Determinantes da estrutura de capital no Brasil para empresas de capital aberto e fechado

Tomando como base o referencial teórico existente, o presente trabalho estuda os fatores determinantes da estrutura de capital das empresas brasileiras abertas e fechadas, com base em uma amostra de 6.396 empresas dos anos de 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 e 2004, em um total de 31.980 observações. Utilizando o procedimento econométrico de análise de dados em painel, foram realizados testes com base nos modelos de pooled OLS sem dummies de tempo, pooled OLS com dummies de tempo, efeitos fixos, efeitos aleatórios e primeiras diferenças. Para cada um destes modelos, foram feitas regressões para o endividamento de curto prazo(Y1), de longo prazo(Y2) e total(Y3). Os fatores tangibilidade, rentabilidade, liquidez, tamanho da empresa, taxa de crescimento do ativo, giro do ativo, taxa de imposto paga pela empresa, natureza do capital (aberto/fechado), segmento de atuação (classificação industrial) e o fato de uma empresa pertencer a grupo econômico apresentaram evidências de serem fatores que influenciam na estrutura de capital das empresas. Os fatores non debt tax shields (benefícios fiscais não provenientes do endividamento), idade da empresa e região geográfica de localização da empresa não se mostraram conclusivos. E, por último, os fatores singularidade e origem do capital (nacional privado, nacional estatal e estrangeiro) pareceram não exercer influência sobre o grau de endividamento das empresas.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Capital flows and monetary control under a domestic currency substitution regime: the recent Brazilian experience

The 90s have witnessed a resumption in capital flows to Latin America. due to the conjugation of low interest rates in the US and economic reforms in most LA countries. In Brazil. however. substantial capital flows have becn induced by the extremely high domestic interest rates practiced by the Central Bank as a measure of last reson given the absence of successful stabilization policies. These very high interest rates were needed to prevent capital flight in a context of a surprisingly stable inflation rate above 20% a month. and keep interest bearing govemment securities preferable to foreign assets as money substitutes. We carefully describe how this domestic currency substitution regime (interest bearing govemment securities are substituted for MIas cash holdings) requires the Central Bank to renounce aoy control over monerary aggregates. In this domestic currency substitution regime. hyperinflation is the most likely outcome of an isolated (i.e.. without fiscal adjusanents) attempt by the Brazilian Central Bank to control money.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

Tax reform under fiscal stress: a CGE analysis of the Brazilian tax reform

In spite of a general agreement over the distortion imposed by the current Brazilian tax system, attempts to reform it during the last decade have faced several restrictions to its implementation. Two of these restrictions were particular binding: a) fiscal adjustment restriction (public sector debt cannot increase), b) fiscal federalist restriction (revenues from individual states and municipalities cannot decrease). This paper focuses on a specific reform that overcomes in principle the fiscal federalist restriction. Using Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) model calibrated for the Brazilian economy, I analyze the short and long run macroeconomic effects of this reform subject to the fiscal adjustment restriction. Finally, I look at the redistributive effects of this reform among generations as a way to infer about public opinion’s reaction to the reform. The reform consists basically of replacing indirect taxes on corporate revenues, which I show to be equivalent to a symmetric tax on labor and capital income, by a new federal VAT. The reform presented positive macroeconomic effects both in the short and long run. Despite a substantial increase in the average VAT rate in the first years after the reform, a majority of cohorts experienced an increase in their lifetime welfare, being potentially in favour of the reform.

A influência da alavancagem financeira na construção do custo de capital próprio: um estudo voltado para o mercado brasileiro

No contexto do Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), este trabalho investiga a significância da alavancagem financeira na construção do risco sistemático. Testamos com dados brasileiros o procedimento de desalavancagem e realavancagem do beta comumente realizado por analistas financeiros para a construção do custo de capital próprio de empresas não negociadas em bolsa de valores. Os resultados apontam que a inclusão do tax shield na fórmula de desalavancagem/realavancagem e a utilização de valores de mercado produzem resultados mais robustos, ao passo que as divisões por setores possuem pouca capacidade como segmentadores de classe de risco sistemático.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

From capital surges to drought: seeking stability for emerging economies

Includes bibliography

The income distribution problem in Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes bibliography

Tax performance and reform in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

Includes bibliography

Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives

Includes bibliography

Education and the labour market in Latin America: why measurement is important and what it tells us about policies, reforms and performance

Includes bibliography