Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China

Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.

Molecular keys to speciation: DNA polymorphism and the control of genetic exchange in enterobacteria

Speciation involves the establishment of genetic barriers between closely related organisms. The extent of genetic recombination is a key determinant and a measure of genetic isolation. The results reported here reveal that genetic barriers can be established, eliminated, or modified by manipulating two systems which control genetic recombination, SOS and mismatch repair. The extent of genetic isolation between enterobacteria is a simple mathematical function of DNA sequence divergence. The function does not depend on hybrid DNA stability, but rather on the number of blocks of sequences identical in the two mating partners and sufficiently large to allow the initiation of recombination. Further, there is no obvious discontinuity in the function that could be used to define a level of divergence for distinguishing species.

Intergenerational Transfer of Family Firm Control: Discount Expectations of Potential Successors

Building on institutional theory and family sociology literature we explore the logics that underlie the formation of transaction price expectations related to the intergenerational transfer of corporate ownership in private family firms. By probing a sample of 3'487 students with family business background from 20 countries we show that next generation family members expect to receive a 56.58% discount in comparison to some nonfamily buyer (i.e. the family discount) when taking over the parent's firm. We also show that the logic underlying the formation of family discount expectations is characterized by parental altruism, filial reciprocity, filial decency and parental inducement. These norms embrace both the family and market logics and accommodate the duties and demands of children and parents in determining a fair transfer price. These findings are important for institutional theory as well as for family business and entrepreneurial exit literatures.

Mitochondrial control region diversity of the houbara bustard Chlamydotis undulata complex and genetic structure along the Atlantic seaboard of North Africa

The houbara bustard, Chlamydotis undulata, is a declining cryptic desert bird whose range extends from North Africa to Central Asia. Three subspecies are currently recognized by geographical distribution and morphology: C.u.fuertaventurae, C.u.undulata and C.u.macqueenii. We have sequenced 854 bp of mitochondrial control region from 73 birds to describe their population genetic structure with a particular sampling focus on the connectivity between C.u.fuertaventurae and C.u.undulata along the Atlantic seaboard of North Africa. Nucleotide and haplotypic diversity varied among the subspecies being highest in C.u.undulata, lowest in C.u.fuertaventurae and intermediate in C.u.macqueenii. C.u.fuertaventurae and C.u.undulata are paraphyletic and an average nucleotide divergence of 2.08% splits the later from C.u.macqueenii. We estimate that C.u.fuertaventurae and C.u.undulata split from C.u.macqueenii approximately 430 000 years ago. C.u.fuertaventurae and C.u.undulata are weakly differentiated (F-ST = 0.27, N-m = 1.3), indicative of a recent shared history. Archaeological evidence indicates that houbara bustards have been present on the Canary Islands for 130-170 000 years. However, our genetic data point to a more recent separation of C.u.fuertaventurae and C.u.undulata at around 20-25 000 years. Concordant archaeological, climatic opportunities for colonization and genetic data point to a scenario of: (i) initial colonization of the Canary Islands about 130 000 years ago; (ii) a period of secondary contact 19-30 000 years ago homogenizing any pre-existing genetic structure followed by; (iii) a period of relative isolation that persists today.

The role of the board in firm strategy: Integrating agency and organisational control perspectives

The role of the board of directors in firm strategy has long been the subject of debate. However, research efforts have suffered from several deficiencies: the lack of an overarching theoretical perspective, reliance on proxies for the strategy role rather than a direct measure of it and the lack of quantitative data linking this role to firm financial performance. We propose a new theoretical perspective to explain the board's role in strategy, integrating organisational control and agency theories. We categorise a board's approach to strategy according to two constructs: strategic control and financial control. The extent to which either construct is favoured depends on contextual factors such as board power, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry.

How does ownership structure affect capital structure and firm value?:Recent evidence from East Asia

The present paper examines the effects of ownership structures on capital structure and firm valuation. It argues that the effects of separation of control from cash flow rights on capital structure and firm value also depend on the separation of control from management as well as on legal rules and enforcement defining investors' protection. We obtain firm-level panel data (three stage least squares, 3SLS) estimates from four of the East Asian countries worst affected by the last crisis. There is evidence that the general wisdom that higher control than cash flow rights may lower firm value may be reversed among owner-managed family firms in the sample countries. © 2007 The Authors Journal compilation © 2007 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Privatisation, state ownership and productivity:evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between the transfer of ownership between the public and private sectors of Chinese industry, and its impacts on performance. We link ownership changes to productivity growth, and demonstrate that privatisation contributes significantly. We offer an extension that is generally ignored in the literature, in looking at firms that are taken back into state ownership, and evaluating the productivity growth effects of this. Further, we highlight the well-understood simultaneity problems, and demonstrate the hazard of ignoring the issue by comparing various estimators, including the modified control function approach. In general, the results stress the importance of allowing for such endogeneity when evaluating the productivity effects of ownership change.

Enabling innovation:knowledge control, sharing and coordination boundaries in UK and German manufacturing

We investigate how boundaries in knowledge control, sharing and co-ordination influence UK and German manufacturing firms’ innovation intensity (an indicator of the volume of product change) and product life (an indicator of the pace of generational change). In general UK plants more commonly face knowledge control boundaries related to plant ownership or control, while German plants more commonly face boundaries related to knowledge sharing and knowledge co-ordination between functional groups. Our empirical results emphasise the importance of the strategic management of innovation. Knowledge control boundaries – related to external ownership, group membership and decision making autonomy – have a weak negative influence on plants’ innovation outcomes. Strategic decisions relating to multifunctional working and networking are found to be more important in overcoming knowledge sharing and co-ordination boundaries. Knowledge sharing boundaries, related to plant or company boundaries, prove most important where a plant has no in-house R&D capability. Knowledge co-ordination boundaries related to functional or multi-functional working have strong but differential effects on different innovation output measures: functional boundaries increase product life in both countries, and in Germany maintaining functional boundaries is also associated with increased innovation intensity.

