred by police, but once referred, they are also more likely to have them accepted for prosecution. Contrary to expectations, victim-suspect relationship, specifically non-stranger assaults, increased the odds of police referral compared to stranger cases. However, the opposite appears to be true for the decision to prosecute cases. Once referred, prosecutors were five times more likely to accept sexual assaults perpetrated by strangers. The implications of these findings are also discussed.

Fatores de proteção em arguidos de violência nas relações íntimas

Poster apresentado no VII Congresso Internacional da Sociedade Portuguesa de Psiquiatria e Psicologia da Justiça. Centro Hosp. Conde de Ferreira, Porto, 26 e 27 de Novembro 2015.

Policy directive

The purpose of this policy is to facilitate the flow of information between the South Carolina Department of Public Safety, the news media and the general public, while protecting the rights of both the defendants and the prosecuting authorities in pending cases from exposure to prejudicial publicity. The DPS is committed to and recognizes the right of the general public and the news media to be fully and accurately informed about all matters of public interest regarding DPS. This policy will assure that the release of information meets the needs of the general public and news media without infringing on an individual’s right to privacy or interfering with the process of conducting a fair and impartial trial.

Avances e inconsistencias en el concepto de reparación integral a raíz de las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y del Consejo de Estado Colombiano

Resumen El concepto de reparación integral en Colombia está mediado en gran parte por las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Ello ha propiciado algunos avances en materia de ampliar el espectro de las reparaciones económicas; en la posibilidad de reabrir investigaciones antes cobijadas por la intangibilidad de la cosa juzgada; en la participación de las víctimas en los procesos penales y disciplinarios, y en algunas formas de reparación simbólica. Sin embargo, en general hay carencia de verdadera voluntad política y de mecanismos jurídicos que posibiliten que la reparación integral sea una realidad.Además, el cruce de decisiones de la Corte Interamericana con las decisiones del Consejo de Estado colombiano, ha originado situaciones absurdas que, aunque teóricamente se ven como un avance, en términos reales son un retroceso frente a los derechos de las víctimas. Ello se debe a la aparente similitud de las competencias de ambos tribunales; a una equivocada lectura del Consejo de Estado sobre los límites y posibilidades reales de su jurisdicción, y finalmente, a que la Corte no ha adoptado criterios claros en relación con las reparaciones económicas y en relación con la coherencia en el cumplimiento de sus sentencias. Palabras clave: reparación, Colombia, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Consejo de Estado. Abstract The concept of integral reparation in Colombia is mediated largely by the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This has led to some progress in broadening the spectrum of economic reparations; in the possibility of reopening investigations sheltered by the intangibility for defendants; in the participation of victims in criminal and disciplinary proceedings, besides in some symbolic forms of reparation. However, there is general lack of real political will and legal mechanisms that enable that comprehensive reparation be a reality. Furthermore, crossing inter-American court decisions with the decisions of the Colombian State Council has created absurd situations that, although theoretically are seen as a breakthrough, in real terms are a retreat from the rights of victims. This is due to the apparent similarity in the competencies of both courts; a mistaken reading of the State Council on the limits and real possibilities of their jurisdiction, and finally, the Court has not adopted clear criteria regarding economic reparations and in relation to consistent com­pliance with its sentences.Keywords: repair, Colombia, Interamerican Court of Human rights, State Council.