The German Federal Constitutional Court's Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) - Another Step Towards National Closure?

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruling of 14 January 2014 deserves a thorough evaluation on several accounts: It is the first ever reference by the FCC to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it represents a continuation of FCC case law aimed at restricting the impact of European Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justices of the European Union (CJEU) on German law as well as questioning Germany’s participation in an ever closer European Union, and it has the potential to dictate the future course of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

This case note discusses three aspects of this decision. First, it considers the aims of challenging the youngest measures to contain the euro currency crisis before the FCC, focusing on the question in how far the claims are based on national closure as opposed to an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe. Secondly it analyzes in how far the aims the claims pursue are reflected in the FCC’s response. Thirdly, it considers the substantive relevance of this reference, highlighting the surprisingly vague consequences the FCC envisages should the CJEU not re-interpret the OMT decision as the FCC suggests, and illuminating the strategic aims of the reference without deference. In conclusion, it sketches the remaining scope for the EU to engage in or at least facilitate transnational solidarity.

Speaking with One Voice?: Ethno-national Division on the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

The challenge of designing institutions to manage ethno-national conflict is one of the enduring concerns of political science. One important but relatively understudied aspect of this challenge is the design of constitutional courts. Courts are likely to play a key role in the maintenence of a constitutional settlement. But this role can be especially onerous in a deeply divided and post-conflict setting where the rule of law is weak and judges have ethno-national affiliations that may undermine the appearance of judicial neutrality. In such contexts, a court’s authority (including compliance with its decisions) cannot be taken for granted.

With reference the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and using an original dataset of the Court's non-unanimous plenary decisions, we test several hypotheses about the degree to which ethno-national affiliation influences judicial behavior. We find that (1) judges on the Constitutional Court do in fact divide predictably along ethno-national lines, (2) that these patterns are robust to changes in the tenure system, and (3) are independent of party political background.

Constitutional Principles and Horizontal Effects: Kücükdeveci revisited

While German labour lawyers were still awaiting the German Constitutional Court’s final verdict on the principles established by the Mangold case, the Court of Justice of the European Union re-visited the question what exactly are the effects of Directive 2000/78 and the constitutional principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. This article analyses the constitutional relevance of this case in two respects. First, it argues that the Court has accepted neither direct horizontal effects of directives nor direct effects of constitutional principles, but rather - much more cautiously - reiterated the rule that directives on constitutional principles such as non-discrimination can exclude the application of national legislation in horizontal cases. The article also demonstrates that this cautious approach has succeeded in convincing the German Constitutional Court that the Mangold judgment was not ultra vires. Consequently, the claim challenging that judgment was dismissed and a constitutional crisis avoided.

Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive’s governing legitimacy. Inspired by Tilly (1984), we compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular configurations of assigned decision-making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies the elected government of Ireland’s parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e. democratic) legitimacy while the executive government of Hong Kong’s administrative state favors output (i.e. performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.

Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster: Constitutional Conundrums and Political Manoeuvres

This article focuses on the issue of Northern Ireland's representation at Westminster. It investigates the political context of the decision to increase Northern Ireland's representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 members to 17 in 1978-9. Exploring this episode in more detail, it is argued, provides a more informed overall understanding of the history of devolution in the UK and of the way issues concerning Northern Ireland often overlapped with questions of constitutional change in Scotland and Wales. The article also throws light on the matter of Northern Ireland MPs and their voting rights at Westminster during Northern Ireland's experience of devolution prior to 1972.

