Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

Where is the credit crunch in Greece? CEPS Commentary, 6 October 2015

Greek policy-makers like to make the point that their economy cannot recover because of a lack of credit and that this affects exports, in particular. Austerity is an easy explanation for the weakness of domestic demand, argues Daniel Gros in this CEPS Commentary, but it is more difficult to see why Greek exports have stagnated in recent years. The author considers the argument that the Greek economy could not recover via export-led growth because of a credit crunch. The overall availability of credit was higher than GDP, and interest rates remained relatively low. There is some indication of a misallocation of bank credit, but the responsibility for any mistakes in this direction must lie squarely with the government and the Troika, given that the Greek banking system has been under government control since 2012.

A Convergence Process in Household Credit in Central and Eastern Europe. ECRI Commentary No. 16, 30 October 2015

The liberalisation of Eastern Europe’s market during the 1990s and the 2004 EU enlargement have had a great impact on the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Indeed, prior to these events, the financial system and household credit markets in CEE were underdeveloped. Nonetheless, it appeared to numerous economists that the development of the CEE financial system and credit markets was following an intensely positive trend, raising the question of sustainability. Many variables impact the level and growth rate of credit; several economists point out that a convergence process might be one of the most important. Using a descriptive statistics approach, it seems likely that a convergence process began during the 1990s, when the CEE countries opened their economies. However, it also seems that the main driver of this household credit convergence process is the GDP per capita convergence process. Indeed, credit to households and GDP per capita have followed broadly similar tendencies over the last 20 years and it has been shown in the literature that they appear to influence each other. The consistency of this potential convergence process is also confirmed by the breakdown of household credit by type and maturity. There is a tendency towards similar household credit markets in Europe. However, it seems that this potential convergence process was slowed down by the financial crisis. Fortunately, the crisis also stabilised the share of loans in foreign currency in CEE countries. This might add more stability to credit markets in Eastern Europe.

Macroeconomic Dynamics of Market Risk Capital Requirements and Credit Supply Interdependence

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. While households with large holdings of securities from stressed Euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) de-crease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Euro area crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Euro area countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. Only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration. Our results are robust to falsification tests, and instrumental variables estimation.

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. We document het- erogeneous responses to these two types of shocks. While households with large holdings of secu- rities from stressed Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) decrease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Eurozone crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Eurozone countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level (caused by bank distress) result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. We also show that only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration, while shocks in retail credit are inconsequential. Our results are robust to falsification tests, propensity score matching techniques, and instrumental variables estimation.

Out of credit: Evaluating the impact of the EU structural funds on Hungarian small business growth and access to finance

Totaling EUR 29 billion, Hungary is in the midst of implementing its largest economic development program in its young democratic history. At the center of the European Union led development program is an effort to revitalize and reequip Hungary’s languishing small and medium sized enterprises (SME), long the country's heart of employment. This paper examines the efficiency and impact of two Structural Fund's instruments to enhance SME development – ECOP 2.1.1 and JEREMIE. A survey of 1275 SME and interviews with dozens of top policy-makers paint a flawed development program in dire need of reform. Despite this, empirical analysis suggests JEREMIE funds may have dampened the effects of the financial crisis and are crucial for the continued liquidity of SME, who have been particularly hit hard by the world financial crisis.

Beyond the crisis: prospects for emerging Europe

This paper assesses the impact of the 2008-09 global financial and economic crisis on the medium-term growth prospects of the countries of central and eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, which began an economic transition about two decades ago. We use crosscountry growth regressions, putting special emphasis on a proper consideration of the crisis and robustness. We find that the crisis has had a major impact on the within-sample fit of the models used and that the positive impact of EU enlargement on growth is smaller than previous research has shown. The crisis has also altered the future growth prospects of the countries studied, even in the optimistic but unrealistic case of a return to pre-crisis capital inflows and credit booms.

A fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózati dinamikájának vizsgálata a likviditási válság előtt és után (Examination of the network dynamics of the uncovered interbank forint markel before the liquidity crisis and after)