Institutions and firm ownership structure:evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

FDI plays a key role in development, particularly in resource-constrained transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe with relatively low savings rates. Gains from technology transfer play a critical role in motivating FDI, yet potential for it may be hampered by a large technology gap between the source and host country. While the extent of this gap has traditionally been attributed to education, skills and capital intensity, recent literature has also emphasized the possible role of institutional environment in this respect. Despite tremendous interest among policy-makers and academics to understand the factors attracting FDI (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2003) our knowledge about the effects of institutions on the location choice and ownership structure of foreign firms remains limited. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining the link between institutions and foreign ownership structures. To the best of our knowledge, Javorcik (2004) is the only papers, which use firm-level data to analyse the role of institutional quality on an outward investor’s entry mode in transition countries. Our paper extends Javorcik (2004) in a number of ways: (a) rather than a cross-section, we use panel data for the period 1997-2006; (b) rather than a binary variable, we use the percentage foreign ownership as continuous variable; (c) we consider multi-dimensional institutional variables, such as corruption, intellectual property rights protection and government stability. We also use factor analysis to generate a composite index of institutional quality and see how stronger institutional environment could affect foreign ownership; (d) we explore how the distance between institutional environment in source and host countries affect foreign ownership in a host country. The firm-level data used includes both domestic and foreign firms for the period 1997-2006 and is drawn from ORBIS, a commercially available dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk. In order to examine the link between institutions and foreign ownership structures, we estimate four log-linear ownership equations/specifications augmented by institutional and other control variables. We find evidence that the decision of a foreign firm to either locate its subsidiary or acquire an existing domestic firm depends not only on factor cost differences but also on differences in institutional environment between the host and source countries.

Differences between theoretical predictions and operational performance in a stock control application

Over the past decade, several experienced Operational Researchers have advanced the view that the theoretical aspects of model building have raced ahead of the ability of people to use them. Consequently, the impact of Operational Research on commercial organisations and the public sector is limited, and many systems fail to achieve their anticipated benefits in full. The primary objective of this study is to examine a complex interactive Stock Control system, and identify the reasons for the differences between the theoretical expectations and the operational performance. The methodology used is to hypothesise all the possible factors which could cause a divergence between theory and practice, and to evaluate numerically the effect each of these factors has on two main control indices - Service Level and Average Stock Value. Both analytical and empirical methods are used, and simulation is employed extensively. The factors are divided into two main categories for analysis - theoretical imperfections in the model, and the usage of the system by Buyers. No evidence could be found in the literature of any previous attempts to place the differences between theory and practice in a system in quantitative perspective nor, more specifically, to study the effects of Buyer/computer interaction in a Stock Control system. The study reveals that, in general, the human factors influencing performance are of a much higher order of magnitude than the theoretical factors, thus providing objective evidence to support the original premise. The most important finding is that, by judicious intervention into an automatic stock control algorithm, it is possible for Buyers to produce results which not only attain but surpass the algorithmic predictions. However, the complexity and behavioural recalcitrance of these systems are such that an innately numerate, enquiring type of Buyer needs to be inducted to realise the performance potential of the overall man/computer system.

'Family' ownership, tunnelling and earnings management:a review of the literature

In this review paper, we bring together a number of aspects of family firms that are ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and the incentives of the families in control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. We examine the role of earnings management in facilitating tunnelling, and evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the empirical exercises are undertaken are relatively few, and hence there is considerable opportunity to expand it to other contexts, in particular in the form of cross-country comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues.

Does ownership always matter? Evidence from the Indian banking industry

Existing empirical evidence on the ownership-performance issue is weighted towards the property rights hypothesis that private enterprises are superior to public enterprises. However, very few studies examine a developing country in which the strong link between the market for corporate control and the efficiency of private enterprises assumed by the property rights hypothesis may not be satisfied. Our study of the Indian banking industry confirms our expectation that, in the absence of well-functioning capital markets, there may not be significant differences in the performance of private and public enterprises. Our analysis highlights the importance of creating appropriate institutions prior to pursuing privatization in developing countries.

Ownership structure and investment finance in transition economies:a survey of evidence from large firms in Hungary and Poland

Using survey data on 157 large private Hungarian and Polish companies this paper investigates links between ownership structures and CEOs’ expectations with regard to sources of finance for investment. The Bayesian estimation is used to deal with the small sample restrictions, while classical methods provide robustness checks. We found a hump-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and expectations of relying on public equity. The latter is most likely for firms where the largest investor owns between 25 percent and 49 percent of shares, just below the legal control threshold. More profitable firms rely on retained earnings for their investment finance, consistent with the ‘pecking order’ theory of financing. Finally, firms for which the largest shareholder is a domestic institutional investor are more likely to borrow from domestic banks.

Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth:evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996-2002

Using data on Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change. Privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth; in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Being privatised has a positive impact on employment but this is concentrated within a range of 3–6 years after privatisation. There are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. Employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is affected by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints.

Privatisation, corporate control and employment growth:evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996-2002

Using panel data on large Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change during the period 1996-2002. We find that privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth and that, in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Interestingly, we find that being privatised has a positive impact on employment growth but that this impact is concentrated within a range of three to six years after privatisation. In contrast with the findings of earlier literature, we find evidence that there are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. On the other hand, employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these combined results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is constrained by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints. Consistent with this, we find that privatised companies, three to six years post-privatisation, are the firms for whom employment is most responsive to positive sales growth and as such, offer the best hope for rapid labour market expansion.