Asset-backed securities: The key to unlocking Europe's credit markets? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/07, 24 July 2014

The European market for asset-backed securities (ABS) has all but closed for business since the start of the economic and financial crisis. ABS (see Box 1) were in fact the first financial assets hit at the onset of the crisis in 2008. The subprime mortgage meltdown caused a deterioration in the quality of collateral in the ABS market in the United States, which in turn dried up overall liquidity because ABS AAA notes were popular collateral for inter-bank lending. The lack of demand for these products, together with the Great Recession in 2009, had a considerable negative impact on the European ABS market. The post-crisis regulatory environment has further undermined the market. The practice of slicing and dicing of loans into ABS packages was blamed for starting and spreading the crisis through the global financial system. Regulation in the post-crisis context has thus been relatively unfavourable to these types of instruments, with heightened capital requirements now necessary for the issuance of new ABS products. And yet policymakers have recently underlined the need to revitalise the ABS market as a tool to improve credit market conditions in the euro area and to enhance transmission of monetary policy. In particular, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have jointly emphasised that: “a market for prudently designed ABS has the potential to improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy and to allow for better risk sharing... by transforming relatively illiquid assets into more liquid securities. These can then be sold to investors thereby allowing originators to obtain funding and, potentially, transfer part of the underlying risk, while investors in such securities can diversify their portfolios... . This can lead to lower costs of capital, higher economic growth and a broader distribution of risk” (ECB and Bank of England, 2014a). In addition, consideration has started to be given to the extent to which ABS products could become the target of explicit monetary policy operations, a line of action proposed by Claeys et al (2014). The ECB has officially announced the start of preparatory work related to possible outright purchases of selected ABS1. In this paper we discuss how a revamped market for corporate loans securitised via ABS products, and how use of ABS as a monetary policy instrument, can indeed play a role in revitalising Europe’s credit market. However, before using this instrument a number of issues should be addressed: First, the European ABS market has significantly contracted since the crisis. Hence it needs to be revamped through appropriate regulation if securitisation is to play a role in improving the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy. Second, even assuming that this market can expand again, the European ABS market is heterogeneous: lending criteria are different in different countries and banking institutions and the rating methodologies to assess the quality of the borrowers have to take these differences into account. One further element of differentiation is default law, which is specific to national jurisdictions in the euro area. Therefore, the pool of loans will not only be different in terms of the macro risks related to each country of origination (which is a ‘positive’ idiosyncratic risk, because it enables a portfolio manager to differentiate), but also in terms of the normative side, in case of default. The latter introduces uncertainties and inefficiencies in the ABS market that could create arbitrage opportunities. It is also unclear to what extent a direct purchase of these securities by the ECB might have an impact on the credit market. This will depend on, for example, the type of securities targeted in terms of the underlying assets that would be considered as eligible for inclusion (such as loans to small and medium-sized companies, car loans, leases, residential and commercial mortgages). The timing of a possible move by the ECB is also an issue; immediate action would take place in the context of relatively limited market volumes, while if the ECB waits, it might have access to a larger market, provided steps are taken in the next few months to revamp the market. We start by discussing the first of these issues – the size of the EU ABS market. We estimate how much this market could be worth if some specific measures are implemented. We then discuss the different options available to the ECB should they decide to intervene in the EU ABS market. We include a preliminary list of regulatory steps that could be taken to homogenise asset-backed securities in the euro area. We conclude with our recommended course of action.

Macroeconomic Dynamics of Market Risk Capital Requirements and Credit Supply Interdependence

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Default Invariance: Naïve Category of Law and Finance

Default invariance is the idea that default does not change at any scale of law and finance. Default is a conserved quantity in a universe where fundamental principles of law and finance operate. It exists at the micro-level as part of the fundamental structure of every financial transaction, and at the macro- level, as a fixed critical point within the relatively stable phases of the law and finance cycle. A key point is that default is equivalent to maximizing uncertainty at the micro-level and at the macro-level, is equivalent to the phase transition where unbearable fluctuations occur in all forms of risk transformation, including maturity, liquidity and credit. As such, default invariance is the glue that links the micro and macro structures of law and finance. In this essay, we apply naïve category theory (NCT), a type of mapping logic, to these types of phenomena. The purpose of using NCT is to introduce a rigorous (but simple) mathematical methodology to law and finance discourse and to show that these types of structural considerations are of prime practical importance and significance to law and finance practitioners. These mappings imply a number of novel areas of investigation. From the micro- structure, three macro-approximations are implied. These approximations form the core analytical framework which we will use to examine the phenomena and hypothesize rules governing law and finance. Our observations from these approximations are grouped into five findings. While the entirety of the five findings can be encapsulated by the three approximations, since the intended audience of this paper is the non-specialist in law, finance and category theory, for ease of access we will illustrate the use of the mappings with relatively common concepts drawn from law and finance, focusing especially on financial contracts, derivatives, Shadow Banking, credit rating agencies and credit crises.

