The Postmodernist Critique of Evidence-Based Practice

In this paper, we examine the postmodernist argument that evidence-based practice (EBP) should be rejected by nurses because it restricts the sources of knowledge used by practitioners. Three main postmodernist criticisms are identified and discussed. First, that the notion of ‘best evidence’ implies a hierarchical and exclusivist approach to knowledge. We accept this argument, noting that such a hierarchy is accepted and justified by many of its proponents. Second, that the hierarchy embraced by the evidence-based practice movement damages health care because it excludes other forms of evidence that are needed to understand the complexity of care. We accept that some manifestations of EBP, notably the Cochrane Collaboration, have devalued qualitative evidence. Using our previous experience of conducting Cochrane reviews (McGaughey et al. 2007), we argue that this limits explanatory scope. Third, that it fails to take account of individuals or their experience. Here, we use evidence of the use by midwives of EBP policies and protocols to the detriment of including women in decision-making processes (Porter et al. 2007) to accept that there is also some merit to this critique. We conclude that, while it is not necessary to concur with the total rejection of EBP that postmodernists advocate, it is necessary to address the issues they raise in order to ensure that EBP better fits the requirements of nursing.
McGaughey, J., Alderdice, F., Fowler, R., Kapila, A., Mayhew, A., Moutray, M., 2007. Outreach and Early Warning Systems (EWS) for the prevention of Intensive Care admission and death of critically ill adult patients on general hospital wards. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2007, Issue 3. Art. No.: CD005529. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD005529.pub2.
Porter, S., Crozier, K., Sinclair, M., Kernohan, W., 2007. New midwifery? A qualitative analysis of midwives’ decision-making strategies. Journal of Advanced Nursing 60 (6), 525-534.

The Changing Worlds and Workplaces of Capitalism

How do the large scale structures of capitalism and the local social relations of workplaces and organisations shape each other? Through a series of European studies of capital and labour's shifting struggles and compromises; of the politics of welfare, industrial relations and labour markets; and the transformation of post-industrial networked workplaces, this edited collection shows how capitalist workplaces and economies are changing today. The first section explores how European capitalism developed and the different national forms of the struggle between capital and labour for a bigger share of national income. In the second part of the volume, the contributors investigate the institutions that are the building blocks of these different national forms, and how they are changing as labour markets are increasingly shaped by globalisation, feminisation and liberalisation. The final chapters examine how these institutions of capitalism play out in the contemporary workplace – where the most dynamic sectors are based on loose networks and external labour markets and a shifting, uncertain alliance between employers and workers. The authors argue for a new integration of political economy and the sociology of work and organisations.

Jonathan Swift's Critique of Consequentialism?

Jonathan Swift’s Modest Proposal for preventing the children of poor people from being a burthen to their parents or country, and for making them beneficial to the public can be regarded as a critique of consequentialism, perhaps the finest and most effective that has ever been written. Swift’s argument is not explicit but his use of consequentialist reasoning shows how it is possible to rationally justify a course of action which is grotesque and barbaric. This interpretation of Swift’s pamphlet is supported by considering it in relation to works by Bernard Mandeville and William Petty. Both authors employed consequentialist reasoning and Swift is likely to have been familiar with their work.

Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.

Globalization and the spread of capitalism: material resonances

The intertwined processes of globalization and capitalism are fundamentally material in expression and are central to understandings of the modern world (however defined). Over the last 50 years, post-medieval archaeologists have engaged directly with the materiality of these broad-scale processes, initially from the standpoint of empirically driven descriptive studies and latterly with more interpretative approaches which challenge and stretch disciplinary boundaries. As later historical archaeology is increasingly characterized by a theoretically and geographically diverse set of practices, insights into the material resonances of globalization and capitalism have become increasingly sophisticated and more broadly relevant to the present day.

After the Critique of Rights: For a Radical Democratic Theory and Practice of Human Rights

The critique of human rights has proliferated in critical legal thinking over recent years, making it clear that we can no longer uncritically approach human rights in their liberal form. In this article I assert that after the critique of rights one way human rights may be productively re-engaged in radical politics is by drawing from the radical democratic tradition. Radical democratic thought provides plausible resources to rework the shortcomings of liberal human rights, and allows human rights to be brought within the purview of a wider political project adopting a critical approach to current relations of power. Building upon previous re-engagements with rights using radical democratic thought, I return to the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to explore how human rights may be thought as an antagonistic hegemonic activity within a critical relation to power, a concept which is fundamentally futural, and may emerge as one site for work towards radical and plural democracy. I also assert, via Judith Butler's model of cultural translation, that a radical democratic practice of human rights may be advanced which resonates with and builds upon already existing activism, thereby holding possibilities to persuade those who remain sceptical as to radical re-engagements with rights.