A cikkben a magyar fedezetlen bankközi forintpiac hálózatának időbeli alakulását vizsgáljuk 2002 decemberétől 2009 márciusáig. Bemutatjuk a piac általános jellemzőit (forgalom, kamatláb, koncentráció stb.) és az alapvető hálózati mutatókat. Azt tapasztaljuk, hogy az időszak első felében ezek a jellemzők lényegében stabilak voltak. 2006-2007-től kezdve azonban a mutatók egy része kezdett jelentősen megváltozni: a hitelfelvevők koncentrációja nőtt, az átlagos közelség és az átlagos fokszám csökkent, továbbá a hálózat magjának mérete is csökkent. Ezek a jelek arra utalhatnak, hogy a bankok már a válság kitörése előtt érzékelték a növekvő hitelkockázatot, és egyre inkább megválogatták, hogy kinek adnak hitelt. Figyelemre méltó, hogy mindeközben az általános piaci mutatók (forgalom, kamatláb, illetve ezek volatilitása) semmiféle változásra utaló jelet nem tükröztek egészen 2008 októberéig, de ekkor hirtelen minden mutatóban egyértelművé vált a rezsimváltás. Végül részletesen elemezzük az egyes szereplők viselkedését, és megmutatjuk, hogy válságban az egyes szerepek drasztikusan megváltoztak (például forrásokból nyelők lettek, és fordítva). / === / The article examines the changes in the network of Hungary's uncovered interbank forint market over the period Decembcr 2000 to March 2009. It presents the general features of the market (volume, interest rates, concentration etc.) and its basic network. It is found that the features were largely stable in the first half of the period, but some of the indicators began to change significantly in 2006-7: the concentration of borrowers incrcased, average distance and average degree declined, as did the size of the core of the network. These signs pointed to the fact that the banks had sensed an increase in credit risk even before the crisis broke and were becoming increasingly choosy selective in their lending. Meanwhile, however. there aerc no indications of change in the general market indicators (volume, interest rates, or volatility of these) right up to October 2008, when the change of regime was clear in all indicators. Finally, the authors analyse in detail the behaviour of each participant and show that thc roles of some altered drastically with the crisis (e.g. sources became consumers and vice versa).

Válság és hitelderivatívák. A szintetikus fedezett adósságkötelezettségek (CDO-k) árazása és kockázataik (Crisis and loan derivatives. The pricing and risks of synthetic collateralized debt obligations)

A dolgozat első részében röviden áttekintjük a 2007-ben kezdődött pénzügyi válság lefolyását és a válsághoz vezető okokat. A bemutatás során igyekszünk végig a mögöttes folyamatokra és azok mozgatórugóira koncentrálni, ezzel megragadva a válság egyfajta "elméletét". A bemutatásból láthatóvá válik a hitelderivatívák kiemelt szerepe a válság során. A dolgozat második részében az egyik legnépszerűbb hitelderivatív termék, a szintetikus fedezett adósságkötelezettségek (CDO-k) matematikai modellezését és annak problémáit mutatjuk be. Sokak szerint ezek a matematikai modellek okozták - vagy legalábbis felerősítették - a válságot. Az elemzés során megmutatjuk, hogy nemcsak a modellezési eszközök nem voltak megfelelők, hanem az árazás elve sem állta meg a helyét a kockázatsemleges árazási keretben. Ez az eredmény élesen rámutat a mögöttes elméletek válságára. / === / The first part of the paper examines briefly the financial crisis of 2007 and its causes, focusing on its driving processes and key motifs. This shows clearly the importance and centrality of credit derivatives in the crisis. The second part presents a mathematical modelling of one of the most popular credit derivative products: synthetic collateralized debt obligations, along with the drawbacks and problems of the modelling process. It is widely claimed that these products caused or at least precipitated the crises. The authors show not only that the modelling tools were inappropriate, but that the principle for pricing did not match adequately the risk-neutral valuation framework.

Anatomy and lessons of the global financial crisis. Is US consumption financed by Chinese savings?

Savings and investments in the American money market by emerging countries, primarily China, financed the excessive consumption of the United States in the early 2000s, which indirectly led to a global financial crisis. The crisis started from the real estate mortgage market. Such balance disrupting processes began on the American financial market which contradicted all previously known equilibrium theories of every school of economics. Economics has yet to come up with models or empirical theories for this new disequilibrium. This is why the outbreak of the crisis could not be prevented or at least predicted. The question is, to what extent can existing market theories, calculation methods and the latest financial products be held responsible for the new situation. This paper studies the influence of the efficient market and modern portfolio theory, as well as Li’s copula function on the American investment market. Naturally, the issues of moral risks and greed, credit ratings and shareholder control, limited liability and market regulations are aspects, which cannot be ignored. In summary, the author outlines the potential alternative measures that could be applied to prevent a new crisis, defines the new directions of economic research and draws the conclusion for the Hungarian economic policy.

Effects of the current financial and economic crisis on the rural landscape as well as the agri-food sector in Europe and Central Asia

This paper reviews the expected effects of the current financial crisis and subsequent recession on the rural landscape, in particular the agri-food sector in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) on the basis of the structure of the rural economy and of different organisations and institutions. Empirical evidence suggests that the crisis has hit the ECA region the hardest. Agriculture contributes about 9% to gross domestic product (GDP) for the ECA region as a whole with 16% of the population being employed in the agricultural sector. As far as the impact of the financial crisis on the agri-food sector is concerned, there are a few interconnected issues: (1) reduction in income elastic food demand and commodity price decline, (2) loss of employment and earnings of rural people working in urban centres, implying also costly labour reallocation, (3) rising rural poverty originating mainly from lack of opportunities in the non-farm sector and a sizable decline of international remittances, (4) tightening of agricultural credit markets, and the (5) collapse of sectoral government support programs and social safety-net measures in many countries. The paper reveals how the crisis hit farming and broader agri-business differently in general and in the ECA sub-regions.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Can Europe recover without credit?

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.