The Kremlin's Scholar. A Memoir of Soviet Politics under Stalin and Khrushchev

The memoirs are dominated by two grand figures of Soviet history, Stalin and Khrushchev. The account of Stalin is riddled with ambiguities. There is an undoubted personal admiration for Stalin, his intellectual and political capacity (Stalin allegedly read 300 pages per day), his simplicity in daily life seen in "an old tunic, patched-up socks, almost constant isolation" (p. 190). At the same time, Shepilov acknowledged the paranoid aspects of Stalin's personality, especially towards the end of his life. Stalin's mechanisms of power are illustrated by Shepilov's account of work on a new book on political economy. Stalin personally chose key people for important tasks and controlled them at key junctures to ensure the desired outcome. In this light, Shepilov's claims that the Great Purges of the late 1930s could have been outside of Stalin's immediate control seem implausible, to say the least (p. 41).

All Stalin's deficiencies, however, pale in comparison with those of Khrushchev, the bête noire of Shepilov's memoirs. There is plenty of criticism of Khrushchev's policies, particularly in agriculture and foreign affairs. What comes across most pungently is, however, Shepilov's disdain of Khrushchev's personality and leadership style. In this respect, the book is unashamedly biased and remarkable for its omissions as much as for its revelations.

The Political Economy of Swift's Satires and other Prose Works

Jonathan Swift wrote perceptively about the emerging commercial society
in Britain in the early eighteenth century. His particular focus was on the
financial revolution and its implications for economic and political stability
as well as for shifts of power between the landed and commercial
classes. Following his return to Ireland Swift’s focus shifted to the developmental
problems of his native country. In several pamphlets he advocated
consumption of domestic products, challenged existing political
structures and made trenchant criticisms of absenteeism and other dysfunctional
aspects of the land tenure system. Swift’s politico-economic
concerns are fully reflected in his best known work, Gulliver’s Travels but
his most pointed criticism of the emerging commercial system is contained
in A Modest Proposal. Written in the form of an economic pamphlet, A
Modest Proposal is ostensibly designed to address the problem of poverty
in Ireland. In addition to its implicit criticism of economic policy in Ireland,
the pamphlet challenges the separation of economics and morality as
evidenced in the writings of William Petty and Bernard Mandeville. Swift
parodies Petty’s political arithmetic but it is suggested here that he also
had in his sights the consequentialist reasoning present in the work of
both authors but explicitly so in Mandeville.
Keywords: financial revolution, public debt, paper credit, rationality, political
arithmetic, consequentialism, Petty (William), Mandeville (Bernard)

Dimensionality of Policy Space in Consociational Northern Ireland

A criticism of consociational power sharing as an institutional response to violent conflict is that it buttresses rather than ameliorates the underlying (linguistic, religious or ethno-national) divide, hence prohibiting the emergence of new dimensions of political competition (such as economic left-right or moral liberal-conservative dimensions) that are characteristic of 'normal' societies. We test this argument in the context of the illustrative Northern Ireland case, using data from expert coding of party policy documents and opinion data derived from two Voter Advice Applications (VAAs). We find evidence for a moral liberal-conservative dimension of politics in addition to the ethno-national dimension. Hence, we caution against assuming that consociational polities are uni-dimensional.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Teachers' perceptions of effects of terminal examinations on teaching and learning at the secondary school level in Zimbabwe

This study was particularly aimed at the examinations and the effect they have on schooling at the secondary school level in Zimbabwe. The views and opinions of teachers on the use of terminal examinations for certification and the influence they are seen to have on teachers' approach to the curriculum were examined. The literature has shown that there is widespread criticism of the justice and effects of terminal examinations. It is argued that they lead to an over-emphasis of that which is measured, knowledge and intellectual ability, at the expense of that kind of education progress which is almost impossible to measure in an end-of-the-course assessment. Three hundred and six secondary school teachers responded to a survey which asked for teachers' perceptions of examinations and the curriculum. The findings of this study indicated that teaching is structured towards examinations. Although teachers are trying to teach and develop reasoning skills and other activities, the pressure of examinations and the importance of doing well in them force teachers to restrict themselves to examination requirements.

