Investigation of organized crime in interstate commerce. Hearings before a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-first Cingress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 202 ...

pt.1.Florida.--pt.1A.Florida.--pt.2.Federal communications, etc.--pt.3.Black market operations.--pt.4.Missouri.--pt.4A.Missouri.--pt.5.Illinois.--pt.6.Ohio-Kentucky.--pt.7.New York-New Jersey.--pt.8.Louisiana.--pt.9.Michigan.--pt.10.Nevada-California.--pt.11.Pennsylvania.--pt.12.U.S.Treasury dept.,etc.--pt.13.Miscellaneous witnesses.--pt.14.Narcotics.--pt.15.Kentucky.--pt.16.Florida.--pt.17.Maryland and District of Columbia.--pt.18.New York and New Jersey.--pt.19.Pennsylvania.

The investigation of crime:the myths and the reality

Initially the study focussed on the factors affecting the ability of the police to solve crimes. An analysts of over twenty thousand police deployments revealed the proportion of time spent investigating crime contrasted to its perceived importance and the time spent on other activities. The fictional portrayal of skills believed important in successful crime investigation were identified and compared to the professional training and 'taught skills’ given to police and detectives. Police practitioners and middle management provided views on the skills needed to solve crimes. The relative importance of the forensic science role. fingerprint examination and interrogation skills were contrasted with changes in police methods resulting from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and its effect on confessions. The study revealed that existing police systems for investigating crime excluding specifically cases of murder and other serious offences, were unsystematic, uncoordinated, unsupervised and unproductive in using police resources. The study examined relevant and contemporary research in the United States and United Kingdom and with organisational support introduced an experimental system of data capture and initial investigation with features of case screening and management. Preliminary results indicated increases in the collection of essential information and more effective use of investigative resources. In the managerial framework within which this study has been conducted, research has been undertaken in the knowledge elicitation area as a basis for an expert system of crime investigation and the potential organisational benefits of utilising the Lap computer in the first stages of data gathering and investigation. The conclusions demonstrate the need for a totally integrated system of criminal investigation with emphasis on an organisational rather than individual response. In some areas the evidence produced is sufficient to warrant replication, in others additional research is needed to further explore other concepts and proposed systems pioneered by this study.

«A Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção», «Direito Penal § Fundamentos Dogmáticos e Político-Criminais»

