Growth parameters of marine fishes in Cuban waters

A total of 73 sets of growth parameters for 34 species belonging to 12 families of marine fish caught in Cuban waters are presented. These parameters are compiled from existing studies (58 sets) or derived from data obtained in the original literature (15 sets).

Research in Global Groundfish Markets: An Exercise in International Cooperation

Over roughly the last decade, most of the fishery resources of the continental shelf and nearshore areas of the world's oceans have come under the control of coastal nations. One consequence of this extension of fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ) by any individual state has been the expansion of its production possibilities. That is, with strengthened property rights in the ocean resources off its shores, a coastal nation experiences increased opportunities to produce goods and services from its newly enlarged pool of resources. Such a nation, then, would appear to be a potential gainer from EFJ.

The evolution of cooperation in asymmetric systems

Explaining "Tragedy of the Commons" of evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. Asymmetrical interaction, which is one of the most important characteristics of cooperative system, has not been sufficiently considered in the existing models of the evolution of cooperation. Considering the inequality in the number and payoff between the cooperative actors and recipients in cooperation systems, discriminative density-dependent interference competition will occur in limited dispersal systems. Our model and simulation show that the local but not the global stability of a cooperative interaction can be maintained if the utilization of common resource remains unsaturated, which can be achieved by density-dependent restraint or competition among the cooperative actors. More intense density dependent interference competition among the cooperative actors and the ready availability of the common resource, with a higher intrinsic contribution ratio of a cooperative actor to the recipient, will increase the probability of cooperation. The cooperation between the recipient and the cooperative actors can be transformed into conflict and, it oscillates chaotically with variations of the affecting factors under different environmental or ecological conditions. The higher initial relatedness (i.e. similar to kin or reciprocity relatedness), which is equivalent to intrinsic contribution ratio of a cooperative actor to the recipient, can be selected for by penalizing less cooperative or cheating actors but rewarding cooperative individuals in asymmetric systems. The initial relatedness is a pivot but not the aim of evolution of cooperation. This explains well the direct conflict observed in almost all cooperative systems.