Digital Paratext : Editorialization and the Very Death of the Author

As shown by different scholars, the idea of “author” is not absolute or necessary. On the contrary, it came to life as an answer to the very practical needs of an emerging print technology in search of an economic model of its own. In this context, and according to the criticism of the notion of “author” made during the 1960–70s (in particular by Barthes and Foucault), it would only be natural to consider the idea of the author being dead as a global claim accepted by all scholars. Yet this is not the case, because, as Rose suggests, the idea of “author” and the derived notion of copyright are still too important in our culture to be abandoned. But why such an attachment to the idea of “author”? The hypothesis on which this chapter is based is that the theory of the death of the author—developed in texts such as What is an Author? by Michel Foucault and The Death of the Author by Roland Barthes—did not provide the conditions for a shift towards a world without authors because of its inherent lack of concrete editorial practices different from the existing ones. In recent years, the birth and diffusion of the Web have allowed the concrete development of a different way of interpreting the authorial function, thanks to new editorial practices—which will be named “editorialization devices” in this chapter. Thus, what was inconceivable for Rose in 1993 is possible today because of the emergence of digital technology—and in particular, the Web.

La preuve ontologique de l'existence de Dieu chez Descartes

Ce projet de mémoire de maîtrise portera sur Descartes et la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu. La présentation qui sera faite de cette preuve, de ses tenants et de ses aboutissants, tiendra compte: premièrement, du rôle et du statut de celle-ci dans l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques; deuxièmement, des relations entre la preuve "ontologique" et la preuve dite "par les effets"; et troisièmement, des différentes oeuvres de Descartes dans lesquelles il est question de l'argument ontologique. Ainsi, cette analyse permettra de noter les différences relatives qu'il pourrait y avoir chez Descartes quant au fond ou à la forme de cet argument. Nous évoquerons notamment la position différente qu'occupe cette preuve dans deux écrits, soient les Méditations métaphysiques (1641) et les Principes de la philosophie (1644). Ce genre d'analyse nous permettra de nous pencher sur le débat initié par Martial Guéroult et Henri Gouhier concernant la place de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au sein de l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques ainsi que ses relations avec la preuve "par les effets". La postérité de ce débat sera également considérée. Aussi, nous serons à même de poser la question à savoir s'il y a une évolution de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au fil des oeuvres dans la pensée de Descartes. En résumé, dans ce mémoire, nous aborderons deux problématiques: la question de l'autonomie ou de la non autonomie de la preuve "ontologique" par rapport à la preuve "par les effets", et le questionnement quant à la possibilité d'une évolution de la place et de la nature de la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu dans les écrits de Descartes.

The postoccidental deconstruction and resignification of "Modernity'': a critical analysis

The thesis which follows, entitled ''The Postoccidental Deconstruction and Resignification of 'Modemity': A Critical Analysis", is an exposition and criticism of the critique of occidental modemity found in a group of writings which identify their critique with a "postoccidental" point of view with respect to postcolonial studies. The general problem ofthe investigation concems the significance and reach ofthis critique of modemity in relation to the ongoing debate, in Latín American studies, about the historical relationship between Latín America, as a mu1ticultural/ structurally heterogeneous region, and the industrial societies of Euro pe and North America. A brief Preface explains the genealogy of the author's ideas on this subject Following this preface, the thesis proceeds to analyze the writings in this corpus through an intertextual, schematic approach which singles out two rnajor elements of the postoccidental critique: "coloniality" and "eurocentrism". These two main elements are investigated in the Introduction and Chapters One and Two, in terms of how they distinguish postoccidental analysis from other theoretical tendencias with which it has affinities but whose key concepts it reformu1ates in ways that are key to the unique approach which postoccidental analysis takes to modemity, the nature of the capitalist world system, colonialism, subaltemization, center/periphery and development . Chapter Three attempts a critical analysis of the foregoing postoccidentalist deconstruction according to the following question: to what extent does it succeed in deconstructing "modernity" as a term which refers to a historically articulated set of discourses whose underlying purpose has been to justify European and North American hegemony and structural asymmetries vis-a-vis the peripheries of the capitalist world system, based on an ethnocentric, racialist logic of exploitation and subalternization of non-European peoples? A Conclusion follows Chapter Three.