Resumo: 1- Introdução: algumas notícias da comunicação social; 2 – O designado «Conselho de Prevenção de Corrupção»; 3 – Procuradoria-Geral da República (P.G.R.) e o Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal (D.I.A.P.); 4 – Alguns sítios com relevo; 5 – Alguns dos problemas que podem ser colocados em relação à Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção; 5.1 – Âmbito dos problemas a serem falados; 6 – Qual a noção de «empresas que vamos utilizar»?; 6.1 – A noção de «empresa» em sentido geral objectivo e penal; 7 – Mas que tipo de crimes de corrupção vamos falar?; 8 – O art. 11º do Código Penal e os crimes de corrupção no contexto do ordenamento jurídico português; 8.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «em nome da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «no interesse da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «quando não há interesse colectivo»?; 9 – E haverá diferenças, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.)?; 10 – E como é que a Jurisprudência portuguesa, a que tivemos acesso - dado não haver ainda fartura de decisões neste campo -, estabelece o nexo de imputação de responsabilidade penal a uma pessoa colectiva e/ou organização?; 10.1 – Uma primeira pré-conclusão dentro do objectivo que pretendemos demonstrar na totalidade deste trabalho; 11 – Uma segunda pré-conclusão: será que as diferenças acima assinaladas, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.), são as únicas? Veja-se o caso, v.g., do art. 7º do Regime Geral das Infracções Tributárias (R.G.I.T.); 12 – Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma primeira grande conclusão; 13 – Uma (primeira) hipótese de solução; 14 – Que tipo de «empresa» podemos enquadrar no art. 11º do Código Penal?; 14.1 – De acordo com o referido anteriormente, podemos dizer que todas as «empresas» podem praticar os crimes previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.2 – De acordo com o referido antes, quais são as «empresas» que não podem praticar os crimes de corrupção que estão previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.3 – Uma outra pré-conclusão: 14.4 – Um esboço de um dos possíveis problemas; 14.4.1 – Mas, afinal, o que são Entidades Públicas Empresariais (E.P.E.)?; 14.5 – Outra hipótese de esboço de um outro dos possíveis problemas que aqui podemos encontrar; 14.6 – Nova pré-conclusão; 14.7 – Uma outra importante pergunta a fazer e a responder desde já; 14.7.1 - Alarguemos, pois, um pouco a nossa investigação para além do Código Penal português; 14.7.2 – O problema da responsabilidade penal das organizações e/ou «pessoas colectivas», rectius, neste breve ensaio, empresas, pela prática de crimes de corrupção previstos e punidos na mencionada Lei n.º 20/2008, de 21 de Abril («Responsabilidade penal por crimes de corrupção no comércio internacional e na actividade privada»); 14.7.3 – Mais algumas pré-conclusões; 15 - Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma segunda grande conclusão; 16 - O que também apresenta outras implicações como por exemplo na aplicação do crime de «branqueamento» quando nos fala em «corrupção» como «crime primário»; 17 – Outras interrogações; 18 – Conclusão final, mas não última, como nenhuma o pode ser em ciência; 19 – Hipótese de solução. § Abstract: 1 - Introduction: some news media; 2 - The so-called "Council for the Prevention of Corruption”, 3 – “Attorney General's Office” (PGR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Penal Action (DIAP) 4 - Some sites with relief , 5 - Some of the problems that can be placed in relation to the Corporate Responsibility of the Crime of Corruption; 5.1 - Scope of issues to be spoken, 6 - What is the concept of "companies that we will use"?; 6.1 - The term “business” in a general purpose and criminal matters; 7 - What kind of crimes of corruption we talking about?; 8 - Art. 11 of the Penal Code and the crimes of corruption in the context of the Portuguese legal system; 8.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "in the name of the legal person"?; 8.2 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means “in the interests of the legal person"?; 8.2.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "where there is no collective interest"?; 9 - There will be differences, for example, between the operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Legal Infractions Anti-Economic and Against Public Health (RIAECSP)?; 10 - And how does the case law of Portugal, we had access - as there still plenty of decisions in this field - makes a connection of allocating criminal liability to a legal person and / or organization?; 10.1 - A first pre-completion within the objective that we intend to demonstrate in all of this work; 11 - A second pre-conclusion: that the differences will be noted above, for example, between operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Rules of the Offences Against Anti-Economics and Public Health (RIAECSP) are the only ones? Take the case v.g. of art. 7 of the Legal Framework of Tax Offences (RGIT) 12 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, do it here, in this brief essay, a first major conclusion; 13 - A (first) chance for a solution, 14 - What kind “undertaking” we can frame the art. 11 of the Penal Code?; 14.1 - According to the above, we can say that all "companies" can practice the crimes defined and punished in the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.2 - According to the mentioned before, what are the "business" who cannot practice corruption crimes that are planned and punished the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.3 - Another pre-completion: 14.4 - A sketch of one of the possible problems; 14.4.1 - But after all the entities that are Public Enterprise (EPE)?; 14.5 - Another chance to draft another one of the possible problems that can be found here; 14.6 - New pre-completion; 14.7 - Another important question to ask and answer now; 14.7.1 - Let us expand, then, a little beyond our investigation of the Portuguese Penal Code; 14.7.2 - The problem of criminal liability of organizations and / or "legal persons", rectius, this brief essay, companies, for crimes of corruption provided for and punished mentioned in Law No. 20/2008 of 21 April ("Criminal liability for crimes of corruption in international trade and private activities"); 14.7.3 - Some more pre-conclusions; 15 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, let it be here in this brief essay, a second major conclusion, 16 - Who also has other implications such as the application of the crime of "money laundering" when we talk about “corruption” as “primary crime”, 17 - Other questions; 18 - Bottom line, but not last, as the can be no science; 19 - Hypothesis solution. Abstract como no livro.

A Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção: o Caso Português a partir de uma Perspectiva de Direito Penal, mas também de Criminologia

1- Introdução: algumas notícias da comunicação social; 2 – O designado «Conselho de Prevenção de Corrupção»; 3 – Procuradoria-Geral da República (P.G.R.) e o Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal (D.I.A.P.); 4 – Alguns sítios com relevo; 5 – Alguns dos problemas que podem ser colocados em relação à Responsabilidade das Empresas pelo Crime de Corrupção; 5.1 – Âmbito dos problemas a serem falados; 6 – Qual a noção de «empresas que vamos utilizar»?; 6.1 – A noção de «empresa» em sentido geral objectivo e penal; 7 – Mas que tipo de crimes de corrupção vamos falar?; 8 – O art. 11º do Código Penal e os crimes de corrupção no contexto do ordenamento jurídico português; 8.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «em nome da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «no interesse da pessoa colectiva»?; 8.2.1 – No contexto do art. 11º do Código Penal, o que significa «quando não há interesse colectivo»?; 9 – E haverá diferenças, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.)?; 10 – E como é que a Jurisprudência portuguesa, a que tivemos acesso - dado não haver ainda fartura de decisões neste campo -, estabelece o nexo de imputação de responsabilidade penal a uma pessoa colectiva e/ou organização?; 10.1 – Uma primeira pré-conclusão dentro do objectivo que pretendemos demonstrar na totalidade deste trabalho; 11 – Uma segunda pré-conclusão: será que as diferenças acima assinaladas, por exemplo, entre o modo de funcionamento técnico-jurídico do art. 11º do Código Penal e o art. 3º do Regime das Infracções Anti-Económicas e Contra a Saúde Pública (R.I.A.E.C.S.P.), são as únicas? Veja-se o caso, v.g., do art. 7º do Regime Geral das Infracções Tributárias (R.G.I.T.); 12 – Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma primeira grande conclusão; 13 – Uma (primeira) hipótese de solução; 14 – Que tipo de «empresa» podemos enquadrar no art. 11º do Código Penal?; 14.1 – De acordo com o referido anteriormente, podemos dizer que todas as «empresas» podem praticar os crimes previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.2 – De acordo com o referido antes, quais são as «empresas» que não podem praticar os crimes de corrupção que estão previstos e punidos no Código Penal português?; 14.3 – Uma outra pré-conclusão: 14.4 – Um esboço de um dos possíveis problemas; 14.4.1 – Mas, afinal, o que são Entidades Públicas Empresariais (E.P.E.)?; 14.5 – Outra hipótese de esboço de um outro dos possíveis problemas que aqui podemos encontrar; 14.6 – Nova pré-conclusão; 14.7 – Uma outra importante pergunta a fazer e a responder desde já; 14.7.1 - Alarguemos, pois, um pouco a nossa investigação para além do Código Penal português; 14.7.2 – O problema da responsabilidade penal das organizações e/ou «pessoas colectivas», rectius, neste breve ensaio, empresas, pela prática de crimes de corrupção previstos e punidos na mencionada Lei n.