Towards a Critique of Educative Violence: Walter Benjamin and ‘Second Education’

Although modern systems of mass education are typically defined in their opposition to violence, it has been argued that it is only through an insistent and critical focus upon violence that radical thought can be sustained. This article seeks to take up this challenge in relation to Walter Benjamin’s lesser-known writings on education. Benjamin retained throughout his life a deep suspicion about academic institutions and about the pedagogic, social and economic violence implicated in the idea of cultural transmission. He nonetheless remained committed to the possibility of another kind of revolutionary potential inherent to true education and, when he comes to speak of this in his Critique of Violence, it is remarkable that he describes it as manifesting an educative violence. This article argues that Benjamin’s philosophy works toward a critique of educative violence that results in a distinction between a ‘first’ and ‘second’ kind of education and asks whether destruction might have a positive role to play within pedagogical theories in contrast to current valorisations of creativity and productivity.

On affirmation and becoming : a Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche's critique of nihilism

The main thrust of this thesis is the re-exploration of Friedrich Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" through the lenses of Gilles Deleuze. A Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche is motivated by a post-deconstrnctive style of interpretation, inasmuch as Deleuze goes beyond, or in between, henneneutics and deconstrnction. Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading of Nietzsche is, however, only secondary to the main aim of this thesis. The primary thrust of this study is the critique of a way of thinking characterized by Nietzsche as nihilistic. Therefore, it should be noted that this study is not about Deleuze's reading per se; rather, it is an appraisal of Nietzsche's "critique of nihilism" using Deleuze's experimental reading. We will accrue Nietzsche's critique and Deleuze's post-deconstrnctive reading in order to appraise Nietzsche's critique itself. Insofar as we have underscored Deleuze's purported experimentation of Nietzschean themes, this study is also an experiment in itself. Through this experimentation, we will find out whether it is possible to partly gloss Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuzian phraseology. Far from presenting a mere exposition of Nietzsche's text, we are, rather, re-reading, that is, re-evaluating Nietzsche's critique of nihilism through Deleuze's experimentation. This is our way of thinking with Nietzsche. Nihilism is the central problem upon which Nietzsche's philosophical musings are directed; he deems nihilism as a cultural experience and, as such, a phenomenon to be reckoned with. In our reconstruction of Nietzsche's critique of nihilism, we locate two related elements which constitute the structure of the prescription of a cure, Le., the ethics of affirmation and the ontology of becoming. Appraising Nietzsche's ethics and ontology amounts to clarifying what Deleuze thinks as the movement from the "dogmatic image of thought" to the "new image of thought." Through this new image of thought, Deleuze makes sense of a Nietzschean counterculture which is a perspective that resists traditional or representational metaphysics. Deleuze takes the reversal of Platonism or the transmutation of values to be the point of departure. We have to, according to Deleuze, abandon our old image of the world in order to free ourselves from the obscurantism of foundationalist or essentialist thinking. It is only through the transmutation of values that we can make sense of Nietzsche's ethics of affirmation and ontology of becoming. We have to think of Nietzsche's ethics as an "ethics" and not a moral philosophy, and we have to think of his ontology as 1/ ontology" and not as metaphysics. Through Deleuze, we are able to avoid reading Nietzsche as a moral philosopher and metaphysician. Rather, we are able to read Nietzsche as one espousing an ethical imperative through the thought of the eternal return and one advocating a theory of existence based on an immanent, as opposed to transcendent, image of the world.

Impoverishment of The Law by The Law: A Critique of The Attorney General's Vision of The Rule of Law and The Federal Principle

This brief article is devoted to a critique of the arguments put forward by the Attorney General of Canada in connection with the Reference concerning certain questions relating to the secession of Quebec (hereinafter, "the Reference"). This critique will not be presented from a plainly positivist standpoint. On the contrary, I will be examining in particular (1) how the approach taken by the Attorney General impoverished the legal concepts of the rule of law anf federalism, both of which were, however, central to her submission; and, in a more general way, (2) how the excessively detailed analysis of constitutional texts contributes to the impoverishment of the symbolic function of the law, however essential that dimension may be to its legitimacy. My criticism will take into account the reasons for judgement delivered recently by the Supreme Court in the Reference.