The engineer under FDIC's conditions of contract for construction

FIDIC has over the years produced standard forms of contracts for the international procurement of projects. A source of continuing criticism of its Red Book concerns the duality in the traditional role of the engineer as the employer's agent and as an independent third party holding the balance fairly between the employer and the contractor. In response to this and other criticisms FIDIC produced a replacement for it in 1999. The role of the engineer under the new Red Book is critically examined in the light of relevant case law, expert commentaries and feedback from two multidisciplinary workshops with international participation. The examination identified three major changes: (1) a duty to act impartially has been replaced by a duty to make fair determination of certain matters; (2) it is open to parties to allow greater control of the engineer by the employer by stating in the appropriate part of the contract powers the engineer must not exercise without the employer's approval; (3) there is provision for a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) to which disputes may be referred. Although the duality has not been eliminated completely, the contract is structured flexibly enough to support those who wish to contract on the basis of the engineer acting solely as the agent of the employer.

The child in wolf’s clothing: the meanings of the ‘wolf’ and questions of identity in Jack London’s White Fang

The criticism of Jack London’s work has been dominated by a reliance upon ideas of the ‘real’, the ‘authentic’ and the ‘archetypal’. One of the figures in London’s work around which these ideas crystallize is that of the ‘wolf’. This article will examine the way the wolf is mobilized both in the criticism of Jack London’s work and in an example of the work: the novel White Fang (1906). This novel, though it has often been read as clearly delimiting and demarcating the realms of nature and culture, can be read conversely as unpicking the deceptive simplicity of such categories, as troubling essentialist notions of identity (human/animal, male/female, white/Indian) and as engaging with the complexity of the journey in which a ‘small animal … becomes human-sexual by crossing the infinite divide that separates life from humanity, the biological from the historical, “nature” from “culture” ’ (Althusser 1971: 206).

The child and imperial return: the mystery of Edwin Drood

The Mystery of Edwin Drood has often been read as an Imperial text, just as Dickens's work has repeatedly been considered in relation to its construction of childhood. Despite this, 'the child' has either been avoided in criticism of Dickens's last novel, or has actively been read as absent. In this essay, I return the ‘repressed’ child to a reading of Drood, and through this disrupt appeals to a hard-impacted Imperial structure I understand to be made within criticism of it.

Il realismo di un nuovissimo medio evo: Boccaccio in the age of neorealism

After the war Italian artists and intellectuals saw a significant and necessary confluence between their political desire to create a "new." Italy and their cultural ambition to re-invigorate the study of medieval Italy. This tendency is particularly evident, I argue, in the post-war scholarly and critical focus on Boccaccio, and especially Boccaccio’s Decameron. Not only within the academy but also in the popular press, Boccaccio was granted pride of place in the canon, venerated as the pioneer of socially conscious vernacular literary realism, the archetype for the pursuit of artistic truth in the face of social upheaval. As a result, I wish to suggest, Italian neorealism, which rose to prominence in the first years after the Second World War, was in a significant sense imbued with and realised through a profound engagement with the work of Boccaccio. In turn, the cultural currents affiliated with neorealism influenced Boccaccio studies, whose operative notions of medieval «realism» were to a perhaps surprising degree stimulated by approaches to the neo-realist poetics at work in the Italian films, novels, and criticism of the 1940s and ’50s. Situating the critical discourse surrounding Boccaccio within the post-war Italian context can therefore serve to shed unexpected light on both the cultural affirmation of neorealism and the disciplinary configuration of Italian medieval studies.