º 20/2008, de 21 de Abril («Responsabilidade penal por crimes de corrupção no comércio internacional e na actividade privada»); 14.7.3 – Mais algumas pré-conclusões; 15 - Em face das duas pré-conclusões anteriores, faça-se aqui, neste breve ensaio, uma segunda grande conclusão; 16 - O que também apresenta outras implicações como por exemplo na aplicação do crime de «branqueamento» quando nos fala em «corrupção» como «crime primário»; 17 – Outras interrogações; 18 – Conclusão final, mas não última, como nenhuma o pode ser em ciência; 19 – Hipótese de solução; 20 – Novos desenvolvimentos. § 1 - Introduction: some news media; 2 - The so-called "Council for the Prevention of Corruption”, 3 – “Attorney General's Office” (PGR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Penal Action (DIAP) 4 - Some sites with relief , 5 - Some of the problems that can be placed in relation to the Corporate Responsibility of the Crime of Corruption; 5.1 - Scope of issues to be spoken, 6 - What is the concept of "companies that we will use"?; 6.1 - The term “business” in a general purpose and criminal matters; 7 - What kind of crimes of corruption we talking about?; 8 - Art. 11 of the Penal Code and the crimes of corruption in the context of the Portuguese legal system; 8.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "in the name of the legal person"?; 8.2 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means “in the interests of the legal person"?; 8.2.1 - In the context of art. 11 of the Penal Code, which means "where there is no collective interest"?; 9 - There will be differences, for example, between the operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Legal Infractions Anti-Economic and Against Public Health (RIAECSP)?; 10 - And how does the case law of Portugal, we had access - as there still plenty of decisions in this field - makes a connection of allocating criminal liability to a legal person and / or organization?; 10.1 - A first pre-completion within the objective that we intend to demonstrate in all of this work; 11 - A second pre-conclusion: that the differences will be noted above, for example, between operating mode of the Art. 11 of the Criminal Code and Art. 3 of the Rules of the Offences Against Anti-Economics and Public Health (RIAECSP) are the only ones? Take the case v.g. of art. 7 of the Legal Framework of Tax Offences (RGIT) 12 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, do it here, in this brief essay, a first major conclusion; 13 - A (first) chance for a solution, 14 - What kind “undertaking” we can frame the art. 11 of the Penal Code?; 14.1 - According to the above, we can say that all "companies" can practice the crimes defined and punished in the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.2 - According to the mentioned before, what are the "business" who cannot practice corruption crimes that are planned and punished the Portuguese Penal Code?; 14.3 - Another pre-completion: 14.4 - A sketch of one of the possible problems; 14.4.1 - But after all the entities that are Public Enterprise (EPE)?; 14.5 - Another chance to draft another one of the possible problems that can be found here; 14.6 - New pre-completion; 14.7 - Another important question to ask and answer now; 14.7.1 - Let us expand, then, a little beyond our investigation of the Portuguese Penal Code; 14.7.2 - The problem of criminal liability of organizations and / or "legal persons", rectius, this brief essay, companies, for crimes of corruption provided for and punished mentioned in Law No. 20/2008 of 21 April ("Criminal liability for crimes of corruption in international trade and private activities"); 14.7.3 - Some more pre-conclusions; 15 - In view of the two pre-earlier conclusions, let it be here in this brief essay, a second major conclusion, 16 - Who also has other implications such as the application of the crime of "money laundering" when we talk about “corruption” as “primary crime”, 17 - Other questions; 18 - Bottom line, but not last, as the can be no science; 19 - Hypothesis solution; 20 - New developments.

