What is the Point of Copyright History?:Reflections on Copyright at Common law in 1774 by H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui

Copyright history has long been a subject of intense and contested enquiry. Historical narratives about the early development of copyright were first prominently mobilised in eighteenth century British legal discourse, during the so-called Battle of the Booksellers between Scottish and London publishers. The two landmark copyright decisions of that time – Millar v. Taylor (1769) and Donaldson v. Becket (1774) – continue to provoke debate today. The orthodox reading of Millar and Donaldson presents copyright as a natural proprietary right at common law inherent in authors. Revisionist accounts dispute that traditional analysis. These conflicting perspectives have, once again, become the subject of critical scrutiny with the publication of Copyright at Common Law in 1774 by Prof Tomas Gomez-Arostegui in 2014, in the Connecticut Law Review ((2014) 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1) and as a CREATe Working Paper (No. 2014/16, 3 November 2014).

Taking Prof Gomez-Arostegui’s extraordinary work in this area as a point of departure, Dr Elena Cooper and Professor Ronan Deazley (then both academics at CREATe) organised an event, held at the University of Glasgow on 26th and 27th March 2015, to consider the interplay between copyright history and contemporary copyright policy. Is Donaldson still relevant, and, if so, why? What justificatory goals are served by historical investigation, and what might be learned from the history of the history of copyright? Does the study of copyright history still have any currency within an evidence-based policy context that is increasingly preoccupied with economic impact analysis?

This paper provides a lasting record of these discussions, including an editorial introduction, written comments by each of the panelists and Prof. Gomez-Arostegui and an edited transcript of the Symposium debate.

Institutional Persistence and Change in England's Common Law: 1700-1865

Institutions are widely regarded as important, even ultimate drivers of economic growth and performance. A recent mainstream of institutional economics has concentrated on the effect of persisting, often imprecisely measured institutions and on cataclysmic events as agents of noteworthy institutional change. As a consequence, institutional change without large-scale shocks has received little attention. In this dissertation I apply a complementary, quantitative-descriptive approach that relies on measures of actually enforced institutions to study institutional persistence and change over a long time period that is undisturbed by the typically studied cataclysmic events. By placing institutional change into the center of attention one can recognize different speeds of institutional innovation and the continuous coexistence of institutional persistence and change. Specifically, I combine text mining procedures, network analysis techniques and statistical approaches to study persistence and change in England’s common law over the Industrial Revolution (1700-1865). Based on the doctrine of precedent - a peculiarity of common law systems - I construct and analyze the apparently first citation network that reflects lawmaking in England. Most strikingly, I find large-scale change in the making of English common law around the turn of the 19th century - a period free from the typically studied cataclysmic events. Within a few decades a legal innovation process with low depreciation rates (1 to 2 percent) and strong past-persistence transitioned to a present-focused innovation process with significantly higher depreciation rates (4 to 6 percent) and weak past-persistence. Comparison with U.S. Supreme Court data reveals a similar U.S. transition towards the end of the 19th century. The English and U.S. transitions appear to have unfolded in a very specific manner: a new body of law arose during the transitions and developed in a self-referential manner while the existing body of law lost influence, but remained prominent. Additional findings suggest that Parliament doubled its influence on the making of case law within the first decades after the Glorious Revolution and that England’s legal rules manifested a high degree of long-term persistence. The latter allows for the possibility that the often-noted persistence of institutional outcomes derives from the actual persistence of institutions.

Responsabilidad civil de la persona mayor incapaz y de sus guardadores por los daños causados a terceros: especial referencia a la responsabilidad del incapaz en el sistema del Common Law

Un número considerable de personas mayores padece alguna enfermedad neurodegenerativa que limita sus facultades intelectivas y volitivas, lo que en la práctica suele traducirse en alteraciones de la personalidad con conservación de consciencia, pérdidas de memoria, desorientación, inquietud, confusión o agresividad. Este deterioro progresivo de capacidad que puede afectar a nuestros mayores no sólo los convierte en fácil objetivo de agresiones sino también en potenciales creadores de riesgos y daños a terceros. Es precisamente la responsabilidad que puede derivarse de tales daños la que será analizada en primer lugar en esta sede, exponiendo el estado de la cuestión tanto en el civil como en el common law. Por otro lado, cuando una persona que tiene sus funciones cognitivas mermadas causa un daño a otro, no sólo se debe analizar la responsabilidad civil del propio agente del daño frente al perjudicado, sino también aquélla en que podría incurrir la persona encargada de su cuidado en caso de haberla. Dicha cuestión ocupará la segunda parte del presente trabajo.

The roots of punitive damages at common law: a longer history

This Article aims to revisit the historical development of the doctrine ofexemplary or punitive damages. Punitive damages are anomalous in that they lie in both tort and crime, a matter that has led to much criticism by modern commentators. Yet, a definitive history of punitive damages does not exist to explain this anomaly. The main contribution of this Article, then, is to begin such a history by way of a meta-narrative. It identifies and links the historically significant moments that led to punitive damages, beginning with the background period of classical Roman law, its renewed reception in Western Europe in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that coincided with the emergence of the English common law,the English statutes of the late thirteenth century, to the court cases of Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money in the eighteenth century that heralded the "first explicit articulation" of the legal principle of punitive damages. This Article argues that this history is not linear in nature but historically contingent. This is a corrective to present scholarship, which fails to adequately connect or contextualize these historical moments, or over-simplifies this development over time.

