exploring the differences of CSR and CSE activities on consumer attributions and responses

The following directed research project analyzes how different sustainability efforts of an organization influence consumers’ responses in an industry, which faces high controversy. The study tested shows how two different high fit sustainability endeavors, namely high fit Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities and Corporate Social Entrepreneurship (CSE), affect the way consumers’ attributions are being made with regard to the company’s motive. With data gathered from surveying 156 participants, the study provides evidence that CSR as well as CSE programs stimulate values-driven attributions which positively affect consumers’ trust, corporate reputation and corporate image. Lastly, theoretical and managerial implications of the study are discussed and future research suggestions provided.

Speech, Language and Communication Therapy Action Plan (2011/12 - 2012/13) - Easy Read (PDF 454 KB)

Easy Read version of Speech, Language and Communication Therapy Action Plan (2011/12 - 2012/13)

Explanatory Note on the General Scheme of the Further Education and Training Authority (SOLAS) Bill 2012

1. Interpretation. The purpose of this provision is set out some commonly used terms to be used in the Bill. 2. Establishment day. The purpose of this provision is to require the Minister to specify a day as the establishment day for the purposes of the Bill. This will be the day on which the new authority, to be known as SOLAS, will come into existence. 3. Establishment of SOLAS. The purpose of this head is to provide for the formal establishment of SOLAS and to define its status as a corporate body with the usual consequent powers. 4. Functions of SOLAS. The purpose of this head is to set down the statutory functions of the new further education and training authority. SOLAS is to have overall strategic responsibility for the provision of further education and training in the country. It will be responsible for deciding what further education and training programmes are provided. A core part of its role will be to ensure the referral of jobseekers to appropriate courses which may be delivered by VECs or by other, including private, providers. It will provide the funding stream to VECS and those other bodies for the provision of this training.

General Scheme of a Further Education and Training Authority (SOLAS) Bill 2012

General Scheme of a Further Education and Training Authority (SOLAS) Bill 2012. Provided by the Department of Education and Skills, Ireland.

Social Policy Preferences and Party Choice in the 2011 Swiss Elections

To what extent do social policy preferences explain party choice? This question has received little attention over the past years, because the bulk of the literature has argued that electoral choice is increasingly shaped by identity-based attitudes, rather than by preferences for economic-distributive social policies. We argue that in the wake of this debate, the significance of social policy preferences for electoral choice has been underestimated, because most contributions neglect social policy debates that are specific to post-industrial societies. In particular, they merely focus on income redistribution, while neglecting distributive conflicts around social investment. The Selects 2011 data allows investigating this crucial distinction for Switzerland. Our empirical analyses confirm that it is pivotal to take the pluridimensionality of distributive conflicts seriously: when looking at preferences for social investment rather than income redistribution, we find that social policy preferences are significant explanatory factors for the choice of the five major Swiss political parties.

Managing Quality under Heterogeneous Consumer Demand and Product Quality, October 2005

Based on accepted advances in the marketing, economics, consumer behavior, and satisfaction literatures, we develop a micro-foundations model of a firm that needs to manage the quality of a product that is inherently heterogeneous in the presence of varying customer tastes or expectations for quality. Our model blends elements of the returns to quality, customer lifetime value, and service profit chain approaches to marketing. The model is then used to explain several empirical results pertaining to the marketing literature by explicitly articulating the trade-offs between customer satisfaction and costs (including opportunity costs) of quality. In this environment firms will find it optimal to allow some customers to go unsatisfied. We show that the relationship between the expected number of repeated purchases by an individual customer is endogenous to the choice of quality by the firm, indicating that the number of purchases cannot be chosen freely to estimate a customer’s lifetime value.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals, Strategic Plan 2008-2011, 2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals, goals and mission.

Secure and Prepared Newsletter, January 14, 2011, Vol. 7, no. 1

A bi-weekly newsletter for those involved in the fields of homeland security and/or emergency management

Secure and Prepared Newsletter, January 28, 2011, Vol. 7, no. 2

A bi-weekly newsletter for those involved in the fields of homeland security and/or emergency management

Secure and Prepared Newsletter, February 11, 2011, Vol. 7, no. 3

A bi-weekly newsletter for those involved in the fields of homeland security and/or emergency management

Secure and Prepared Newsletter, February 25, 2011, Vol. 7, no. 4

A bi-weekly newsletter for those involved in the fields of homeland security and/or emergency management