A technical investigation of an oil painting on copper support, including a study on consolidants for treatment

Paper submitted to e-conservation Journal: Maria Leonor Oliveira, Leslie Carlyle, Sara Fragoso, Isabel Pombo Cardoso and João Coroado, “Investigations into paint delamination and consolidation of an oil painting on copper support”.

DNA evidence collecting in criminal investigation: Portuguese and Thai legal approaches

Doctoral Thesis in Juridical Sciences (Specialty in Public Legal Sciences)

Contributo para a compreensão das causas de exclusão de ilicitude e da culpa no crime de acesso ilegítimo

Dissertação de mestrado em Direito e Informática

A forensic perspective of the AFL investigation into peptides: an antidoping investigation case study.

BACKGROUND: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is introducing enhancements to doping investigations in its 2015 Code, which include improved sharing of information between antidoping organisations (including sporting bodies) and enhanced accountability of athlete support staff. These additions will improve the control of links between sports doping and organised crime. In February 2013 the Australian Crime Commission released a report that linked several professional sporting codes, professional athletes with links to organised crime, performance enhancing drugs and illicit substances. Following this report the Australian Football League (AFL) partnered the Australian national antidoping organisation to investigate peptide use in Australian football. METHODS: This review compared the model proposed by Marclay, a hypothetical model for anti-doping investigations that proposed a forensic intelligence and analysis approach, to use the forensic capabilities of the AFL investigation to test the model's relevance to an actual case. RESULTS: The investigation uncovered the use of peptides used to enhance athlete performance. The AFL investigation found a high risk of doping where athlete support staff existed in teams with weak corporate governance controls. A further finding included the need for the investigation to provide a timely response in professional team sports that were sensitive to the competition timing. In the case of the AFL the team was sanctioned prior to the finals as an interim outcome for allowing the risk of use of performance-enhancing substances. Doping violation charges are still being considered. DISCUSSION: Antidoping strategies should include the investigation of corporate officers in team doping circumstances, the mandatory recording of all athlete substance use during competition and training phases, the wider sharing of forensic intelligence with non-sporting bodies particularly law enforcement and collaboration between antidoping and sporting organisations in doping investigations. CONCLUSIONS: The AFL investigation illustrated the importance of the 2015 WADA Code changes and highlighted the need for a systematic use of broad forensic intelligence activities in the investigation of doping violations.

Iowa Uniform Crime Report, Iowa Department of Public Safety, 1997

In 1974, the 65th Iowa General Assembly enacted a provision of Chapter 749 B of the Code of Iowa requiring law enforcement agencies to submit reports of crime and arrests to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation. The following language now is contained in section 692.15 Code of Iowa concerning Uniform Crime Reports: If it comes to the attention of a sheriff, police department or other law enforcement agency that a public offense has been committed in its jurisdiction, the law enforcement agency shall report information concerning such a public offense to the department on a form to be furnished by the department not more than thirty-five days from the time the public offense first comes to the attention of the law enforcement agency. The reports shall be used to generate crime statistics. The department shall submit statistics to the governor, the general assembly, and the division of criminal and juvenile justice planning of the department of human rights on a quarterly and yearly basis.

Investigation of Restraint Device use in Iowa's County Jail

Executive Summary The use of full-body restraint devices is a widespread practice in Iowa’s county jails. Full-body restraints come in the form of restraint chairs, boards, and beds, including two such devices manufactured in Iowa. Iowa law, which refers to these as four- and fivepoint restraints, states they are only to be used when an inmate is a threat to self, others, or jail security. However, the Ombudsman found they were also used on inmates who caused minor disruptions or in response to an inmate’s verbal abuse. In some cases, the restraints were used on inmates with known mental illness who were acting out, though no attempts were made to seek medical or mental health reviews for those inmates while restrained, leading to extended use of the restraint device.

Iowa Uniform Crime Report, 2004

The National Uniform Crime Reporting System began with 400 cities representing 20 million inhabitants in 43 states on January 1st, 1930. Since the establishment of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, the volume, diversity, and complexity of crime steadily increased while the UCR program remained virtually unchanged. Recognizing the increasing need for more in-depth statistical information and the need to improve the methodology used for compiling, analyzing, auditing, and publishing the collected data, an extensive study of the Uniform Crime reports was undertaken. The objective of this study was to meet law enforcement needs into the 21st century. The result of the study was NIBRS (National Incident Based Reporting System). Adoption of the NIBRS system took place in the mid 1980’s and Iowa began organizational efforts to implement the system. Conversion to IBR (Incident Based Iowa Uniform Crime Reporting) was completed January 1, 1991, as part of a national effort to implement incident based crime reporting, coordinated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice. Iowa was the fifth state in the nation to be accepted as a certified “reporting state” of incident based crime data to the national system.