'The witness who saw, /He left little doubt' : a comparative consideration of expert testimony in mental disability law cases in common and civil law systems

The question of how courts assess expert evidence - especially when mental disability is an issue - raises the corollary question of whether courts adequately evaluate the content of the expert testimony or whether judicial decision making may be influenced by teleology (cherry picking evidence), pretextuality (accepting experts who distort evidence to achieve socially desirable aims), and/or sanism (allowing prejudicial and stereotyped evidence). Such threats occur despite professional standards in forensic psychology and other mental health disciplines that require ethical expert testimony. The result is expert testimony that, in many instances, is at best incompetent and at worst biased. The paper details threats to competent expert testimony in a comparative law context - in both the common law (involuntary civil commitment laws and risk assessment criminal laws) and, more briefly, civil law. We conclude that teleology, pretextuality, and sanism have an impact upon judicial decision making in both the common law and civil law. Finally, we speculate as to whether the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is likely to have any impact on practices in this area. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Charity law reforms : overview of progress since 2001

In the UK, Singapore, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, as in many other jurisdictions, charity law is rooted in the common law and anchored on the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601. The Pemsel classification of charitable purposes was uniformly accepted, and together with a shared and growing pool of judicial precedents, aided by the ‘spirit and intendment’ rule, has subsequently allowed the law to develop along much the same lines. In recent years, all the above jurisdictions have embarked on law reform processes designed to strengthen regulatory processes and to statutorily define and encode common law concepts. The reform outcomes are now to be found in a batch of national charity statutes which reflect interesting differences in the extent to which their respective governments have been prepared to balance the modernising of charitable purposes and other common law concepts alongside the customary concern to tighten the regulatory framework.

Modernising charity law : recent developments and future directions

In recent years the pressure for charity law reform has swept across the common law jurisdictions with differing results. Modernising Charity Law examines how the UK jurisdictions have enacted significant statutory reforms after many years of debate, whilst the federations of Canada and Australia seem merely to have intentions of reform. New Zealand and Singapore have begun their own reform journeys. This highly insightful book brings together perspectives from academics, regulators and practitioners from across the common law jurisdictions. The expert contributors consider the array of reforms to charity law and assess their relative successes. Particular attention is given to the controversial issues of expanded heads of charity, public benefit, religion, competition with business, government participation and regulation. The book concludes by challenging the very notion of charity as a foundation for societies which, faced by an array of global threats and the rising tide of human rights, must now also embrace the expanding notions of social capital, social entrepreneurism and civil society. This original and highly topical work will be a valuable resource for academics, regulators and legal practitioners as well as advanced and postgraduate students in law and public policy. Specialists in charity law, comparative law, and law and public policy should also not be without this important book.

Defences in medical negligence : to what extent has tort law reform in Australia limited the liability of health professionals?

Tort law reform has resulted in legislation being passed by all Australian jurisdictions in the past decade implementing the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report. The report was in response to a perceived crisis in medical indemnity insurance. The objective was to restrict and limit liability in negligence actions. This paper will consider to what extent the reforms have impacted on the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions. The reversal of the onus of proof through the obvious risk sections has attempted to extend the scope of the defence of voluntary assumption of risk. There is no liability for the materialisation of an inherent risk. Presumptions and mandatory reductions for contributory negligence have attempted to reduce the liability of defendants. It is now possible for reductions of 100% for contributory negligence. Apologies can be made with no admission of legal liability to encourage them being made and thereby reduce the number of actions being commenced. The peer acceptance defence has been introduced and enacted by legislation. There is protection for good samaritans even though the Ipp Report recommended against such protection. Limitation periods have been amended. Provisions relating to mental harm have been introduced re-instating the requirement of normal fortitude and direct perception. After an analysis of the legislation, it will be argued in this paper that while there has been some limitation and restriction, courts have generally interpreted the civil liability reforms in compliance with the common law. It has been the impact of statutory limits on the assessment of damages which has limited the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions.

Insurance and the law of negligence : an influential or irrelevant persuader?

This article examines, from both within and outside the context of compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance, the different academic and judicial perspectives regarding the relevance of insurance to the imposition of negligence liability via the formulation of legal principle. In particular, the utility of insurance in setting the standard of care held owing by a learner driver to an instructor in Imbree v McNeilly is analysed and the implications of this High Court decision, in light of current jurisprudential argument and for other principles of negligence liability, namely claimant vulnerability, are considered. It concludes that ultimately one’s stance as to the relevance, or otherwise, of insurance to the development of the common law of negligence will be predominately influenced by normative views of torts’ function as an instrument of corrective or distributive justice.

Palliative care, double effect and the law in Australia

Care and decision-making at the end of life that promotes comfort and dignity is widely endorsed by public policy and the law. In ethical analysis of palliative care interventions that are argued potentially to hasten death, these may be deemed to be ethically permissible by the application of the doctrine of double effect, if the doctor’s intention is to relieve pain and not cause death. In part because of the significance of ethics in the development of law in the medical sphere, this doctrine is also likely to be recognized as part of Australia’s common law, although hitherto there have been no cases concerning palliative care brought before a court in Australia to test this. Three Australian States have, nonetheless, created legislative defences that are different from the common law with the intent of clarifying the law, promoting palliative care, and distinguishing it from euthanasia. However, these defences have the potential to provide less protection for doctors administering palliative care. In addition to requiring a doctor to have an appropriate intent, the defences insist on adherence to particular medical practice standards and perhaps require patient consent. Doctors providing end-of-life care in these States need to be aware of these legislative changes. Acting in accordance with the common law doctrine of double effect may not provide legal protection. Similar changes are likely to occur in other States and Territories as there is a trend towards enacting legislative defences that deal with the provision of palliative care.