Constitutional Questions

Constitutional Questions
Professor John Morison MRIA School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast
How should we live together? Is there any ethical question more fundamental than this?
Is a constitution only about who does what in government or is it about what is to be done? Does a constitution provide the ground rules for deciding this or is it part of the answer itself? Is it the repository of fundamental values about how to live? What is the good life anyway? Is it about the preservation of life and liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Or something more? What about preserving (or radically reordering) the distribution of property? Or ensuring that everyone has the same chances? Is it the job of the constitution to simply promise dignity, equality and freedom, or to deliver these values?
If the constitution is the place where the state undertakes “to promote the welfare of the whole people”, what does this actually mean in practical terms? And who pays for it? Should a constitution give us an entitlement to at least a basic minimum by way of a lifestyle? Or is it the job only of the political process to decide issues about the allocation of resources? What do we do if we feel that we cannot trust our politicians? Are there basic rules that should govern the operation of politics and are there fundamental values that should not be overridden? Are these “sacred and undeniable”? Or to be interpreted in line with modern conditions and within a “margin of appreciation”? Who decides on this in individual cases?
Who is entitled to any of this, and on what basis? Is everyone equal? Is the constitution about making it clear that no-one is better than you, and that in turn, you are better than no-one? Is a constitution about ensuring that you will always be an end in yourself and never simply a means to anyone else’s end? Or does it simply reinforce the existing distribution of power and wealth?
Are citizens to be given more than those who are not citizens? Is more to be expected from them, and what might that be? Can the constitution tell us how we should treat those from outside who now live with us?
What is the relationship between a constitution and a nation? Who is in the nation anyway? Should we talk about “we the people” or “we the peoples”? Should a constitution confirm a nationality or facilitate diversity? Is the constitution the place to declare aspirations for a national territory? Or to confirm support for the idea of consent? What about all our neighbours – on the island of Ireland and in Great Britain? Or in Europe? And beyond?
What is the relationship between a constitution and democracy? Is a constitution simply the rules by which the powerful govern the powerless? In what sense does a constitution belong to everyone, across past, present and future generations? Is it the place where we state common values? Are there any? Do they change across time? Should the people be asked about changes they may want? How often should this be done? Should the constitution address the past and its problems? How might this be done? What do we owe future generations?
Finally, if we can agree that the constitution is about respecting human rights, striving for social justice and building a fair and democratic Ireland – North and South – how do we make it happen in practice?

Dignity and the Challenge to Liberty :Reading Andras Sajo's Constitutional Sentiments

This paper considers debates about the anti-liberal tendencies of the concept of “human dignity”, in particular those conceptions that are “expressivist”. My aim is to examine how far conceptions of dignity are expressivist, and if so what problems the concept of dignity understood in this way poses for liberty. I consider concerns about dignity’s potential illiberality, in particular the potential illiberality of respect-based conceptions of dignity, in the context of Professor András Sajó’s recent writing, illustrating the discussion with examples drawn from recent judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding freedom of speech.

Severe aplastic anaemia in association with a unique constitutional translocation 46,XY,t(6;10)(q13;q22)c

Severe aplastic anaemia (SAA) is an uncommon disorder which may be associated with several congenital syndromes. However, it has rarely been described in association with a constitutional karyotypic abnormality. The breakpoint of the balanced t(6:10)(q13:q22) translocation described here does not disrupt any currently recognized gene of haemopoietic or stromal importance. This report also highlights the problems inherent in the use of bone marrow transplantation (BMT) for treating multiply transfused aplastic anaemia patients.

Presidential power and congressional acquiescence in the "war" on terrorism: a new constitutional equilibrium?

US presidents have expanded executive power in times of war and emergency,sometimes aggressively so. This article builds on the application of punctuated equilibria theory by Burnham (1999 and Ackerman (1999). Underpinning this theory is the notion that rapid changes in - or external shocks to - domestic and international society impose new and insistent demands on the state. In so doing, they produce important and decisive moments of institutional mobilization and creativity, disrupt a pre-existing, relatively stable, equilibrium between the Congress and the president, and precipitate decisions or nondecisions by the electorate and political leaders that define the contours for action when the next crisis or external shock occurs. The article suggests that the combination of President George W. Bush's presidentialist doctrine, 9/11 and the 'war' on terror has consolidated a new, constitutional equilibrium. While some members of Congress contest the new order, the Congress collectively has acquiesced in its own marginalization. The article surveys a wide range of executive power assertions and legislative retreats. It argues that power assertions generally draw on precedent: on, for example, a tradition of wartime presidential extraconstitutional leadership extending to presidents, such as John Adams and Abraham Lincoln,as well as to Cold War and post-Cold War presidentialism.