Iowa Uniform Crime Report, 2005

The National Uniform Crime Reporting System began with 400 cities representing 20 million inhabitants in 43 states on January 1st, 1930. Since the establishment of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, the volume, diversity, and complexity of crime steadily increased while the UCR program remained virtually unchanged. Recognizing the increasing need for more in-depth statistical information and the need to improve the methodology used for compiling, analyzing, auditing, and publishing the collected data, an extensive study of the Uniform Crime reports was undertaken. The objective of this study was to meet law enforcement needs into the 21st century. The result of the study was NIBRS (National Incident Based Reporting System). Adoption of the NIBRS system took place in the mid 1980’s and Iowa began organizational efforts to implement the system. Conversion to IBR (Incident Based Iowa Uniform Crime Reporting) was completed January 1, 1991, as part of a national effort to implement incident based crime reporting, coordinated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice. Iowa was the fifth state in the nation to be accepted as a certified “reporting state” of incident based crime data to the national system.

Iowa Uniform Crime Report, 2006

The National Uniform Crime Reporting System began with 400 cities representing 20 million inhabitants in 43 states on January 1st, 1930. Since the establishment of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, the volume, diversity, and complexity of crime steadily increased while the UCR program remained virtually unchanged. Recognizing the increasing need for more in-depth statistical information and the need to improve the methodology used for compiling, analyzing, auditing, and publishing the collected data, an extensive study of the Uniform Crime reports was undertaken. The objective of this study was to meet law enforcement needs into the 21st century. The result of the study was NIBRS (National Incident Based Reporting System). Adoption of the NIBRS system took place in the mid 1980’s and Iowa began organizational efforts to implement the system. Conversion to IBR (Incident Based Iowa Uniform Crime Reporting) was completed January 1, 1991, as part of a national effort to implement incident based crime reporting, coordinated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice. Iowa was the fifth state in the nation to be accepted as a certified “reporting state” of incident based crime data to the national system.

Iowa Uniform Crime Report, 2007

The National Uniform Crime Reporting System began with 400 cities representing 20 million inhabitants in 43 states on January 1st, 1930. Since the establishment of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, the volume, diversity, and complexity of crime steadily increased while the UCR program remained virtually unchanged. Recognizing the increasing need for more in-depth statistical information and the need to improve the methodology used for compiling, analyzing, auditing, and publishing the collected data, an extensive study of the Uniform Crime reports was undertaken. The objective of this study was to meet law enforcement needs into the 21st century. The result of the study was NIBRS (National Incident Based Reporting System). Adoption of the NIBRS system took place in the mid 1980’s and Iowa began organizational efforts to implement the system. Conversion to IBR (Incident Based Iowa Uniform Crime Reporting) was completed January 1, 1991, as part of a national effort to implement incident based crime reporting, coordinated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice. Iowa was the fifth state in the nation to be accepted as a certified “reporting state” of incident based crime data to the national system.

Iowa Uniform Crime Report, 2008

The National Uniform Crime Reporting System began with 400 cities representing 20 million inhabitants in 43 states on January 1st, 1930. Since the establishment of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, the volume, diversity, and complexity of crime steadily increased while the UCR program remained virtually unchanged. Recognizing the increasing need for more in-depth statistical information and the need to improve the methodology used for compiling, analyzing, auditing, and publishing the collected data, an extensive study of the Uniform Crime reports was undertaken. The objective of this study was to meet law enforcement needs into the 21st century. The result of the study was NIBRS (National Incident Based Reporting System). Adoption of the NIBRS system took place in the mid 1980’s and Iowa began organizational efforts to implement the system. Conversion to IBR (Incident Based Iowa Uniform Crime Reporting) was completed January 1, 1991, as part of a national effort to implement incident based crime reporting, coordinated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice. Iowa was the fifth state in the nation to be accepted as a certified “reporting state” of incident based crime data to the national system.