Credit risk & forward price models

Doutoramento em Gestão

Risk premiumin the global creditMarkets: 2006-2012

¿What have we learnt from the 2006-2012 crisis, including events such as the subprime crisis, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers or the European sovereign debt crisis, among others? It is usually assumed that in firms that have a CDS quotation, this CDS is the key factor in establishing the credit premiumrisk for a new financial asset. Thus, the CDS is a key element for any investor in taking relative value opportunities across a firm’s capital structure. In the first chapter we study the most relevant aspects of the microstructure of the CDS market in terms of pricing, to have a clear idea of how this market works. We consider that such an analysis is a necessary point for establishing a solid base for the rest of the chapters in order to carry out the different empirical studies we perform. In its document “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”, Basel sets the requirement of a capital charge for credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk in the trading book and its methodology for the computation for the capital requirement. This regulatory requirement has added extra pressure for in-depth knowledge of the CDS market and this motivates the analysis performed in this thesis. The problem arises in estimating of the credit risk premium for those counterparties without a directly quoted CDS in the market. How can we estimate the credit spread for an issuer without CDS? In addition to this, given the high volatility period in the credit market in the last few years and, in particular, after the default of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, we observe the presence of big outliers in the distribution of credit spread in the different combinations of rating, industry and region. After an exhaustive analysis of the results from the different models studied, we have reached the following conclusions. It is clear that hierarchical regression models fit the data much better than those of non-hierarchical regression. Furthermore,we generally prefer the median model (50%-quantile regression) to the mean model (standard OLS regression) due to its robustness when assigning the price to a new credit asset without spread,minimizing the “inversion problem”. Finally, an additional fundamental reason to prefer the median model is the typical "right skewness" distribution of CDS spreads...

Protecting the most vulnerable in consumer credit transactions

There are two key ways in which the Australian Uniform Consumer Credit Code seeks to protect consumers in relation to consumer credit transactions. The first is by means of disclosure regulation where information is required to be disclosed to the consumer before the credit contract is entered into and the second is by way of “safety net” provisions, where contracts can be varied or set aside in the event of hardship, a finding that the transaction was unjust, or a finding of unconscionable fees or charges. This article explores the limitations of both of these means of protection, particularly in the case of vulnerable, low-income consumers. In order to highlight the inadequacies of these forms of consumer protection and the need for regulatory reform, we draw on interviews conducted with 30 low-income consumers who had recently signed a credit contract, focusing on their understanding of information disclosed in the contract, as well as their responses to hypothetical unfair terms and their understanding of their rights, for example in the event of an unjust transaction. These interviews were conducted as part of a joint research project between Brotherhood of St Laurence and Griffith University’s Centre for Credit and Consumer Law, funded by Consumer Affairs Victoria.

National consumer credit laws, financial exclusion and interest rate caps : The case for diversity within a centralised framework

Australia is going through a major reform of consumer credit regulation, with the implementation of a proposal to transfer regulatory responsibility from the State and Territory Governments to the Commonwealth Government. While the broad policy approach is supported, the reform process has missed a significant opportunity to engage directly with issues of financial exclusion and with the potential role of regulation to reduce financial exclusion. The imposition of an interest rate cap can limit the impact of financial exclusion. However, the future of the existing interest rate caps is uncertain, given the diversity of approaches, and the heated debate that surrounds this issue. In the absence of support for regulatory initiatives to increase the availability of low cost, small loans, permitting regulatory diversity on this issue of interest rate caps, within an otherwise centralised regulatory framework., can minimise the impact of financial exclusion on consumers.

Preventing consumer credit over-commitment and irresponsible lending in Australia

Mirroring the trends in other developed countries, levels of household debt in Australia have risen markedly in recent years. As one example, the total amount lent by banks to individuals has risen from $175.5 billion in August 1995 to $590.5 billion in August 2005.1 Consumer groups an~ media commentators here have long raised concerns about the risks of increasing levels of household debt and over-commitment, linking these issues at least in part to irresponsible lending practices. And more recently, the Reserve Bank Governor has also expressed concerns about the ability 'of some households to manage if personal or economic circumstances change.2

The appropriateness of default investment options in defined contribution plans : Australian evidence

For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising investment choice, plan contributions are invested following the default investment option of their respective plans. Since default investment options of different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most important determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these options face significantly different wealth outcomes at retirement. This paper simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC plans. We find that strategies with low or moderate allocation to stocks are consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the participant’s wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of falling below that target outcome by aggressive strategies whose allocation to stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our evidence suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to be nominated as default investment options in DC plans unless plan providers emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy of retirement wealth.

Don’t judge a superannuation default investment option by its name

With the massive decline in savings arising from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it is timely to review superannuation fund investment and disclosure strategies in the lead-up to the crisis. Accordingly, this study examines differences among superannuation funds’ default investment options in terms of naming and framing over three years from 2005 to 2007, as presented in product disclosure statements (PDSs). The findings indicate that default options are becoming more alike regardless of their name, and consequently, members may face increasing difficulties in distinguishing between balanced and growth-named default options when comparing them across superannuation funds. Comparability is also likely to be constrained by variations in the framing of default options presented in investment option menus in PDSs. These findings highlight the need for standardisation of default option definitions and disclosures to ensure descriptive accuracy, transparency and comparability.

Is providing micro-credit social responsible?

Micro-finance, which includes micro-credit as one it its services, has become big business with a range of models – from those that operate on a strictly business basis to those who come from a philanthropic base, through Non Government organisations (NGOs). Success is often measured by the numbers involved and the repayment rates – which are very high, largely because of the lending models used. The purpose of this paper is to identify whether the means used to deliver micro-credit services to the poor are socially responsible. This paper will explore the range of models currently used and propose a model that addresses some of the social responsibility issues that appear to plague delivery. The model is being developed in Beira, the second largest city in Mozambique. Mozambique exhibits many of the characteristics found in other African countries, so the model, if successful, may have implications for other poor African nations.