On the significance of the basic structure: a priori baseline views and luck egalitarianism

This paper uses the exploration of the grounds of a common criticism of luck egalitarianism to try to make an argument about both the proper subject of theorising about justice and how to approach that subject. It draws a distinction between what it calls basic structure views and a priori baseline views, where the former take the institutional aspects of political prescriptions seriously and the latter do not. It argues that objections to luck egalitarianism on the grounds of its harshness can in part be explained by this blindness to relevant features of institutions. Further, it may be that luck egalitarianism cannot regard its own enactment as just. A related objection to Dworkin’s equality of resources, which claims that it cannot pick a particular institutional background to set the costs of resources and so is radically indeterminate, is also presented. These results, I argue, give us good reason to reject all a priori baseline views.

Understanding Foreign Masters : the examples of Rabindranath Tagore and Fyodor Dostoyevskiy

The Indian author Rabindranath Tagore was received like royalty during his visits to the West after winning the Nobel Prize in 1913. Dreams of foreign cultures offered a retreat from a complicated age. In a time when the West appeared to be living under threat of disintegration and when industrialism seemed like a cul-de-sac, he appeared to offer the promise of a return to a lost paradise, a spiritual abode that is superior to the restless Western culture. However, Tagore’s popularity faded rapidly, most notably in England, the main target of his criticism. Soon after Tagore had won the Nobel Prize, the English became indignant at Tagore’s anti-colonial attitude.Tagore visited Sweden in 1921 and 1926 and was given a warm reception. His visits to Sweden can be seen as an episode in a longer chain of events. It brought to life old conceptions of India as the abode of spirituality on earth. Nevertheless, interest in him was a relatively short-lived phenomenon in Sweden. Only a few of his admirers in Sweden appreciated the complexity of Tagore’s achievements. His “anathema of mammonism”, as a Swedish newspaper called it, was not properly received. After a steady stream of translations his popularity flagged towards the end of the 1920s and then almost disappeared entirely. Tagores visits in Sweden gave an indication that India was on the way to liberate itself from its colonial legacy, which consequently contributed to the waning of his popularity in the West. In the long run, his criticism of the drawbacks in the western world became too obvious to maintain permanent interest. The Russian author Fyodor Dostoyevskiy’s Crime and Punishment (1866) has enticed numerous interpretations such as the purely biographical approach. In the nervous main character of the novel, the young student Raskolnikov, one easily recognizes Dostoyevskiy himself. The novel can also be seen as a masterpiece of realistic fiction. It gives a broad picture of Saint Petersburg, a metropolis in decay. Crime and Punishment can also be seen as one of the first examples of a modern psychological novel, since it is focused on the inner drama of its main character, the young student Raskolnikov. His actions seem to be governed by mere coincidences, dreams and the spur of the moment. it seems fruitful to study the novel from a psychoanalytical approach. In his book Raskolnikov: the way of the divided towards unity in Crime and Punishment (1982), a Swedish scholar, Owe Wikström, has followed this line of interpretation all the way to Freud’s disciple C G Jung. In addition to this, the novel functions as an exciting crime story. To a large extent it is Viktor Sjklovskij and other Russian formalists from the 1920s and onwards who have taught the western audience to understand the specific nature of the crime story. The novel could be seen as a story about religious conversion. Like Lasarus in the Bible (whose story attracts a lot of attention in the novel) Raskolnikov is awakened from the dead, and together with Sonja he starts a completely new life. The theme of conversion has a special meaning for Dostoyevskiy. For him the conversion meant an acknowledgement of the specific nature of Russia itself. Crime and punishment mirrors the conflict between traditional Russian values and western influences that has been obvious in Russia throughout the history of the country. The novel reflects a dialogue that still continues in Russian society. The Russian literary historian Mikhail Bakhtin, who is probably the most famous interpreter of the works of Dostoyevskiy, has become famous precisely by emphasizing the importance of dialogues in novels like Crime and Punishment. According to Bakhtin, this novel is characterized by its multitude of voices. Various ideas are confronted with each other, and each one of them is personified by one of the characters in the novel. The author has resigned from his position as the superior monitor of the text, and he leaves it to the reader to decide what interpretation is the correct one..The aim of the present study is thus to analyze the complex reactions in the west to Tagore’s visits in Sweden and to Fyodor Dostoyevskiys novel Crime and Punishment.. This leads to more general conclusions on communication between cultures.